Naya L. Abbey v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee; Terrance Stuckey

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
File Name: 26a0198p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
NAYA L. ABBEY; D.H., a minor, by and through his
parents and next of kin Justin Hernandez and Naya L.
Abbey,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE AND
DAVIDSON COUNTY, TENNESSEE; TERRANCE STUCKEY,
Defendants-Appellees.
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No. 25-5736
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee at Nashville.
No. 3:23-cv-00300—Waverly D. Crenshaw, Jr., District Judge.
Decided and Filed: July 17, 2026
Before: COLE, CLAY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
_________________
COUNSEL
ON BRIEF: Lucas E.W. Jerkins, JERKINS LAW, PLLC, Spring Hill, Tennessee, for
Appellants. Melissa Roberge, Michael Dohn, METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF
NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellees.
MURPHY, J., announced the judgment of the court in which COLE, J., concurred.
MURPHY, J., also delivered the lead opinion, in which COLE, J., concurred in part. COLE, J.
(pp. 14–16), delivered a separate concurring opinion. CLAY, J. (pp. 17–33), delivered a separate
dissenting opinion.
>

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_________________
OPINION
_________________
MURPHY, Circuit Judge. Officer Terrance Stuckey arrested Naya Abbey during a traffic
stop. Stuckey testified at Abbey’s preliminary hearing that she refused to stop when he tried to
pull her over. Abbey disagreed with these charges. But she could not tell her side of the story at
trial because a state court indefinitely stayed her criminal case. Three years later, prosecutors
disclosed dispatch tapes of Stuckey’s interactions with a dispatcher while he followed Abbey.
Because these tapes allegedly supported Abbey’s version of events, the prosecutors dismissed
the charges against her. Abbey and her son, D.H., then brought this suit against Stuckey and the
Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County (“Metro”) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
They alleged that Stuckey violated the Fourth Amendment during the traffic stop. And Abbey
alleged that Metro violated its duty to disclose exculpatory evidence under Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83 (1963), by withholding the dispatch tapes for three years. The district court
dismissed their complaint.
This appeal raises a procedural question about § 1983’s statute of limitations and a
substantive question about Brady’s scope. The procedural question asks: Did the applicable one-
year statute of limitations start to run on the (earlier) date of the traffic stop or the (later) date of
the disclosure of the dispatch tapes? In my view, even under the “discovery” rule of accrual, the
statute of limitations began at the time of the traffic stop because Abbey knew of her injury and
its source by then. She thus did not timely pursue her Fourth Amendment claims. The
substantive question asks: Did Metro’s three-year delay in disclosing the dispatch tapes violate
Brady? Like other circuit courts, I would answer “no” because Brady creates a trial right and
prosecutors dismissed Abbey’s charges before trial. All this said, the district court did err by
dismissing D.H.’s Fourth Amendment claims against Stuckey on its own initiative without
notice. All told, I would affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for proceedings consistent
with this opinion.

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I
This case reaches us at the pleading stage. At that stage, we must accept the operative
complaint’s well-pleaded factual allegations as true—whether or not the discovery process
would confirm or refute those allegations later in the litigation. See Rudd v. City of Norton
Shores, 977 F.3d 503, 507, 511 (6th Cir. 2020). So I will describe the facts using those
allegations alone.
Abbey lived with her “autistic and nonverbal” minor son, D.H., in Nashville, Tennessee.
Am. Compl., R.42, PageID 260–61. The lease expired on their Nashville home in the summer of
2019. But the lease on her new home did not begin until later. During this gap, Abbey decided
to live at a friend’s home and store her belongings there.
On August 14, 2019, Abbey repeatedly drove to her friend’s home moving boxes of her
possessions. That evening, she noticed a “blue car” following her on one of these trips. Id.,
PageID 262. When she made it to the friend’s home, she and her son refused to exit her vehicle
because this unknown car had parked right behind her. She drove off out of fear for her safety.
Yet the blue car started to follow her again. Although Abbey “was following all traffic laws,”
the car turned on its sirens and flashing lights after she passed through an intersection. Id.
Around 8:13 p.m., she stopped and turned on her hazard lights. Apart from this car, “aviation
services” were also monitoring her from above. Id., PageID 263.
Officer Stuckey and another officer got out of the blue car. They drew their firearms and
yelled at Abbey to exit her vehicle. Ultimately, they “forcibly removed” her “at gunpoint,” put
her in handcuffs, and placed her in the back of their vehicle. Id. Stuckey told Abbey that she
had “committed the offenses of felony reckless endangerment and evading arrest” by refusing to
stop when he had turned on his flashing lights. Id. He also alleged that she had almost hit a
pedestrian. Stuckey claimed that he first activated his vehicle’s flashing lights at 8:02 p.m.,
which would have meant that Abbey failed to stop for over ten minutes. After arresting Abbey,
Stuckey searched her car, told her that they would place D.H. in the custody of Children’s
Protective Services, and transported her to jail. The jail released Abbey after she spent several
hours in custody.

