Kirstyn Paige Bashaw v. Majestic Care of Whitehall, LLC

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
File Name: 25a0047p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
KIRSTYN PAIGE BASHAW,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MAJESTIC CARE OF WHITEHALL, LLC,
Defendant-Appellee.
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No. 24-3292
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio at Columbus.
No. 2:23-cv-00291—Sarah Daggett Morrison, District Judge.
Argued: December 12, 2024
Decided and Filed: March 5, 2025
Before: KETHLEDGE, THAPAR, and LARSEN, Circuit Judges.
_________________
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Carrie J. Dyer, MANSELL LAW LLC, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant. Joseph J.
Brennan, UB GREENSFELDER LLP, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Carrie J.
Dyer, Greg R. Mansell, Rhiannon M. Herbert, MANSELL LAW LLC, Columbus, Ohio, for
Appellant. Joseph J. Brennan, Emma M. Tomsick, UB GREENSFELDER LLP, Cleveland,
Ohio, for Appellee.
_________________
OPINION
_________________
LARSEN, Circuit Judge. Kirstyn Paige Bashaw was fired by her employer, Majestic
Care of Whitehall. Bashaw then sued Majestic Care under Title VII and Ohio law, claiming
retaliation. The district court granted Majestic Care summary judgment, holding it had provided
three non-pretextual grounds for Bashaw’s termination. For the reasons below, we AFFIRM.
>

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I.
Majestic Care operates a skilled nursing home and residential facility in Ohio. Bashaw
served as the Director of Social Services there from November 2021 until she was terminated in
March 2022. The Director of Social Services is not a medical position. Instead, Bashaw’s job
was to “direct and manage[] the day-to-day operations of the Social Service department,” which
included enhancing the psychosocial experiences of residents and their families. R. 21-1,
PageID 244–46. Bashaw’s role also included attending daily morning and end-of-day director
meetings. The morning meeting was considered the beginning of the work day.
Bashaw worked at Majestic Care for just under four months. During a six-week span,
between mid-January and early March 2022, she was tardy or late for the morning meetings
eleven times and absent from work without prior authorization eight and a half days.1 According
to Edward Beatrice, Majestic Care’s Executive Director and Bashaw’s manager, this affected
Bashaw’s performance, and she fell behind in her work.
During her four months at Majestic Care, Bashaw grew concerned about resident care,
which she began to document. Bashaw had specific concerns about one nurse whom Bashaw
heard twice cursing at patients and who Bashaw believed was giving inadequate medical
treatment to a leg wound suffered by Resident A. Bashaw reported her concerns about Resident
A’s care to Beatrice and the Director of Nursing, Amia Ford. These two allegedly responded by
telling Bashaw not to worry about the nursing department since that was outside her purview.
Soon after, Resident A’s leg was amputated because of a severe infection. Bashaw raised
additional concerns about patient care in mid-to-late February, including complaints about
patients suffering frequent urinary tract infections, nurses’ failure to provide bathing assistance,
lack of staff training to handle behavioral issues, and an overall lack of adequate care.
Bashaw’s concerns went beyond patient care, however. She viewed Beatrice as racially
insensitive. As examples, Bashaw offered that Beatrice referred to staff as “ghetto” and
“bougie.” R. 27-4, PageID 695. He commented that Muslim staff members “don’t celebrate
1Majestic Care marked employees as “late” if they arrived after the 9:00 AM morning meeting starts and
“tardy” if they were more than fifteen minutes late.

