United States of America v. Rodney Hamilton Higgins, Jr.

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
File Name: 25a0171p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
RODNEY HAMILTON HIGGINS, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
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No. 24-5331
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky at London.
No. 6:21-cr-00061-1—Robert E. Wier, District Judge.
Decided and Filed: June 27, 2025
Before: THAPAR, NALBANDIAN, and READLER, Circuit Judges.
_________________
COUNSEL
ON BRIEF: Benton C. Martin, Keshava A. Kirkland, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL
COMMUNITY DEFENDER, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellant. Amanda Harris Huang, Charles
P. Wisdom, Jr., UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Lexington, Kentucky, for
Appellee.
_________________
OPINION
_________________
THAPAR, Circuit Judge. Rodney Higgins pled guilty to possession with the intent to
distribute methamphetamine and fentanyl. On appeal, he challenges the search that led to his
arrest. Because probable cause supported that search, we affirm.
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I.
From June to August 2021, Rodney Higgins participated in a methamphetamine and
fentanyl distribution ring. While officers were investigating Higgins and his co-conspirators,
they used a confidential source to conduct two controlled buys of methamphetamine from
Higgins.
As part of this investigation, a Drug Enforcement Administration task force officer
prepared an affidavit in support of a search warrant for Higgins’s apartment located at Rapid Run
Drive. That affidavit detailed the officer’s training and experience; how he came into contact
with the confidential source; the confidential source’s knowledge of Higgins’s extensive drug
dealing; Higgins’s criminal history; the two controlled buys with the confidential source; and the
location of the Rapid Run apartment and the fact that Higgins resided there.
The affidavit also recounted a text exchange between the confidential source and
Higgins. The day before officers presented the magistrate judge with the warrant, Higgins texted
the confidential source that he had “more clear” and “more of that slow.” R. 177-8, Pg. ID 738.
The confidential source, in turn, told law enforcement that “clear” was code for
methamphetamine, and “slow” was code for “heroin, fentanyl, or a combination of the two.” Id.
Higgins had texted the source to come to Higgins’s “crib,” and also told the source over the
phone to come to Higgins’s apartment “to complete the transaction.” Id. Based on all this
information, a magistrate judge found probable cause and issued a warrant to search Higgins’s
apartment.
The search of Higgins’s apartment turned up 370 grams of a substance that tested positive
for methamphetamine and over 200 grams of a substance that tested positive for fentanyl. The
government indicted Higgins for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and fentanyl and
possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and fentanyl. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 846,
841(a)(1). But Higgins moved to suppress the evidence that officers found while they searched
his apartment. The district court denied that motion.
Higgins then pled guilty to the possession charge, but he reserved the right to appeal the
district court’s denial of his suppression motion. He preserved the right to appeal three

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questions: (1) whether there was a sufficient nexus between his drug trafficking and residence to
support the search warrant; (2) whether he was entitled to a hearing based on a claim that the
affidavit contained misrepresentations or omissions; and (3) whether the good-faith exception to
the exclusionary rule could save the search even if it lacked probable cause.
II.
Probable cause is “not a high bar” to meet. District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48,
57 (2018) (citation omitted). It requires only “a ‘fair probability’ that an officer will find
contraband or evidence of a crime.” United States v. Whitlow, 134 F.4th 914, 919 (6th Cir.
2025) (citation omitted). Further, there must be a “nexus” between the evidence sought and the
place to be searched. United States v. Sanders, 106 F.4th 455, 460–61 (6th Cir. 2024) (en banc).
That is, officers must provide “direct or circumstantial support to create ‘more than mere
suspicion’ that contraband will be found at the location in question.” Id. at 462 (citation
omitted). This warrant met those requirements.
A.
Start with the affidavit supporting the warrant. It showed that Higgins engaged in drug
trafficking. And it linked Higgins’s drug trafficking to his apartment. See id.
The affidavit began by reporting how officers zeroed in on Higgins: a confidential source
had received about a pound of methamphetamine from Higgins. The officers then used that
source to conduct two controlled buys of methamphetamine from Higgins. Further, the
confidential source also stated that the source had received one pound or more of
methamphetamine from Higgins “on at least 10 prior occasions.” R. 177-8, Pg. ID 737. The
affidavit also referenced Higgins’s extensive history with drug dealing, including serving a
seven-year sentence for trafficking in controlled substances.
And why did officers decide to search the River Run apartment? For one, Higgins
resided there, as he was listed as a tenant at the apartment. That fact, coupled with evidence of
Higgins’s continual drug dealing, alone suffices to provide probable cause to search the
apartment. See Sanders, 106 F.4th at 466 (resolving intra- and inter-circuit split and recognizing