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Prosecutors charged Abbey with various crimes. Stuckey testified at her preliminary
hearing. He claimed that Abbey had sped through multiple intersections and refused to stop after
he had “engaged his sirens and lights.” Id., PageID 265. A state judge bound her case over
“from general sessions court to Criminal Court[.]” Id., PageID 266. For unidentified reasons,
though, Abbey’s case remained stayed in that court for three years.
On August 24, 2022, over three years after the incident, Abbey finally obtained the
dispatch tapes that recorded Stuckey’s statements to dispatch as he followed her vehicle back in
August 2019. Abbey alleges that these tapes contradicted Stuckey’s testimony at her preliminary
hearing. According to the complaint, Stuckey told dispatch that Abbey “was driving normal
speeds” and that he was “not in pursuit” of her. Id., PageID 263, 266. He also did not claim to
dispatch that she had “fled at multiple intersections” as he had alleged at the hearing. Id.,
PageID 266. The “time stamps” on the tapes also conflicted with Stuckey’s preliminary-hearing
testimony. Id.
These inconsistencies allegedly led state prosecutors to conclude that Stuckey had never
activated his lights except right before he stopped Abbey at 8:13 p.m. Prosecutors thus
dismissed the criminal case against Abbey a week after the disclosure of the dispatch tapes.
But the case had already harmed Abbey and D.H. Abbey had been pregnant with her
second child at the time of the traffic stop. But the stress of the case caused a miscarriage.
Abbey also lost her job and could not find other employment because background checks kept
flagging her pending felony charges. And she lost the lease on her new home when the landlord
learned of those charges. So she remained homeless for about two years. While living on the
streets, Abbey lacked enough food to eat, and unknown criminals physically and sexually
assaulted her. She became pregnant with her third child while homeless. But she lacked access
to medical care and did not realize that she had gestational diabetes. As a result, her third child
tragically died just two days after birth. Lastly, Abbey has had no “meaningful contact” with
D.H. in years. Id., PageID 269. He has lived with his father in Alabama since her preliminary
hearing. The traffic stop has also caused D.H. to suffer from ongoing “fear and anxiety, night
terrors, and trepidation around authority figures.” Id., PageID 271.

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In April 2023, Abbey and D.H. sued Officer Stuckey and Metro under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Although Abbey and her son originally proceeded without a lawyer, they had retained counsel by
the time that they filed their operative complaint. That complaint alleged three claims against
Stuckey under the Fourth Amendment. It first alleged that he committed an unreasonable seizure
by stopping Abbey’s vehicle, arresting her without probable cause, and seizing and detaining
D.H. It next alleged that he committed an unreasonable search by looking through Abbey’s car
without probable cause to believe that it contained contraband. It then alleged that Stuckey used
excessive force on Abbey by forcibly pulling her from the car, throwing her to the ground, and
handcuffing her. Apart from these claims against Stuckey, the operative complaint also sought
to hold Metro liable for the Fourth Amendment violations and a Brady violation based on the
lengthy concealment of the dispatch tapes.
Stuckey and Metro each moved to dismiss the complaint. Metro sought to dismiss Abbey
and D.H.’s claims, but Stuckey moved to dismiss only Abbey’s claims and not D.H.’s. Yet the
district court dismissed all claims, even D.H.’s claims against Stuckey. See Abbey v. Metro.
Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 2025 WL 1901344, at *7 (M.D. Tenn. July 9, 2025). The
court held that Tennessee’s statute of limitations barred Abbey’s Fourth Amendment claims
against Stuckey. See id. at *4. It found that these claims accrued when Stuckey arrested Abbey
and searched her car in 2019. See id. at *3. But Abbey did not file this suit until 2023—over
three years after the one-year statute of limitations had run. See id. at *4. It next held that
Metro’s eventual disclosure of the dispatch tapes foreclosed Abbey’s Brady claim. Id. at *5.
And regardless, it found that Abbey’s and D.H.’s claims against Metro failed to allege that a
municipal policy or custom had caused any purported constitutional violation. Id. at *5–7.
II
Abbey and D.H. raise three arguments on appeal. First, Abbey argues that the district
court mistakenly held that she did not timely file her Fourth Amendment claims against Stuckey.
Second, Abbey argues that the district court wrongly dismissed her Brady claim against Metro.
Third, D.H. argues that the district court improperly dismissed his claims against Stuckey on its

