In re: East Palestine Train Derailment Harold R. Feezle, Susan E. Scheufele, David… v. Norfolk Southern Railway Company; Norfolk Southern Corporation (24-3852/3880)

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
File Name: 25a0304p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
IN RE: EAST PALESTINE TRAIN DERAILMENT
___________________________________________
HAROLD R. FEEZLE, SUSAN E. SCHEUFELE, DAVID J.
SCHEUFELE, ROLLERENA AUTO SALES, LLC (25-
3342), MARILYN FIGLEY, ROSEMARY MOZUCH,
CHARLES MOZUCH, JON LUKE AFFELTRANGER, and
EDWARD E. BARNHOUSE, on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated; LAURA MANN (24-
3852/3880),
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY; NORFOLK
SOUTHERN CORPORATION (24-3852/3880),
Defendants-Appellees,
REVEREND JOSEPH SHEELY (24-3852/25-3342);
ZSUZSA TROYAN, TAMARA FREEZE, SHARON LYNCH,
and CARLY TUNNO (24-3880/25-3342),
Objectors-Appellants.
┐
│
│
│
│
│
│
│
│
│
│
│
│
│
│
│
│
│
│
│
│
│
│
┘
Nos. 24-3852/3880/25-3342
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio at Youngstown.
No. 4:23-cv-00242—Benita Y. Pearson, District Judge.
Decided and Filed: November 5, 2025
Before: THAPAR, READLER, and HERMANDORFER, Circuit Judges.
_________________
COUNSEL
ON BRIEF: David M. Graham, Jacksonville, Florida, for Appellants. Paul D. Clement,
Matthew D. Rowen, Kyle R. Eiswald, CLEMENT & MURPHY, PLLC, Alexandria, Virginia,
Elizabeth Graham, Adam J. Gomez, GRANT & EISENHOFER P.A., Wilmington, Delaware,
>

-- 1 of 10 --

No. 24-3852 In re E. Palestine Train Derailment Page 2
Mark Chalos, LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN LLP, Nashville, Tennessee, Seth
A. Katz, BURG SIMPSON ELDREDGE HERSH & JARDINE, P.C., Englewood, Colorado,
Melanie S. Bailey, BURG SIMPSON ELDREDGE HERSH & JARDINE, P.C., Cincinnati,
Ohio, for the Plaintiffs-Appellees. Alan Schoenfeld, WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE
AND DORR LLP, New York, New York, Albinas Prizgintas, WILMER CUTLER
PICKERLING HALE AND DORR LLP, Washington, D.C., for the Norfolk Southern Appellees.
_________________
OPINION
_________________
THAPAR, Circuit Judge. A set of objectors to a class-action settlement are over eight
months late in paying an $850,000 appeal bond. Instead of paying up, they moved to extend the
time to appeal the bond order—one day late. Because they’re a day late, we can’t hear their
reasons for being $850,000 short. We dismiss their appeal of the motion to extend for lack of
jurisdiction, and we dismiss their appeals of the settlement for failure to pay the bond.
I.
In February 2023, a Norfolk Southern train carrying hazardous materials derailed near
East Palestine, Ohio. Unfortunately, the clean-up efforts vented toxic chemicals across the
surrounding area. So affected residents and businesses sued the railroad, railcar owners, and
other parties in federal court. The district court consolidated the suits into one master class
action. After months of exhaustive discovery, motions, and mediation, the railroad agreed to pay
$600 million to the class. The district court approved this settlement in September 2024.
Five class members timely appealed. On January 16, 2025, the district court required
these objectors to post an appeal bond of $850,000 by January 30. See Fed. R. App. P. 7. The
bond accounts for $825,000 in administrative costs for delaying a third party’s distribution of the
class-action settlement, as well as $25,000 in taxable costs. The objectors didn’t post the
required bond or proffer a lesser amount—and, over 250 days later, they still haven’t.
Three days after the district court issued the bond order, the objectors filed a “Motion to
Eliminate or Reduce Appeal Bond” in their pending appeals before our court. The objectors
urged us to construe the motion as a request for a review of the merits of the appeal, not a stay of