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that “probable cause to search a known drug dealer’s residence is established where the dealer is
engaged in continual and ongoing operations typically involving large amounts of drugs”
(citations and quotations omitted)); see also United States v. Simmons, 129 F.4th 382, 387 (6th
Cir. 2025) (recognizing known drug-dealer status can be established through extensive or
repeated drug dealing, as well as a record of past drug convictions).
The affidavit had additional information establishing probable cause to search the
apartment. According to the affidavit, Higgins had texted the confidential source that he had
obtained more “clear” and “slow,” slang for methamphetamine and some combination of heroin
and fentanyl, respectively. R. 177-8, Pg. ID 738. The next day, Higgins directed the source to
come to his “crib.” Id. And when law enforcement instructed the source to place a recorded
phone call to Higgins, Higgins directed the source to come to his apartment to complete the drug
transaction. That same day, the officers applied for a warrant to search the apartment in
question. All told, Higgins was an active drug dealer who had just directed his repeat customer
to come to his residence to buy drugs. This all creates a “fair probability” that contraband would
be found in Higgins’s apartment. Sanders, 106 F.4th at 462.
B.
Higgins’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing.
He first argues that there wasn’t enough of a connection between the drug sales and his
apartment because officers never saw him travel to or from his apartment during a controlled
buy. But officers didn’t have to observe Higgins selling from his apartment. Indeed, there’s “no
model fact pattern for establishing a fair probability that contraband will be found” at a given
place. Id. Instead, the officers just had to show a connection between the place to be searched
and the illicit activity. See id. And here, officers established that a known drug dealer resided at
a particular location and had told a repeat customer to come to his “crib” and get more drugs. R.
177-8, Pg. ID 738. That is more than enough to create a “fair probability” of contraband in
Higgins’s apartment.
Higgins also observes that the most recent controlled buy took place fifty-five days
before the search. In his view, the information derived from the controlled buys was too

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outdated to support probable cause. See United States v. Frechette, 583 F.3d 374, 377–78 (6th
Cir. 2009).
But if information in an affidavit is “in some respects stale,” more recent activity can
“refresh this otherwise stale information.” United States v. Spikes, 158 F.3d 913, 924 (6th Cir.
1998) (cleaned up). That’s exactly what happened here. The affidavit showed that Higgins
texted that he had drugs a day before police applied for and executed the warrant. And Higgins
told the source the day of the search to come to his apartment to complete the transaction. Even
assuming the earlier controlled buys were stale, the texts Higgins sent just one day before the
warrant was executed refreshed the allegedly outdated information and provided probable cause
to search his apartment.
Further, Higgins objects that the text and phone messages did not “provide any evidence
of drugs being present in the residence.” Appellant Br. at 26. But probable cause does not
require officers to have ironclad evidence that contraband will be present before they conduct a
search. Rather, all it requires is a fair shot of finding contraband. And here, officers had a
confidential source who had repeatedly bought drugs from Higgins and understood Higgins’s
code to mean that Higgins was prepared to sell drugs from his apartment. The officers didn’t
need to wait for Higgins to say the magic words of “methamphetamine” or “fentanyl” to have
probable cause to search his residence.
Finally, Higgins criticizes the affidavit as resting on “conclusory statements” that
probable cause existed. Appellant Br. at 28. He relies on United States v. Lewis, where this
court found an affidavit insufficient because it stated only that the suspect “had used his laptop to
view images of child sexual exploitation.” 81 F.4th 640, 646–47 (6th Cir. 2023). Here, though,
the affidavit detailed a months-long investigation into Higgins’s drug trafficking and supplied
direct quotations from Higgins’s interactions with the confidential source.
In sum, Higgins’s probable-cause challenges fail.