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own initiative. Reviewing the district court’s decision de novo, I disagree with Abbey but agree
with D.H. See Bannister v. Knox Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 49 F.4th 1000, 1007 (6th Cir. 2022).
A. Abbey’s Fourth Amendment Claims Against Officer Stuckey
Abbey first challenges the statute-of-limitations dismissal of her three Fourth
Amendment claims against Officer Stuckey under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 lacks its own
statute of limitations and instead incorporates the most analogous state-law limitations period.
See Reguli v. Russ, 109 F.4th 874, 879 (6th Cir. 2024) (per curiam). The parties agree that
Abbey’s Fourth Amendment claims trigger a one-year statute of limitations under Tennessee
law. See Dibrell v. City of Knoxville, 984 F.3d 1156, 1161 (6th Cir. 2021). But they disagree on
the “accrual date” for the claims—that is, the date on which the one-year clock started to run on
them. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007). This accrual question turns on federal (not
state) law. See id.
Before we can identify the specific accrual date for the claims, we must identify the
accrual rule that governs them. Under the so-called “occurrence” rule, the Supreme Court has
held that a statute of limitations “presumptively” starts on the first day that “a complete and
present cause of action” exists. McDonough v. Smith, 588 U.S. 109, 115 (2019) (quoting
Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388); see Reguli, 109 F.4th at 879. In other words, this rule triggers the
limitations period when a claim’s elements have all arisen, see Reguli, 109 F.4th at 879, such that
the plaintiff can sue in court on the claim, see Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388. Our cases, by contrast,
have departed from this presumptive occurrence rule in § 1983 suits by regularly following a
“discovery” rule instead. See Reguli, 109 F.4th at 879–80. This rule starts the limitations period
on the date that the plaintiff learned of (or should have learned of) certain “facts about the
claim.” Id.
The parties dispute whether the standard “occurrence” rule or the competing “discovery”
rule should apply to Abbey’s three Fourth Amendment claims under § 1983. Because the
complaint “alleges facts showing” that Abbey did not timely file her three claims under either
accrual rule, we need not choose between them to resolve this case. Id. at 879.

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To start, Abbey seemingly concedes that she did not timely file her three Fourth
Amendment claims if the occurrence rule applies. She alleges that Stuckey committed an
unreasonable seizure when stopping her car and arresting her; that he committed an unreasonable
search when searching her car; and that he used excessive force when restraining her. Although
the parties do not identify the elements for these claims, Abbey does not dispute that the claims
all arose (and that she “could have filed suit” to litigate them) on the day of the traffic stop:
August 14, 2019. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388. True, an unreasonable-seizure claim that challenges
an arrest might trigger a special rule that delays the claim’s accrual until the defendant releases
the plaintiff from custody or provides “legal process” to justify the detention. Dibrell, 984 F.3d
at 1162. But the complaint alleged that the jail released Abbey within hours of her arrest. So
this “refinement” on the standard occurrence rule does not matter here. Wallace, 549 U.S. at
388. And because Abbey did not sue until April 2023, her claims would fall well outside the
one-year statute of limitations under the occurrence rule’s accrual date.
Abbey thus relies on the discovery rule to save her claims. This rule triggers the statute
of limitations on the date that the plaintiff first knew of (or should have known of) certain facts
about the claim. See Reguli, 109 F.4th at 879–80. But which facts matter? Our cases leave the
answer unclear. See id. at 882–83. At times, we have found that a claim accrues when the
plaintiff learns of the injury alone. See Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 273 (6th Cir. 1984). In
another case, though, we have said that a claim does not accrue until a plaintiff learns of “both
his injury and the cause of that injury.” Bishop v. Child.’s Ctr. for Developmental Enrichment,
618 F.3d 533, 536 (6th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
Neither version of the discovery rule helps Abbey. Even if she had to learn of both her
injuries and their cause, she discovered these facts on the day of the traffic stop in August 2019.
Her complaint leaves no doubt that she knew of her injuries on this date. As for the arrest, the
complaint alleges that “Abbey was aware of her confinement” when Stuckey restrained her and
“took [her] to jail” for an hours-long detention. Am. Compl., R.42, PageID 264, 270; see Fox v.
DeSoto, 489 F.3d 227, 233 (6th Cir. 2007), abrogated on other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan,
555 U.S. 223 (2009). As for the search, the complaint alleges that Stuckey “searched Abbey’s
vehicle” in her presence, so she would have likewise learned of the search at that time. Am.