-- 2 of 10 --

No. 24-3852 In re E. Palestine Train Derailment Page 3
the bond order. See Reply Br. at 3 n.1, In re E. Palestine Train Derailment, No. 24-3852 (6th
Cir. Jan. 31, 2025), Dkt. No. 37 (“No appellant either seeks or desires such a stay.”); id. at 2
(arguing that reading the motion as a stay request was a “putrid red herring” and “defies
comprehension by rational minds”).
We took them at their word. As a three-judge motions panel explained, absent a separate
notice of appeal, “our only avenue to address the appeal bond would [have been] on a motion to
stay, which the Objectors have definitively stated is not their intent.” Order at 3, In re E.
Palestine Train Derailment, No. 24-3852 (6th Cir. Mar. 21, 2025), Dkt. No. 47. Even if the
objectors had sought a stay of the appeal bond, they still wouldn’t have prevailed. Among other
problems, they hadn’t shown that they were likely to succeed on the merits or faced “irreparable
harm, in part because they could still obtain review of the bond order by filing a direct appeal
from that order.” Id. (citing Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), (a)(5)).
The same day our order issued, the objectors moved in the district court to extend the
time to appeal the bond order. But they faced a timing problem: Accounting for weekends and
federal holidays, the 30-day deadline to file a notice of appeal of the January 16 bond order was
February 18. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), 26(a)(1)(C). And, in turn, the 30 days to request an
extension expired on March 20. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5)(A). The objectors moved on March
21 to extend the time to file—one day after Rule 4’s final deadline.
The objectors conceded this. As they frankly observed, their motion “was filed 1 day
beyond the time allowed.” R. 912, Pg. ID 61030. But to excuse their lateness, they latched onto
our previous order’s statement that “they could still obtain review of the bond order by filing a
direct appeal.” Id. (quoting Order at 3, In re E. Palestine Train Derailment, No. 24-3852 (6th
Cir. Mar. 21, 2025), Dkt. No. 47). On their read, the motions panel’s statement was binding law
of the case and thus commanded the district court to allow them to file late.
The district court disagreed. Like both parties, the district court treated the motion as
“untimely because it was not filed within the grace period allowed by Rule 4(a)(5).” R. 923, Pg.
ID 61237; see Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5)(A). It viewed the deadlines as binding, so it denied the
motion.

-- 3 of 10 --

No. 24-3852 In re E. Palestine Train Derailment Page 4
The objectors timely appealed. They also requested that the motions panel reconsider its
previous ruling, which it declined to do. While those filings were pending, the plaintiffs moved
to dismiss the objectors’ settlement appeals for failure to pay the appeal bond. We now consider
the appeal from the motion to extend time as well as the plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss.
II.
Since the deadline to request an extension to file an appeal is jurisdictional, the district
court correctly declined to grant the objectors’ untimely motion.
Congress has imposed a set of “mandatory and jurisdictional” statutory deadlines for
appeals. Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 209 (2007) (quotation omitted). By default, parties
must appeal “within thirty days after the entry of [a] judgment, order, or decree,” except in cases
involving the government or a judgment with a delayed notice to the parties. 28 U.S.C. §
2107(a), (b), (c)(1). District courts may, however, “extend the time for appeal upon a showing of
excusable neglect or good cause,” provided that the litigant moves for an extension “not later
than 30 days after the expiration of the time otherwise set for bringing appeal.” Id. § 2107(c).
Since these deadlines are jurisdictional, we may not use our general equitable power to add to the
list of enumerated exceptions. Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 433
(2011).
These statutory deadlines are codified in the federal appellate rules. Tracking the text of
section 2107(a), Rule 4 first provides the default rule that parties in a civil case must file a notice
of appeal “within 30 days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from.” Fed. R. App. P.
4(a)(1)(A). Then, like section 2107(c), it permits district courts to “extend the time to file a
notice of appeal” if (i) the movant requests an extension “no later than 30 days after the time
prescribed by . . . Rule 4(a) expires,” and (ii) “shows excusable neglect or good cause.” Fed. R.
App. P. 4(a)(5)(A). If the movant makes such a showing, the district court may extend the
window to appeal by either 30 days from the original deadline or 14 days from its order,
whichever is later. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5)(C).
The deadlines imposed by Rules 4(a)(1) and 4(a)(5)(A) are also jurisdictional. The
Supreme Court has explained that “a time limit prescribed only in a court-made rule” is usually a