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Easter.” Id. at 697. And he noted his surprise that he had liked a book by actor Will Smith.
Bashaw also believed that Beatrice had engaged in sexually harassing conduct when he allegedly
entered Admission Director Jailah Hopson’s office while her door was closed because she was
expressing breast milk for her newborn baby.
On Friday, February 25, 2022, Bashaw received a phone call from a social worker at Mt.
Carmel hospital about readmitting a former patient, Resident B. Resident B had been sent to Mt.
Carmel to receive emergency psychiatric care and Mt. Carmel now sought to discharge him back
to Majestic Care. During the routine call, Bashaw told Mt. Carmel that she believed Resident B
was suffering from hallucinations, tried to explain the nature of his psychosis and his home
situation, and suggested that Majestic Care was not equipped to care for someone with Resident
B’s psychological issues. She claims, however, that at no time did she tell Mt. Carmel that
Majestic Care would not readmit Resident B. Whatever Bashaw might have said, Mt. Carmel
left the call with the impression that Bashaw had refused Resident B’s readmission. After the
phone call, Kathleen Stein from Mt. Carmel called Beatrice and informed him that Bashaw had
refused readmission of Resident B and threatened to report Majestic Care to the Ohio
Department of Health for the illegal practice of patient dumping. Beatrice, who had not been on
the prior call with Bashaw, reassured Stein that Majestic Care would readmit Resident B and
dissuaded Mt. Carmel from contacting the state.
The phone call with Mt. Carmel prompted Beatrice to email the department heads the
next day, a Saturday. He explained that Resident B had been readmitted and that Mt. Carmel had
threatened to report Majestic Care, and he reminded everyone that only he and Ford could refuse
to readmit a patient.
On Tuesday, March 1, the situation deteriorated further. Bashaw met with Majestic
Care’s local Human Resources Representative, Chandler Kuhn, to raise her concerns about
resident care and Beatrice’s behavior. She had mentioned patient care concerns to Kuhn in prior
informal interactions as well, although Bashaw never filed any official reports through Majestic
Care’s reporting system. In her meeting with Kuhn, Bashaw highlighted numerous instances of
inadequate patient care in the facility. And she discussed Beatrice’s “sexual[ly] inappropriate
and/or harassment of a fellow coworker.” R. 27-1, PageID 633. Specifically, Bashaw reported

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that Beatrice “had the tendency to invade [this employee’s] personal space while in her office”
and ignored her closed door despite everyone knowing she was expressing breast milk. Id. at
634; R. 30-3, PageID 886. Bashaw also reported that Beatrice was culturally insensitive and
gave as an example an instance where Beatrice said he would fight a staff member if he ever saw
her in an alley. This staff member was a black woman. Bashaw said that she tried discussing
this behavior with Beatrice, sending him links and resources for cultural competency training but
he ignored them. According to Kuhn’s notes, he asked Bashaw what evidence she had of
Beatrice’s alleged sexually harassing conduct and racial insensitivity and Bashaw claimed to be
gathering “screenshots, emails, recordings, and documentation.” R. 21-7, PageID 257. She
refused Kuhn’s request to see her evidence; but she did reveal that she “would listen in on
private conversations between [Beatrice] and the Business Office Manager” although “the voices
were too muffled” for her to “record . . . on her phone.” Id.
Kuhn’s notes also reveal that Bashaw told him several other things pertinent to this
appeal. According to Kuhn, Bashaw began the conversation by telling him: “I am not coming to
you [from] an HR standpoint, I am coming to you as a friend because I care about you.” R. 21-7,
PageID 257. Bashaw then told Kuhn if he “ha[dn’t] started job searching, that [he] should be,”
and that “she was on her 3rd interview this week.” Id. Bashaw also admitted in her deposition
testimony that she discussed interviewing with other potential employers. R. 27-1, PageID 635.
She also informed Kuhn that she and “3 other managers were leaving work early to meet off-site
and gather all ‘evidence’ available to provide an ultimatum to the Majestic Care home office”
that the company either fire Beatrice or “lose 4 department heads.” R. 21-7, PageID 257. In her
deposition, Bashaw acknowledged telling Kuhn that if Beatrice “was not released, then most, if
not all, of us would be putting in our notices.” R. 27-1, PageID 635. Bashaw invited Kuhn to
join the group.
Rather than join the group, Kuhn immediately reported the information to Beatrice and
the regional Human Resource Director, Simone Wimberly. Wimberly began to investigate
Bashaw’s allegations against Beatrice. Meanwhile, after her meeting with Kuhn, Bashaw left
work early without authorization. Beatrice had planned to deliver a “corrective action” to
Bashaw that afternoon, highlighting her attendance issues. Because Bashaw had already left