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Compl., R.42, PageID 264; see Wynn v. City of Covington, 2025 WL 2093032, at *2 (6th Cir.
July 25, 2025). As for the force, she knew that she had been “thrown to the ground, held to the
ground, and placed in handcuffs” as these events were happening. Am. Compl., R.42, PageID
270; see Miller v. Cocke County, 2022 WL 103143, at *2 (6th Cir. Jan. 11, 2022). Her complaint
also leaves no doubt that she learned the cause of the arrest, search, and force (a Nashville police
officer) on the same day. Am. Compl., R.42, PageID 263–64. And even if Abbey needed to
know Stuckey’s identity, the complaint leaves no doubt that she had learned this fact when he
testified at her preliminary hearing in August 2019. Id., PageID 265; but cf. Wynn, 2025 WL
2093032, at *3. In sum, Abbey’s knowledge of both the injury and its cause started the
limitations period in August 2019. Even if we follow the discovery rule, then, she still did not
sue on time.
Abbey responds with a single point. She argues that the discovery rule should delay the
start of the statute of limitations until August 2022 when she received the “dispatch tapes” that
“completely discounted” Stuckey’s preliminary-hearing testimony. Appellants’ Br. 15–16. She
reasons that her unreasonable-search and unreasonable-seizure claims required proof that
Stuckey lacked probable cause. Until the disclosure of the tapes, though, she says that she had
“no basis” to show the absence of probable cause “other than her belief in her innocence[.]” Id.
at 15. She adds that even her excessive-force claim lacked evidentiary support until she received
the tapes because Stuckey’s testimony about her conduct “would justify a greater use of force”
than what the tapes revealed. Id. at 16. In essence, Abbey argues that the discovery rule delays
the accrual date until she knew (or should have known) of the unlawful nature of the seizure,
search, and force.
This broad expansion of the discovery rule has both legal and factual problems. Legally,
“a claim accrues” under the discovery rule “upon awareness of actual injury, not upon awareness
that the injury constitutes a legal wrong.” New Castle County v. Halliburton NUS Corp., 111
F.3d 1116, 1125 (3d Cir. 1997). Take the medical-malpractice context. There, the Supreme
Court has held that the discovery rule requires plaintiffs to know (at most) that a medical
provider’s conduct caused a patient’s health problem—not that the provider’s conduct qualified
as (wrongful) malpractice. See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 118–25 (1979). Or take