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III.
Next, Higgins contends that the district court erred in denying him a hearing to assess
whether the affidavit contained misrepresentations or omissions.
In certain limited circumstances, a defendant is entitled to a hearing to challenge the
truthfulness of factual statements in a search warrant affidavit. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S.
154, 155–56 (1978). Our circuit has expanded these circumstances to allow defendants to show
misrepresentations or omissions. See United States v. Davis, 84 F.4th 672, 681–82 (6th Cir.
2023). For a hearing based on an alleged misrepresentation, a defendant must “make a
substantial preliminary showing that the affidavit contains a knowing, intentional, or reckless
falsehood,” and “that the affidavit would not have established probable cause without the
falsity.” Sanders, 106 F.4th at 471 (citation omitted). And if a defendant is trying to show an
omission, he must meet an even higher standard: that the officer omitted the information “with
an intention to mislead” and that the omission was “critical to the finding of probable cause.”
Davis, 84 F.4th at 682 (citations omitted).
In evaluating whether an affidavit contains misrepresentations or omissions, warrants are
presumed valid, and the district court enjoys significant discretion. This court reviews for clear
error a district court’s determination as to whether an officer intentionally misled the magistrate
or acted with reckless disregard for the truth. See United States v. Bateman, 945 F.3d 997, 1007–
08 (6th Cir. 2019). And review of a district court’s legal conclusions is de novo. Id.
Higgins provides various reasons why he should’ve been entitled to a Franks hearing.
First, Higgins claims the government misled the magistrate judge into thinking he was
offering drugs in the text exchange with the confidential source. The crux of Higgins’s argument
is that the government failed to preserve the text messages cited in the affidavit that he “got more
clear and . . . got more . . . slow,” so the government misled the magistrate judge into thinking
Higgins was selling drugs from his apartment. R. 177-8, Pg. ID 738.
This argument fails. Even though the government never revealed the text messages,
Higgins has no evidence to suggest that the officer was lying when he summarized the messages

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for the magistrate judge. See Sanders, 106 F.4th at 471. Given that courts presume warrants are
valid, Higgins’s claim fails at the outset—he hasn’t made a “substantial preliminary showing” of
a knowing or intentional falsehood. See Bateman, 945 F.3d at 1008 (citation omitted). Instead,
he’s just pointed to an absence of particular evidence (the text messages themselves) to
corroborate the confidential informant’s account.
What’s more, other text messages in the record corroborate the officer’s summary of the
messages. When the confidential source began cooperating with law enforcement, for example,
the source asked if Higgins “had 1 [the source] could get.” R. 180-4, Pg. ID 802. Higgins
replied, “Oh of the clear? Like the whole thing?” Id. (emphasis added). That Higgins used the
same coded language as reported in the affidavit lends credibility to the officer’s summary.
Further, the day after Higgins claimed to the confidential source that he “got more clear,” the
source followed up over text and the two arranged a meet-up at Higgins’s “crib.” R. 180-7, Pg.
ID 814. This timeline suggests that the exchange the officer summarized indeed took place. All
to say, Higgins has no evidence that the officer falsely summarized any text messages, and
record evidence suggests otherwise.
Higgins also contests that the officer “present[ed] his own interpretation” of Higgins’s
coded language “as a fact” to the magistrate judge. Appellant Br. at 32–33. But that’s not an
allegation that the affidavit contained a knowing or reckless falsehood. Sanders, 106 F.4th at
471. On the contrary, the officer had a sound basis for this interpretation: the confidential
source, who had bought drugs from Higgins at least twelve times, told law enforcement what
Higgins’s coded language meant.
Further, Higgins zeroes in on the affidavit’s language that the confidential source “was in
Higgins’s residence on one occasion” when he “saw a duffle bag full of meth.” R. 177-8, Pg. ID
737. Higgins claims that the affidavit omitted that this “residence” was his former residence and
not his current apartment.
Because Higgins alleges an omission, however, he must show the omission was “critical”
to the probable-cause determination. Davis, 84 F.4th at 682 (citation omitted). He can’t make
that showing. Why? Higgins’s texts and phone call just before the execution of the search

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No. 24-5331 United States v. Higgins Page 8
warrant were sufficient to establish probable cause. To be sure, the fact that the source saw a
duffel bag “full of meth” at Higgins’s former residence increased the probability that his current
residence also contained contraband. R. 177-8, Pg. ID 704. But the warrant’s issuance did not
hinge on this detail.
Finally, Higgins quibbles with the affidavit’s statement that Higgins was seen leaving and
returning to his apartment. He argues that the way the affidavit appended this observation to the
description of the drug transaction makes it seem like he was seen leaving and returning to his
apartment as part a drug deal. But this claim fails: Higgins doesn’t argue that the statement that
he was seen leaving and returning to his apartment is false, let alone intentionally or recklessly
so. See United States v. Henderson, No. 23-1786, 2024 WL 3549582, at *5 (6th Cir. July 26,
2024) (rejecting a similar challenge to an affidavit that “merely recount[ed] [the defendant’s]
movement and access”).
* * *
Thus, we affirm.

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