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work, however, Beatrice was unable to deliver the corrective action that day. The record is
unclear whether Beatrice formed the intent to cite Bashaw before or after Kuhn informed him of
her allegations.
The next day everything fell apart. During the morning meeting, Bashaw, while
surreptitiously recording on her phone, confronted Beatrice about Resident B’s readmission. She
argued that because Resident B didn’t “have a diagnosis” and was “his own guardian,” Majestic
Care could not keep him in a locked unit. R. 21-12, PageID 266, Transcript at 2. She questioned
whether Majestic Care’s plans were legal and argued that Resident B should go “in patient” or
“go home.” Id. Beatrice informed Bashaw that he and Majestic Care’s Medical Director, Dr.
Miller, had made a clinical decision to support Resident B’s re-admission and temporarily keep
him in the locked unit due to his psychological issues until Miller could evaluate him. When
Bashaw kept pushing back on Beatrice’s decision, he asked her what she would like to do
instead. She answered, “I don’t know, you are the boss, you’re supposed to have these solutions
not me.” Id. at 3. Beatrice responded that the course they had chosen was the only viable
solution at the time, although he didn’t like it either. The conversation heated up and Bashaw
ultimately walked out of the unfinished morning meeting, leaving the facility for the day without
authorization.
After this, Beatrice contacted Majestic Care’s Vice President of Human Resources,
Melany Nieset, about Bashaw’s behavior, the Mt. Carmel incident, and the corrective action.
Nieset immediately launched an investigation, joining Wimberly’s ongoing efforts. Nieset and
Wimberly interviewed Bashaw on the phone about her allegations against Beatrice, the Mt.
Carmel incident, and her performance issues. During the interview, Bashaw discussed what she
described as the “beyond toxic into hostile work environment” at Majestic Care and volunteered
that she had been making secret recordings of meetings. R. 21-13, PageID 267, Transcript at 1.
One week later, Nieset terminated Bashaw’s employment and concluded that her allegations
against Beatrice were unfounded.
Bashaw then sued, claiming that she was fired because she had expressed concern about
resident care and Beatrice’s behavior. She initially alleged only retaliatory termination under
Ohio Revised Code § 3721.24 and a claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy.

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She later added Title VII and Ohio Revised Code § 4112 retaliation claims.2 Majestic Care
removed the case to federal court and the district court granted its motion for summary judgment.
The court reasoned that summary judgment was appropriate because Majestic Care had offered
three non-pretextual reasons for terminating Bashaw, although material fact disputes remained
about a fourth. Bashaw timely appealed.
II.
“We review the district court’s summary judgment decision de novo.” El-Khalil v.
Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 23 F.4th 633, 634 (6th Cir. 2022). When, as here, there is no direct
evidence of discrimination, we analyze retaliation claims under the burden shifting framework
set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). This requires that Bashaw
make a prima facie case that her employer fired her in response to protected activity. Id. at 802.
If she does that, the burden shifts to Majestic Care to set forth legitimate non-retaliatory reasons
for Bashaw’s termination. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507 (1993); Graoch
Assocs. #33, L.P. v. Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Hum. Rels. Comm’n, 508 F.3d 366, 371
(6th Cir. 2007). Having done so, the burden returns to Bashaw to show that these proffered
reasons were pretextual. Graoch, 508 F.3d at 371. Throughout each phase, the burden of
persuasion remains with Bashaw. Id.
The district court assumed that Bashaw had established a prima facie case and resolved
the case on the ground that Majestic Care had offered non-pretextual reasons for terminating her
employment. Bashaw v. Majestic Care, 2024 WL 1256054, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 25, 2024).
We follow the same course. See Williams v. AT&T Mobility Servs., 847 F.3d 384, 396 (6th Cir.
2017).
Bashaw “can show pretext in three interrelated ways: (1) [showing] that the proffered
reasons had no basis in fact, (2) [showing] that the proffered reasons did not actually motivate
the employer’s action, or (3) [showing] that [the proffered reason was] insufficient to motivate
2Both parties agree that Bashaw’s claims under O.R.C. §§ 3721.24 and 4112 are substantially similar to
those raised under Title VII and thus rise or fall together. See Jones v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc., 504 F. App’x 473,
476 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that the same analysis applies for a plaintiff’s Title VII and Ohio law retaliation
claims); Arnold v. City of Columbus, 515 F. App’x 524, 529 (6th Cir. 2013) (same).