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the employment context. There, the circuit courts have held that the discovery rule requires
plaintiffs to know that an employer took an adverse “employment action” against them—not that
the employer harbored a (wrongful) discriminatory purpose when taking the action. Reguli, 109
F.4th at 884 (collecting cases); see, e.g., Amini v. Oberlin Coll., 259 F.3d 493, 499–500 (6th Cir.
2001).
It would make no sense to adopt a more lenient discovery rule for Fourth Amendment
claims like Abbey’s. After all, those types of claims depend on the objective reasonableness of
the officer’s actions. See Torres v. Madrid, 592 U.S. 306, 317 (2021); Graham v. Connor, 490
U.S. 386, 397–99 (1989). So unlike employment claims (which depend on an employer’s hidden
subjective mindset), Fourth Amendment claims do not turn on facts peculiarly in the defendant’s
control. Cf. Amini, 259 F.3d at 499–501. And unlike medical-malpractice claims (which require
technical medical expertise that most plaintiffs lack), Fourth Amendment claims often require an
inquiry into the “considerations of everyday life” on which “reasonable” people (not “legal
technicians”) rely. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983) (citation omitted). As a result,
Fourth Amendment plaintiffs have a much greater ability “to protect [their] rights” once they
learn of their injury than do malpractice or employment plaintiffs. Miller, 2022 WL 103143, at
*2.
Unsurprisingly, then, our Fourth Amendment cases do not support Abbey’s proposed
rule. To the contrary, we have often held that these claims accrue once a plaintiff knows of an
“actual injury” (an arrest, a search, or a use of force), not when the plaintiff knows of the “legal
wrong” underlying the injury (that the arrest or search lacked probable cause or the use of force
was excessive). New Castle County, 111 F.3d at 1125. Many cases have thus concluded that an
unreasonable-seizure claim or an unreasonable-search claim accrued on the date of the arrest or
search. Wynn, 2025 WL 2093032, at *2; Codrington v. Dolak, 142 F.4th 884, 890–91 (6th Cir.
2025); Ruffin v. Kudley, 2020 WL 7062665, at *2 (6th Cir. Sept. 1, 2020) (order). And many
cases have concluded that an excessive-force claim accrued on “the date the allegedly excessive
force [was] used.” Hodge v. City of Elyria, 126 F. App’x 222, 224 (6th Cir. 2005); see Dibrell v.
Rex, 2025 WL 3285587, at *3 (6th Cir. Nov. 25, 2025); Wynn, 2025 WL 2093032, at *2; Miller,
2022 WL 103143, at *2; Fox, 489 F.3d at 233. Under these cases, Abbey’s claims accrued on

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the date of the arrest, search, and use of force—not on the date that she received the dispatch
tapes allegedly contradicting Stuckey’s testimony.
Factually, even if Abbey were correct that the statute of limitations accrued only when
she knew or should have known of the “legal wrong,” New Castle County, 111 F.3d at 1125, she
had a basis to know of that wrong before she received the dispatch tapes. The complaint alleged
that Abbey “was following all traffic laws” on the date of Stuckey’s traffic stop. Am. Compl.,
R.42, PageID 262. It also alleged that she spotted a “blue car” following her that did not have
any sirens or flashing lights activated. Id. And when this car later turned on its siren and lights,
the complaint alleged that Abbey “immediately” pulled over her vehicle. Id., PageID 263. So
her own personal knowledge of the events “should have” led her to believe that Stuckey acted
improperly. Wynn, 2025 WL 2093032, at *2. Although the dispatch tapes provided additional
evidence to support Abbey’s version of the events, she could have relied on her own testimony to
pursue this case. And the discovery rule does not delay the statute of limitations until the date
that a plaintiff gathers enough evidence to win the case; it delays the statute of limitations until
the date that “the average lay person” should have recognized the need to investigate further.
Miller, 2022 WL 103143, at *2. Under the complaint’s own allegations, Abbey should have
recognized the need for this investigation on the date of the traffic stop. She thus did not file
timely claims against Stuckey. And Abbey raised no equitable-tolling or fraudulent-concealment
claims, so we need not consider these distinct (and unbriefed) grounds for delaying the
expiration of the statute of limitations. See Reguli, 109 F.4th at 884; see also United States v.
Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371, 375–76 (2020).
B. Brady Claims Against Metro
Abbey next challenges the dismissal of her claim that Metro violated her Brady rights by
concealing the dispatch tapes for three years. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
makes clear that Tennessee may not “deprive” Abbey of her “liberty” without providing her “due
process of law[.]” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. In Brady, the Supreme Court read this text to
require state prosecutors to turn over “evidence favorable to an accused” if the evidence “is
material” to the accused’s guilt or punishment. 373 U.S. at 87. Since then, the Court has