-- 4 of 10 --

No. 24-3852 In re E. Palestine Train Derailment Page 5
“mandatory claim-processing rule,” not a jurisdictional deadline. Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous.
Servs. of Chi., 583 U.S. 17, 19 (2017). But if that time limit “implement[s] an appeal deadline
created by Congress,” it’s jurisdictional. In re Tennial, 978 F.3d 1022, 1026 (6th Cir. 2020).
That’s the case here: Section 2107(c) requires parties to move for an extension no “later than 30
days” after the deadline to appeal and to show good cause or excusable neglect, and Rule
4(a)(5)(A) operationalizes that deadline by requiring the same. Rule 4(a)(5)(A) imposes a
“‘specific[]’ appeal deadline that is ‘set forth in a statute.’” Id. at 1026 (quoting Bowles, 551
U.S. at 213, 210). So it’s equally as “mandatory and jurisdictional” as that statute. Ultimate
Appliance CC v. Kirby Co., 601 F.3d 414, 415 (6th Cir. 2010).
In short, district courts lack jurisdiction over late motions to extend—and the objectors’
motion was late. The objectors’ time to request an extension from the district court’s January 16
order expired on March 20. So, as everyone agrees, the objectors’ March 21 motion was one day
late. Since the deadlines to appeal are jurisdictional, the district court lacked the power to extend
their time, even if it had agreed that the objectors’ lateness was excusable. See Bowles, 551 U.S.
at 214. Thus, the district court had no option but to deny the objectors’ requested extension for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
The objectors argue that the district court had to give them an extension because our prior
statement that the objectors “could still obtain review of the bond order by filing a direct appeal”
is binding law of the case. No. 25-3342 Appellants’ Br. at 14 (quoting Order at 3, In re E.
Palestine Train Derailment, No. 24-3852 (6th Cir. Mar. 21, 2025), Dkt. No. 47). But our
previous statement didn’t bind the district court. We lacked jurisdiction and the objectors didn’t
show they were likely to succeed on the merits. So our statement that the objectors also failed to
show irreparable injury because they could move to extend in the district court did “nothing to
determine the outcome.” Wright v. Spaulding, 939 F.3d 695, 701 (6th Cir. 2019). That means
it’s not part of the law of the case. See Keahy v. Marquis, 978 F.3d 474, 481 (6th Cir. 2020).
Even if it were law of the case, our judgment couldn’t expand the district court’s jurisdiction
with an equitable extension that would override “mandatory” time limits. Ultimate Appliance
CC, 601 F.3d at 415. Since section 2107 and Rule 4(a)(5)(A) limit the district court’s

-- 5 of 10 --

No. 24-3852 In re E. Palestine Train Derailment Page 6
jurisdiction to timely motions, the district court would lack power to follow any contrary
mandate.
It doesn’t matter whether the motion to extend was one day, one hour, or one minute late.
When the 30 days ended, the district court lost jurisdiction over the objectors’ motion to extend
their time to appeal the bond order.
III.
At present, the objectors are over eight months late in paying an appeal bond. We have
now affirmed the denial of their motion to extend for lack of jurisdiction and denied
reconsideration of our order denying the motion to eliminate or reduce the appeal bond. So all
that remains is to enforce the January bond order by dismissing their appeals of the final
settlement.
“Failure to execute . . . a bond unless exempted by law is grounds for dismissal of an
appeal.” Powers v. Citizens Union Nat. Bank & Tr. Co., 329 F.2d 507, 508–09 (6th Cir. 1964)
(per curiam) (cleaned up). To avoid dismissal, we expect a party contesting the validity of an
appeal bond to either seek a stay in the district court or make a good-faith proffer of a lesser
amount. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d 812, 818 (6th Cir. 2004). To determine
whether to dismiss, we look to “factors such as [1] the prejudice to the other parties, [2] the
demonstrated justification for the failure to post the bond, and [3] the merits of the underlying
appeal.” Id. None of these factors favors the objectors.
First, objectors’ appeals have delayed disbursement of the settlement funds to about
55,000 injured claimants. As of September 2024, close to 80% of households within 2 miles of
the derailment site and about 28% of those within 20 miles had filed claims. By contrast, only
86 of the approximately half million eligible class members filed timely objections. Thus, the
objections of less than 0.01% of the class now delay the disbursement of direct cash payments to
many of the claimants. And those payments are critically important. They will compensate
residents near the derailment site for “loss of use and enjoyment, emotional distress,
inconvenience, relocation, [and] medical monitoring” stemming from their exposure to
dangerous chemicals and will reimburse businesses for “net business loss.” R. 553, Pg. ID

