Dimitar Petlechkov v. Michael J. Stengel, dba Stengel Law Firm, P.C.

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 245483n.06
No. 24-5483
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
DIMITAR PETLECHKOV,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MICHAEL J. STENGEL, dba Stengel Law Firm,
P.C.,
Defendant-Appellee.
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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF
TENNESSEE
O R D E R
Before: GIBBONS, BUSH, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Dimitar Petlechkov, a Bulgarian citizen proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s
dismissal of his legal malpractice action against his former criminal defense attorney. This case
has been referred to a panel of the court that, upon examination, unanimously agrees that oral
argument is not needed. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a). As set forth below, we affirm in part, vacate
in part, and remand for further proceedings.
Petlechkov filed this legal malpractice action against Michael J. Stengel, the attorney who
represented him in his federal criminal case. In 2018, a jury convicted Petlechkov of mail fraud
for a scheme to obtain shipping discounts from Federal Express Corporation (“FedEx”). He was
sentenced to 37 months’ imprisonment, referred for deportation, and ordered to pay over $800,000
in restitution to FedEx. See United States v. Petlechkov, 922 F.3d 762 (6th Cir. 2019) (affirming
in part, reversing in part, and remanding for resentencing); United States v. Petlechkov, Nos. 21-
5174/5199, 2022 WL 168651 (6th Cir. Jan. 19, 2022) (affirming following resentencing).

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Stengel filed an answer to the malpractice complaint and moved to stay the case pending
the resolution of Petlechkov’s resentencing and his motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his
sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Stengel pointed out that, under Tennessee law, a plaintiff must
obtain post-conviction relief to maintain a malpractice claim against a criminal defense attorney.
See Gibson v. Trant, 58 S.W.3d 103, 107 (Tenn. 2001). The district court granted Stengel’s motion
and held the malpractice case in abeyance.
The district court ultimately stayed the malpractice case until July 2023, when it conducted
a status conference and entered a scheduling order. Stengel then moved to dismiss Petlechkov’s
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) on the basis that Petlechkov had failed to obtain post-conviction relief from his
underlying criminal conviction. In response, Petlechkov asserted that he had filed a petition for a
writ of coram nobis under 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), which was still pending in his criminal case.
Petlechkov also filed a motion for leave to amend his complaint. Stengel moved to reinstate the
stay of the malpractice case and to hold a decision on the pending motions in abeyance pending
the resolution of Petlechkov’s coram nobis petition.
While these motions were pending, Judge Norris, the judge to whom the malpractice case
was originally assigned, recused himself “[d]ue to a recently discovered conflict of interest.” The
case was reassigned to another judge. Petlechkov moved for partial reassignment of the case,
asserting that Judge Norris recused himself after FedEx made a limited appearance to quash a
subpoena served on it by Petlechkov and that the case should return to Judge Norris following a
ruling on FedEx’s motion to quash. The district court denied Petlechkov’s motion for partial
reassignment. The district court subsequently granted Stengel’s motion to reinstate the stay of the
malpractice case pending the resolution of Petlechkov’s coram nobis petition.
After Petlechkov’s coram nobis petition was denied, he filed a status report and a motion
to vacate the stay of the malpractice case, asserting that termination of the stay was self-executing
upon the resolution of the coram nobis proceeding. The district court then granted Stengel’s
motion to dismiss and denied Petlechkov’s motion for leave to amend his complaint as futile. The

