Tanya Chapman v. Commissioner of Social Security

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
FILE NAME: 25A0344N.06
Case No. 24-2114
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
TANYA CHAPMAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF
MICHIGAN
OPINION
Before: BATCHELDER, CLAY, and BLOOMEKATZ, Circuit Judges.
ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge. Tanya Chapman filed an application with
the Social Security Administration (SSA), seeking disability insurance benefits and supplemental
security income. When the claims were denied, Chapman sought and obtained a hearing before
an administrative law judge (ALJ), at which she was represented by counsel.
Following the hearing, the ALJ issued a written decision (14 single-spaced pages), in which
he painstakingly described the evidence and the governing law, made factual findings, applied the
law to those facts, and determined that Chapman was not disabled under the Social Security Act,
and therefore not entitled to benefits. By regulation, the ALJ “must base the decision on the
preponderance of the evidence,” 20 C.F.R. § 404.953 & § 416.1453, and it is clear from the opinion
(from any and every part of the 14-page decision) that the ALJ did so in this case. But the opinion
contains no express statement that the findings and decisions are based on a preponderance of the
evidence; in fact, it does not mention the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard at all.
After the SSA Appeals Council denied a request for review, Chapman filed suit in the
district court, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), raising a single claim: namely, that the ALJ’s

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No. 24-2114, Chapman v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
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findings of fact and the associated decisions in his opinion are all invalid because “not one of them
expressly states that the finding is based upon a preponderance of the evidence.” Chapman v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:23-cv-941, 2024 WL 4579085, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 25, 2024). The
district court set out the law for judicial review of an ALJ’s decision, summarized the substance
of the ALJ’s decision, and rejected the claim. After pointing out that Chapman had cited no law
to support the claim, id. (“Plaintiff does not cite any regulation which requires the ALJ to ‘declare
that the evidence preponderates’ or requires the ALJ to ‘provide analysis as to how the evidence
preponderates in favor of each finding made.’”), it explained that there is “no law or regulation
[that] requires that the ALJ expressly state that its decision was based on the preponderance of the
evidence,” id. (quotation marks and editorial marks omitted; emphasis added) (quoting Martinez
v. Kijakazi, 71 F.4th 1076, 1079 n.2 (7th Cir. 2023)). The court determined that the ALJ’s findings
were supported by substantial evidence, and affirmed. Id.
In this appeal, Chapman—still represented by the same counsel—raises the exact same
claim, without elaboration or any attempt to address the district court’s assessment. She does not
address, or even acknowledge, Martinez, 71 F.4th at 1079 n.2. She simply insists, again without
any legal support, that: “The regulation required that the written decision be expressly based upon
the preponderance of the evidence.” Apt. Br. at 24-25 (emphasis added). But, as the Seventh
Circuit recognized in Martinez, the regulation does not require that. No law requires that. And,
as in Martinez, “it is clear to us, given the context,” that the ALJ in this case found by a
preponderance of the evidence that “the weight of the evidence did not support [Chapman’s]
claims.” See id. (quoting Gedatus v. Saul, 994 F.3d 893, 900 (7th Cir. 2021).
We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

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