-- 6 of 10 --

No. 24-3852 In re E. Palestine Train Derailment Page 7
14493–95, 14500. The delay therefore poses overwhelming prejudice by endangering residents’
health and the community’s financial stability. See In re Cardizem, 391 F.3d at 818.
Second, the objectors have no valid justification for failing to pay the bond. The
objectors make two arguments: First, they argue that their ongoing attempts to reduce the bond
and to appeal justifies their nonpayment. Second, they allege that their inability to pay both
invalidates the bond and explains their refusal to pay it. But neither excuse allows them to
ignore a court order.
For starters, we have never found that challenging the validity of a bond is a legitimate
reason for refusing to pay it. See, e.g., Powers, 329 F.2d at 508–09 (ordering payment despite a
valid appeal); In re Cardizem, 391 F.3d at 818 (dismissing for failure to pay a bond despite a
pending appeal). Instead of simply pointing to their unsuccessful motions, the objectors should
have moved to stay the bond, requested to reduce it based on their financial declarations, or
proffered uncontested portions of it. Absent good-faith efforts to pay the bond, the objectors’
choice to “ignore an order” from the court must have “consequences to [their] appeal.” In re
Cardizem, 391 F.3d at 818.
For the same reason, the objectors’ alleged inability to pay the ordered bond in full
doesn’t justify their refusal to post any amount. Instead of excusing nonpayment, detailed
affidavits demonstrating financial hardship could support a request to reduce, eliminate, or stay
the bond. Cf. Powers, 329 F.2d at 508–09 (ordering payment despite asserted unwillingness to
pay). And even if financial hardship could justify nonpayment, the objectors have done little to
convince us that they can’t post at least some portion of the required amount. After all, they are
not proceeding in forma pauperis—so they have covered, either personally or through counsel,
some appeal-related expenses. And because their attorneys are handling the case on a
contingency basis, they likely lack other large, out-of-pocket obligations for the appeal at
present. All in all, the objectors have not adequately demonstrated why they can afford other
costs associated with their appeal but not some portion of the bond. See, e.g., In re Polyurethane
Foam Antitrust Litig., 178 F. Supp. 3d 635, 642 (N.D. Ohio 2016). So the objectors’ ongoing
appeals and alleged inability to pay might have justified a stay, reduction, or deferral of the
bond—but not outright nonpayment.

-- 7 of 10 --

No. 24-3852 In re E. Palestine Train Derailment Page 8
Third, the objectors are unlikely to succeed on the merits of their challenge to (1) the
class notice or (2) the reasonableness of the settlement. We review the district court’s factual
findings about the adequacy of notice for clear error and the legal conclusion that a particular
notice satisfies the requirements of Rule 23 and the Due Process Clause de novo. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23; Fidel v. Farley, 534 F.3d 508, 513–14 (6th Cir. 2008). And we review the overall
reasonableness of a settlement for abuse of discretion, a deferential standard that favors
settlement of meritorious class actions. Fidel, 534 F.3d at 513–14.; UAW v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
497 F.3d 615, 632 (6th Cir. 2007). When determining whether to dismiss, our preliminary
assessment of “the merits of the [objectors’] underlying appeal” remains only one factor under
consideration. In re Cardizem, 391 F.3d at 818.
At the outset, the objectors forfeited most of their objections to the contents of the notice.
Before the district court, they challenged only the length of the opt-out period and the notice’s
lack of information on how settlement payments would be calculated. That focus bars their
belated attempts to attack other aspects of the notice provided. See Swanigan v. FCA US LLC,
938 F.3d 779, 786 (6th Cir. 2019).
But even setting aside forfeiture, the district court didn’t err in approving the settlement
notice. To comply with the Due Process Clause and federal procedural rules, notice must be
given in a manner that is reasonably calculated to reach and be understood by any named or
unnamed class member who may be bound by the settlement. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B),
(e)(1); U.S. Const. amend. V; Fidel, 534 F.3d at 515. This notice met those requirements. To
reach the class, the parties mailed the notice to class members, posted it online, circulated it in
local newspapers, and advertised on social media and local television. See R. 452-4, Pg. ID
6096–97; R. 553, Pg. ID 14489–90. The notice itself fairly informed class members about the
existence and terms of the binding settlement. See Fidel, 523 F.3d at 513–15. That notice never
needed to include the size of class representatives’ awards or the division of attorneys’ fees,
much less the objectors’ hypotheses about strict liability and punitive damages. And the 31-day
opt-out period—though shorter than average—left time for the class members to make informed
choices about the terms based on the information given.