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district court also ordered Petlechkov to show cause why it should not impose a pre-filing
restriction on him. Petlechkov appealed the district court’s order (No. 24-5483) and moved to
withdraw the show-cause order. The district court denied Petlechkov’s motion to withdraw the
show-cause order, imposed the pre-filing restriction, and entered a judgment dismissing the
malpractice case with prejudice. Petlechkov moved to alter or amend the order imposing the
pre-filing restriction; the district court denied his motion. Petlechkov appealed the pre-filing
restriction; that appeal is still pending before this court (No. 25-5339).
After Petlechkov filed these appeals in his malpractice case, he appealed the district court’s
order denying his coram nobis petition. We accepted his appeal as timely filed. United States v.
Petlechkov, No. 24-6080 (6th Cir. Feb. 12, 2025). That appeal is still pending.
In this appeal, Petlechkov challenges the district court’s orders denying partial
reassignment of the malpractice case, reinstating the stay, denying him leave to amend his
complaint, and dismissing the case. Petlechkov moves this court to reconsider its order denying
his motion for electronic filing privileges, to expedite oral argument and allow him to appear
virtually, and to expedite a decision in this appeal.
Partial Reassignment: Petlechkov argues that the district court abused its discretion in
denying his motion for partial reassignment of the malpractice case. See Decker v. GE Healthcare
Inc., 770 F.3d 378, 388 (6th Cir. 2014) (reviewing partial recusal decision for abuse of discretion).
Positing that Judge Norris recused himself because of FedEx’s appearance, Petlechkov argues that
the newly assigned judge should have ruled on FedEx’s motion to quash and then returned the case
to Judge Norris.
A federal judge must “disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might
reasonably be questioned” or in certain other listed circumstances. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), (b)(1). We
have recognized that partial recusal is allowed under 28 U.S.C. § 455, see Decker, 770 F.3d
at 389-90, but we have never held that partial recusal or reassignment is required. Petlechkov did
not make any allegations calling into question the impartiality of the newly assigned judge, Judge
Fowlkes. Nor did Petlechkov claim that he was prejudiced by the reassignment of his case to

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Judge Fowlkes. See United States v. Ashrafkhan, 821 F. App’x 428, 438 (6th Cir. 2020); Sinito v.
United States, 750 F.2d 512, 516 (6th Cir. 1984). Petlechkov merely asserted that Judge Norris
had presided over the case for three and a half years. But the case had been stayed for most of that
time—from July 2020 until July 2023. Petlechkov has failed to show that the district court abused
its discretion in denying his motion for partial reassignment.
Reinstatement of the Stay: Petlechkov argues that the district court erred in granting
Stengel’s motion to reinstate the stay of the malpractice case pending the resolution of the coram
nobis petition and in imposing a stay of immoderate scope and indefinite duration. We review the
district court’s stay order for abuse of discretion. See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706 (1997)
(recognizing the “broad discretion” of district courts to stay proceedings).
“[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to
control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for
counsel, and for litigants.” Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). The party seeking “a
stay must make out a clear case of hardship or inequity in being required to go forward, if there is
even a fair possibility that the stay for which he prays will work damage to some one else.” Id.
at 255. “Thus the burden is on the party seeking the stay to show that there is pressing need for
delay, and that neither the other party nor the public will suffer harm from entry of the order.”
Ohio Env’t Council v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 565 F.2d 393, 396 (6th Cir. 1977). Petlechkov argues that
Stengel did not satisfy this burden because he cited state law and addressed only judicial economy.
But the district court applied federal law and considered the relevant factors, including judicial
economy, in its own analysis.
Stengel sought reinstatement of the stay pending the resolution of the coram nobis petition,
pointing out that Petlechkov must obtain post-conviction relief to maintain his malpractice claim.
See Gibson, 58 S.W.3d at 107. In opposition to Stengel’s motion to reinstate the stay, Petlechkov
argued that he had an interest in proceeding expeditiously and would be prejudiced by a delay in
obtaining discovery from FedEx. The district court questioned Petlechkov’s claimed interest in
proceeding expeditiously given that he had “brought numerous actions of questionable merit that