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the employer’s action.” Jackson v. Genesee Cnty. Rd. Comm’n, 999 F.3d 333, 350–51 (6th Cir.
2021) (citation omitted). At summary judgment, she must produce evidence that would allow a
jury to reject her employer’s stated reasons and infer that the real reason was retaliation. See
Johnson v. Kroger Co., 319 F.3d 858, 866 (6th Cir. 2003).
Even if courts find some reasons pretextual, if “at least one other is not, the defendant
employer is still entitled to summary judgment.” Jones, 504 F. App’x at 477–78. This has long
been the law in this circuit. See Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799, 806 (6th Cir. 1998)
(“[A]n employee must demonstrate that the employer’s reasons (each of them, if the reasons
independently caused the employer to take the action it did) are not true.” (cleaned up)); Sims v.
Cleland, 813 F.2d 790, 793 (6th Cir. 1987) (“Where two or more alternative and independent
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons are articulated by the defendant employer, the falsity or
incorrectness of one may not impeach the credibility of the remaining articulated reason(s).”);
Burks v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 258 F. App’x. 867, 876 (6th Cir. 2008); Rufo v. Dave & Busters,
Inc., 2007 WL 247891, at *3–4 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2007). In other words, if the employer proffers
a single independent nondiscriminatory reason for its conduct, that can defeat a retaliation claim.
III.
Majestic Care offered four reasons in support of its decision to terminate Bashaw, all of
which she now challenges on appeal: (1) “Bashaw had surreptitiously recorded work
conversations and meetings”; (2) “Bashaw was often tardy or missed work”; (3) “Bashaw told
Ms. Nieset that she did not want to return to work”; and (4) “Bashaw violated company policies
regarding the safe discharge of a resident.” Bashaw, 2024 WL 1256054, at *5. We address each
in turn.
A.
Bashaw argues that her surreptitious recording of work meetings did not actually
motivate Nieset to fire her. We disagree.
To begin, Bashaw argues that Majestic Care’s reason must be pretextual because it had
no official policy against surreptitious recording of meetings. It is true that Majestic Care had no

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official policy prohibiting recording. Nor is it illegal in Ohio to secretly record conversations to
which one is a party. See O.R.C. § 2933.52(4). But the lack of an official policy or law
prohibiting the behavior does not itself demonstrate pretext on Majestic Care’s part. See 6 W.
Ltd. Corp. v. NLRB, 237 F.3d 767, 778 (7th Cir. 2001) (“No company needs to have a set
procedure for what action it will take when adjudicating every single employee problem.”);
Gilbert v. Des Moines Area Cmty. Coll., 495 F.3d 906, 919 (8th Cir. 2007) (“lack of an explicit
policy regarding plagiarism by faculty members does not demonstrate [employer’s] decision to
investigate and discipline [plaintiff] for his actions was pretextual”); Hoppens v. Gen. Nutrition
Ctr., 129 F.3d 608, at *3 n.1 (5th Cir. 1997) (rejecting argument that employer could not point to
a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason . . . because it lacks a written policy clearly dealing with
her case”); Martinez v. Barnhart, 177 F. App’x 796, 801 (10th Cir. 2006) (affirming district
court’s holding that “the absence of a policy did not create an inference of pretext”). Nieset
testified that Bashaw’s surreptitious recordings undermined Majestic Care’s trust in her. And an
employer may terminate an employee whose actions undermine the employer’s trust. 6 W. Ltd.
Corp., 237 F.3d at 778 (“It is also obvious that, at a bare minimum, companies must be able to
trust their employees . . . [and] must be able to discharge . . . an untruthful employee.”).
The record shows that Nieset had significant concerns about Bashaw’s surreptitious
recording. As soon as she learned of it. Nieset told Bashaw that this was a “huge concern,” that
she would have to tell the other team members, that this would undermine trust in the workplace,
and she sought to terminate the conversation to speak with legal counsel. R. 21-13, PageID, 267
Transcript at 8–10. On the day that Nieset terminated Bashaw, she told upper management that
the reason was “Paige’s admission of using a voice recorder with no one’s knowledge in
morning meetings.” R. 21-11, PageID 265. And she testified that these recordings “create[]
mistrust” and issues with “open communication between individuals once they become aware
that there are recordings.” R. 27-6, PageID 807. Bashaw points us to no contradictory evidence,
suggesting that these reasons were pretextual.
Bashaw’s surreptitious recording not only undermined Majestic Care’s trust in her, but
Majestic Care reasonably believed they increased its risk of legal liability. An employer may
terminate an employee for creating legal risk for the company. See, e.g., Williams v. Hous. Auth.