-- 8 of 10 --

No. 24-3852 In re E. Palestine Train Derailment Page 9
The objectors next contest the reasonableness of the settlement itself. To assess the
reasonableness of a settlement, we consider the factors identified in Rule 23(e)(2), as well as (1)
the likelihood of success on the merits of the case, (2) the complexity, expense, and duration of
discovery and litigation, (3) the opinions of class members, representatives, and counsel, and (4)
the risk of collusion or fraud. UAW, 497 F.3d at 631. The likelihood of success is the most
important factor because it provides a yardstick against which the benefits of the settlement may
be measured. In re Gen. Tire & Rubber Co. Sec. Litig., 726 F.2d 1075, 1086 (6th Cir. 1984).
The likelihood-of-success factor cuts against the objectors. Settlement was “particularly
sensible” because continued litigation would have significantly delayed residents’ resettlement
payments without any certainty of yielding a larger award. UAW, 497 F.3d at 632; see also Does
1-2 v. Déjà Vu Servs., Inc., 925 F.3d 886, 896 (6th Cir. 2019) (affirming settlement when its
“benefits . . . outweigh the value of the [plaintiffs’] claims”). And the objectors don’t raise
issues likely to alter that settlement calculus. The gist of their argument is that the district court
and class counsel failed to review, credit, and disseminate expert declarations and soil-sampling
data about the long-term hazards from environmental toxins. But the class members’ expert
reviewed the environmental data and reached an informed conclusion about the levels of toxicity
in the soil. See R. 553, Pg. ID 14486–87 (explaining negotiated soil-sampling protocols); R.
518-10, Pg. ID 11186–91. The existence of contradictory evidence from the objectors’ private
report does little to undermine the conclusions of the parties’ expert. At the end of the day, the
parties settled precisely because they felt that $600 million adequately compensated injured
individuals given the balance of conflicting evidence. The objectors can’t explain why adding
more conflicting evidence to a billowing record would move the needle during renewed
settlement negotiations.
The remaining factors strongly favor approving the settlement. Before settlement, the
litigation had already produced over a million pages of documents, seventy depositions, and
extensive motions practice. Since then, some parties have continued to press crossclaims,
culminating in a multi-day jury trial this spring. Despite all that, the class seems largely
satisfied: Just 0.18% of eligible households and 0.31% of eligible businesses opted out, while
more than 54,000 households—especially those closest to the derailment—have already filed

-- 9 of 10 --

No. 24-3852 In re E. Palestine Train Derailment Page 10
claims. The discovery, mediation, and settlement process was complex, expensive, and
exhaustive, and the class’s counsel, representatives, and absent members all support the
agreement.
In light of this suit’s complexity, we disagree that the district court unreasonably
approved the $15,000 incentive payments to class representatives or the $162 million in
attorneys’ fees paid to class counsel. Accounting for the time, effort, and risk incurred by the
class representatives, the district court’s approval of $15,000 bonuses falls well within its
discretion. In re Dry Max Pampers Litig., 724 F.3d 713, 722 (6th Cir. 2013). The same is true
for the attorneys’ fees. Déjà Vu Servs., 925 F.3d at 898 (“It is not abnormal for negotiated
attorneys’ fee awards to comprise 20% to 30% of the total award.”). Aside from alleging that
class counsel did not face adversarial pressure when allocating the fees, the objectors provide no
evidence that class counsel colluded to pocket outsized compensation. Both the class
representatives’ awards and the attorneys’ fees remain within an acceptable range, even though
the settlement required unusually complex and lengthy negotiations.
In sum, the parties are prejudiced by the delay in distributing the settlement, the objectors
have offered no valid justification for failing to pay the appeal bond, and the objectors are
unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claims. So we dismiss the objectors’ appeals of the
settlement for failure to pay the bond.
***
We dismiss the objectors’ appeal of the motion to extend for lack of jurisdiction, and we
grant the motion to dismiss the objectors’ appeals of the settlement.

-- 10 of 10 --