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have succeeded only in delaying the resolution of his prior actions” and had “repeatedly filed
motions across his several cases that appear to have no other purpose but to harass the parties.”
As for Petlechkov’s claimed interest in obtaining discovery from FedEx, the district court queried
why this particular case was required to move forward to allow him to acquire information from
FedEx and why he had not sought this information in his other cases, including the underlying
criminal and post-conviction proceedings as well as his actions against FedEx directly. The district
court pointed out that, depending on the resolution of Petlechkov’s coram nobis petition, Stengel
and the non-parties would save on unnecessary litigation costs. According to the district court, the
public interest did not favor either party. The district court acted within its discretion in weighing
these factors and reinstating the stay.
Petlechkov also argues that the district court imposed a stay of immoderate scope and
indefinite duration. A “stay is immoderate and hence unlawful unless so framed in its inception
that its force will be spent within reasonable limits, so far at least as they are susceptible of
prevision and description.” Landis, 299 U.S. at 257. The district court reasonably stayed all
proceedings pending the resolution of Petlechkov’s coram nobis petition given that the outcome
of his post-conviction proceeding potentially foreclosed his malpractice case. The district court
ordered Stengel to file a status report every 90 days, reasonably requiring regular updates on the
post-conviction proceeding and the need to continue the stay. Petlechkov has failed to show that
the district court’s stay was immoderate in scope or duration.
Dismissal: Petlechkov challenges the district court’s dismissal of his malpractice case for
failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). According to Petlechkov, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss was not the appropriate procedural vehicle for seeking dismissal because Stengel had
already filed an answer. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss filed after
the defendant has answered the complaint “may be properly considered as one for judgment on
the pleadings under” Rule 12(c). Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 436
n.1 (6th Cir. 1988). “We review de novo a judgment on the pleadings granted pursuant to
Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, using the same standard that applies to a review

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of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” Moore v. Hiram Township, 988 F.3d 353, 357 (6th
Cir. 2021). “For purposes of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, all well-pleaded material
allegations of the pleadings of the opposing party must be taken as true, and the motion may be
granted only if the moving party is nevertheless clearly entitled to judgment.” Moderwell v.
Cuyahoga County, 997 F.3d 653, 659 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting Jackson v. Pro. Radiology Inc., 864
F.3d 463, 466 (6th Cir. 2017)).
In Gibson, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that “a plaintiff cannot prevail in a ‘criminal
malpractice’ case against his defense lawyer unless he proves that he has obtained post-conviction
relief.” 58 S.W.3d at 117. The district court dismissed Petlechkov’s malpractice case and denied
him leave to amend his complaint as futile because he had not obtained post-conviction relief.
But the district court’s dismissal was premature. Tennessee courts have interpreted the
Gibson decision as requiring the malpractice court to “await the outcome of the post-conviction
proceeding before deciding whether the malpractice action should go forward or be dismissed.”
Burnett v. South, No. M2004-03017-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 4497729, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Apr. 26, 2006); see Montague v. Kellum, No. E2002-01733-COA-R3-CV, 2002 WL 31640568,
at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2002). Petlechkov’s coram nobis petition was pending when
Stengel filed his motion to dismiss. Although the petition had been denied when the district court
granted Stengel’s motion to dismiss, the time for appealing that denial had not yet expired. And
Petlechkov’s appeal from the denial of his coram nobis petition remains pending. Petlechkov’s
pending post-conviction proceeding therefore precludes dismissal of his malpractice case. See
Blackwood v. Martin, No. W2000-01573-COA-R3-CV, 2002 WL 1751238, at *3 n.3 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Jan. 16, 2002).
Remand: Petlechkov argues that, on remand, the district court should grant him leave to
amend his complaint and refrain from imposing a stay because he “is unequivocally entitled to
conduct discovery and file summary judgment motions.” Based on our reading of Tennessee law,
however, we believe that Petlechkov’s malpractice case should be held in abeyance pending the
resolution of his post-conviction proceeding. See Montague, 2002 WL 31640568, at *6; see also

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Meyer v. Pellegrin, No. 3:19-0413, 2019 WL 5777759, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 10, 2019). We see
no reason to subject Stengel and the non-parties to discovery when Petlechkov cannot prevail on
his legal malpractice claim unless and until “he has obtained post-conviction relief.” Gibson, 58
S.W.3d at 117.
For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s orders denying partial reassignment
and reinstating the stay, VACATE its order dismissing Petlechkov’s malpractice case and denying
him leave to amend his complaint, and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this
order. Petlechkov’s pending motions are DENIED.
ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT
Kelly L. Stephens, Clerk

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