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distilled Brady into “three well-known elements.” Clark v. Louisville-Jefferson Cnty. Metro
Gov’t, 130 F.4th 571, 578 (6th Cir. 2025) (per curiam). The government must have suppressed
evidence. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280 (1999). The suppressed evidence must
favor the defendant. See id. And this evidence must matter (that is, be “material”) to the
defense. See id.
Abbey’s Brady claim fails on materiality grounds. The Supreme Court has treated
evidence as “material” only if “a reasonable probability” exists that the evidence would have led
to a “different” “result” in the “proceeding[.]” Id. (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S.
667, 682 (1985)). And by the “proceeding,” the Court means the criminal trial. It has indicated,
for example, that evidence meets this materiality test when it “undermines confidence in the
outcome of the trial.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995) (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at
678). And it has said that the prosecution violates the Brady rule only when the suppression of
evidence “deprives the defendant of a fair trial.” Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678. So the Court
described Brady as creating a “trial-related” disclosure right. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S.
622, 631 (2002).
As a result, we and other circuit courts have held that no Brady violation occurs from the
suppression of evidence if the prosecution dismisses the criminal case before a defendant stands
trial. See Lech v. Gettel, 2024 WL 2815971, at *1–2 (6th Cir. June 3, 2024); Snow v. Nelson,
634 F. App’x 151, 155 (6th Cir. 2015); see also Anderson v. Baltimore County, 2025 WL
3459768, at *5 (4th Cir. Dec. 2, 2025) (per curiam); Phillips v. Whittington, 2022 WL 797418, at
*8 (5th Cir. March 15, 2022) (per curiam); Gill v. City of Milwaukee, 850 F.3d 335, 343 (7th Cir.
2017); Livers v. Schenck, 700 F.3d 340, 359 (8th Cir. 2012); Parker v. County of Riverside, 78
F.4th 1109, 1113–14 (9th Cir. 2023) (per curiam); Morgan v. Gertz, 166 F.3d 1307, 1310 (10th
Cir. 1999); Flores v. Satz, 137 F.3d 1275, 1278 (11th Cir. 1998) (per curiam). These courts
“universally” reason that a pretrial dismissal of charges cannot infringe “the right to a fair trial”
that Brady protects even if prosecutors did not disclose evidence before the dismissal. Morgan,
166 F.3d at 1310.

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This law poses an insurmountable obstacle for Abbey’s Brady claim because her
complaint alleges that she “never stood trial.” Snow, 634 F. App’x at 155. Rather, prosecutors
“dismissed the criminal actions against” her a week after they revealed the dispatch tapes. Am.
Compl., R.42, PageID 266. There can be no doubt that (under the complaint’s well-pleaded
allegations) the felony charges created many serious hardships for Abbey. But the injuries that
she identifies are not the type of harms that “Brady claims are intended to remedy.” Snow, 634
F. App’x at 156. Because Abbey has not asserted that the suppression of evidence caused her to
receive an “unfair trial,” she has not alleged a viable Brady violation. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
In response, Abbey points out that prosecutors took three years to disclose the dispatch
tapes and that a delayed disclosure can sometimes violate Brady. See United States v. Spry, 238
F. App’x 142, 147–48 (6th Cir. 2007). But this delay implicates Brady only if a defendant shows
that the delay so undermined the defense’s trial strategy that “a reasonable probability” of an
acquittal would have existed if the prosecution had revealed the evidence in a timely manner. Id.
at 148. This rule does not help Abbey. Because prosecutors dismissed her criminal charges, the
delay could not have affected her trial strategy. Brady thus does not reach her allegations.
C. D.H.’s Fourth Amendment Claim Against Officer Stuckey
D.H. separately challenges the district court’s decision to reject his Fourth Amendment
claim against Officer Stuckey without giving him any notice. All agree that, while Metro moved
to dismiss all claims against it, Stuckey moved to dismiss only Abbey’s claims. The district
court thus dismissed D.H.’s claims against Stuckey on its own initiative. We review a district
court’s decision to dismiss a complaint sua sponte for abuse of discretion, but we also review any
underlying legal conclusions de novo. See Doe v. Oberlin Coll., 60 F.4th 345, 351 (6th Cir.
2023).
The district court abused its discretion here. Before dismissing a complaint, the court
should have “notif[ied] all parties of its intent to dismiss” and given D.H. “a chance to either
amend his complaint or respond to the reasons stated by the district court” for the dismissal. Id.
(quoting Tingler v. Marshall, 716 F.2d 1109, 1112 (6th Cir. 1983)). Yet the court took neither
action. Rather, it dismissed D.H.’s claims against Officer Stuckey without notice or an