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of Savannah, Inc., 834 F. App’x 482, 489 (11th Cir. 2020) (holding that terminating an employee
for losing keys that “could put residents in danger and [the employer] at risk of liability” was not
pretextual); Turner v. Marathon Petroleum Co., LP, 804 F. App’x 375, 378 (6th Cir. 2020)
(holding that terminating an employee for closing the wrong safety valve that created significant
safety risks was not pretextual). During the morning meetings, Majestic Care’s team repeatedly
discussed sensitive health information, likely protected under the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act (HIPAA). In fact, each of the three recorded conversations reference the
names and medical care of one or more patients.3 Exposure of protected information without a
patient’s consent could open Majestic Care up to a wide range of civil penalties. See 45
C.F.R. § 160.404. And Nieset testified that Bashaw’s recordings “create[d] risk and exposure for
the organization in regards to confidential information” and “patient information that might be
breached.” R. 27-6, PageID 807.
Bashaw responds that her recordings are no different than her taking home written notes
of the meeting to review. Even assuming that’s true, it does not demonstrate that Nieset’s
proffered reasons were pretextual or that they were not the actual reason for her termination.
In sum, Bashaw has provided no evidence to rebut Nieset’s testimony that she fired
Bashaw because she reasonably believed Bashaw had undermined trust in the workplace and put
the company at risk. See Niswander v. Cincinnati Ins., 529 F.3d 714, 728 (6th Cir. 2008).
B.
Bashaw next contends that her work attendance and tardiness was a pretextual reason for
firing her because similarly situated employees were not also terminated. We once again
disagree.
3The U.S. Health and Human Services’ HIPAA privacy rule protects all “individually identifiable health
information . . . in any form or media, whether electronic, paper, or oral.” This protected data includes information
“that relates to” (1) “the individual’s past, present or future physical or mental health or condition”; (2) “the
provision of health care to the individual”; and (3) “the past, present, or future payment for the provision of health
care to the individual.” Identifying information includes a person’s “name, address, birthdate, [and] Social Security
Number.” See “Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule,” https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/laws-
regulations/index.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2025).

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Unauthorized absences from work are a valid reason for termination. See Sukari v.
Akebono Brake Corp., 814 F. App’x 108, 113 (6th Cir. 2020). As is excessive tardiness. See
Keogh v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 752 F. App’x 316, 323 (6th Cir. 2018) (holding under
the Family and Medical Leave Act that the plaintiff’s firing was not pretextual in part because he
was consistently late for work); Velazquez v. Yoh Servs., LLC, 2019 WL 1448716, at *13
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2019) (holding under Title VII that “habitual tardiness” was “a perfectly
valid reason to fire [the plaintiff]”). So to show that this reason was pretextual, Bashaw had to
point to similarly-situated employees, known as comparators, who were not fired even though
they engaged in the same or similar conduct. Tennial v. U.S. Postal Serv., 840 F.3d 292, 303–04
(6th Cir. 2016). Bashaw and her proposed comparators must be “similar in all relevant respects,”
including having “engaged in acts of comparable seriousness.” Bobo v. United Parcel Serv., 665
F.3d 741, 751 (6th Cir. 2012), abrogated on other grounds by Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v.
Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013). The law does not demand “an exact correlation” between the
plaintiff and the comparator, see id. at 752, but the comparator must have “engaged in
substantially identical conduct.” Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chems., 29 F.3d 1078, 1084 (6th
Cir. 1994).
Majestic Care’s proffered reason for firing Bashaw was that she had been repeatedly late,
tardy, and absent without authorization. Beatrice’s proposed “corrective action” noted that
Bashaw had been absent seven and a half days (five days counted as a single occurrence) and
tardy or late eleven times, over the past six weeks. Bashaw then left work early without
authorization two more times, on both March 1 and 2. So, all told, Bashaw was absent roughly
eight and a half days and tardy eleven times over this six-week span.
Bashaw identified only one comparator, Jailah Hopson. Hopson testified she was “often
late to the morning meeting” but “was never disciplined or given corrective action for [her]
tardiness” and that “[i]t was very common for at least one team member to be late to the morning
meeting each day.” R. 30-3, PageID 885–86. She added that, during her six or seven months of
employment, “there were 4–5 times” she had to miss work and “was unable to give prior
advanced notice.” Id. at 886. Hopson’s declaration does not detail how many times she was late
or tardy to the morning meeting, however, or whether any of her absences were excused after the

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fact. Bashaw thus “did not produce sufficient information about [Hopson’s] alleged
absenteeism . . . to indicate whether the absenteeism . . . [was] of ‘comparable seriousness’ to the
conduct” Bashaw engaged in. Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 1992).
Bashaw also contends that her firing was pretextual because Beatrice’s planned
corrective action would have been her first warning about attendance and timeliness issues, and
it stated only that “[a]dditional occurrences could result in second corrective actions.” R. 21-3,
PageID 249. According to Bashaw, this shows pretext because “[a]s of March 1, 2022, Mr.
Beatrice did not think that Bashaw’s attendance issues warranted termination.” Appellant Br. at
37. Even if that’s true, that doesn’t demonstrate that Nieset’s decision to terminate Bashaw
based on her attendance was pretextual. Beatrice’s role was merely to recommend whether to
fire Bashaw. Nieset made the ultimate termination decision. Bashaw does not explain how
Beatrice’s purported belief that her attendance issues warranted a second chance demonstrates
that Nieset’s decision to fire her for attendance issues was pretextual.
In sum, Bashaw failed to provide enough information to determine whether Hopson was
an adequate comparator or other evidence to show this reason was pretext for retaliation.
C.
Bashaw also argues that Majestic Care’s belief that she did not want to return to work
was pretextual because it was not based in fact. We again disagree.
When a plaintiff seeks to establish pretext by arguing that a stated reason was not based
in fact, she must show that the facts necessary for the employer’s legitimate, non-retaliatory
reason were false or never happened. Macy v. Hopkins Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 484 F.3d 357,
366 (6th Cir. 2007), abrogated in part on other grounds, Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp.,
681 F.3d 312 (6th Cir. 2012) (en banc). An employer can defeat a pretext argument if it can
show that it “honestly believed” its proffered reason. Clay v. U.S. Parcel Serv., 501 F.3d 695,
713–14 (6th Cir. 2007). An honest belief is one formed in “reasonable reliance on the
particularized facts that were before it at the time the decision was made.’” Wright v. Murray
Guard, Inc., 455 F.3d 702, 708 (6th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). But “we do

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not require that the decisional process used by the employer be optimal or that it left no stone
unturned.” Id.
Nieset reasonably formed an honest belief that Bashaw no longer wished to work at
Majestic Care. Before interviewing Bashaw, Nieset learned that Bashaw had told Kuhn she was
interviewing for other positions. And after speaking with Bashaw, Nieset testified that Bashaw
“conveyed . . . she didn’t feel comfortable working in the building” and that “[s]he didn’t want to
return to the building.” R. 27-6, PageID 795, 805. The district court considered these statements
and determined that Nieset reasonably formed an honest belief that Bashaw did not wish to
return to work. Bashaw, 2024 WL 1256054, at *7.
Additional facts in the record also show that Nieset’s belief was honest and reasonable.
Both Nieset and Wimberly knew, when they spoke to Bashaw, that she had told Kuhn that she
had been interviewing for other jobs and planned to resign on March 2 if Beatrice was not
terminated. And Bashaw made mixed statements during the conversation that could support
Nieset’s belief that Bashaw no longer wished to work at Majestic Care. For example, Bashaw
claimed that Majestic Care had been “a beyond toxic [] hostile work environment for
approximately 2 months,” that “there are very very few meetings that . . . I have been able to do
or say anything without some type of kick-back,” that she was “gaslighted on a regular basis,”
and that she had consistently “been ignored and/or just like told to be quiet.” R. 21-3, PageID
267, Transcript at 1–4.
Bashaw contends that Nieset could not have honestly believed that Bashaw did not wish
to return to work because the recording shows that Bashaw never said she no longer wanted to
work at Majestic Care. Bashaw said on the recording that she loved her job, loved taking care of
the residents, that she had a “lot of hope that things would get better,” and that the
“communication would change.” R. 21-13, PageID 267, Transcript at 9, 13. Based on what
Nieset and Wimberly knew about Bashaw’s efforts to leave Majestic Care, however, it was not
unreasonable for them to believe that Bashaw no longer wished to work there.
In sum, Nieset formed an honest belief that Bashaw no longer wanted to work at Majestic
Care. A jury could not find this reason was pretext for retaliation.

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D.
Bashaw finally argues that the district court was right to conclude that material fact
disputes remain regarding whether Majestic Care fired Bashaw for refusing to readmit Resident
B. We need not reach this question, however, because Majestic Care provided three independent
non-pretextual reasons for firing Bashaw. That is sufficient to defeat a retaliation claim under
our caselaw. See Smith, 155 F.3d at 806; Jones, 504 F. App’x at 477–78.
* * *
We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

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