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opportunity to brief the dismissal. In fairness to the court, the decision by plaintiffs’ counsel to
file a single response to both Metro’s and Stuckey’s motions blurred the status of Abbey’s and
D.H.’s distinct claims. Even so, without notice, D.H. had no opportunity to respond to Stuckey’s
arguments.
We have suggested that this type of error can be harmless if, for example, the court bases
the dismissal on a legal issue that is not open to doubt. See id. at 353. To his credit, however,
Officer Stuckey does not defend the district court’s judgment on this ground. Rather, he
concedes that D.H.’s claims are likely timely because Tennessee law tolls the statute of
limitations for minors until they turn 18. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-106(a); see also Wallace,
549 U.S. at 394–95. So we cannot uphold the district court’s decision on harmlessness grounds.
Officer Stuckey instead suggests that D.H. forfeited any reliance on Tennessee’s tolling
statute by failing to cite it in his opening brief on appeal. Yet D.H. established the district
court’s error in that brief, thereby shifting the burden to Stuckey to establish the error’s
harmlessness. He failed to meet this burden. We thus must vacate the dismissal of D.H.’s
Fourth Amendment claim against Officer Stuckey. Cf. Shelton v. United States, 800 F.3d 292,
295 (6th Cir. 2015).
The district court’s judgment is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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_________________
CONCURRENCE
_________________
COLE, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. I agree with the
lead opinion’s reasoning and conclusion in Part II.C. I also agree with the conclusions of Parts
II.A and II.B: Naya Abbey filed her complaint outside Tennessee’s applicable statute of
limitations and failed to state a Brady claim against Metro. I write separately, however, because
I share the dissenting opinion’s concerns regarding the lead opinion’s application of the
discovery rule and the problematic behavior of law enforcement officers in this case. I also
depart from the lead opinion on its discussion of the scope of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963).
I.
Regarding Part II.A., I concur only in the judgment. This court has “long held that the
discovery rule applies in the § 1983 context[,]” and like the dissent, I find no basis for departing
from our binding precedent. Snyder-Hill v. Ohio State Univ., 48 F.4th 686, 698 (6th Cir. 2022).
Applying the discovery rule, I agree that Abbey’s claims accrued on the date of her arrest, but I
am unpersuaded by the lead opinion’s characterization of Fourth Amendment claims.
The lead opinion reasons that Fourth Amendment claims are based on the “considerations
of everyday life,” and plaintiffs, therefore, “have a much greater ability” to vindicate their rights
upon learning of their injury. Lead Op. 9 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983)). I
strongly disagree. Many Fourth Amendment plaintiffs, like Abbey, face criminal charges and
unjust prosecution. See e.g., Fox v. DeSoto, 489 F.3d 227, 231–32 (6th Cir. 2007), abrogated on
other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009). These barriers hinder a plaintiff’s
understanding of the factual basis giving rise to her constitutional injury, and like employment
discrimination cases, these facts may be “peculiarly in the defendant’s control.” Lead Op. 9. A
driver, for example, is likely unaware of every traffic law and regulation, so she may not know
whether probable cause existed for a stop or search.

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Further, the lead opinion places too much weight on objective reasonableness and fails to
consider that an injury from an unreasonable search or seizure may be less apparent than an
injury in a medical malpractice or employment discrimination suit. Although litigating those
claims requires technical expertise and ample discovery, the actual injury of a botched procedure
or lost job is sometimes more obvious than an injury from an unreasonable traffic stop.
Unfortunately, these considerations do not alter the outcome in this case. According to
Abbey’s amended complaint, she “was following all traffic laws” prior to being stopped. (Am.
Compl., R. 42, PageID 262.) She therefore “discovered, or reasonably should have discovered”
“both h[er] injury and the cause of that injury” at the time of her arrest. See Reguli v. Russ, 109
F.4th 874, 879, 882 (6th Cir. 2024) (citation modified).
I nevertheless remain deeply troubled by Abbey’s allegations. Abbey alleges that Officer
Terrance D. Stuckey falsely attested that Abbey had committed felony offenses, that prosecutors
withheld dispatch recordings contradicting that account for nearly three years, and that the
charges were dismissed only after those recordings were finally disclosed. These allegations
suggest that Abbey could have brought a malicious prosecution claim. See Sykes v. Anderson,
625 F.3d 294, 308–10 (6th Cir. 2010).
The tragic facts alleged here may also have supported an equitable tolling argument.
“Strictly defined, equitable tolling is the doctrine that the statute of limitations will not bar a
claim if the plaintiff, despite diligent efforts, did not discover the injury until after the limitations
period had expired.” Mezo v. Holder, 615 F.3d 616, 620 (6th Cir. 2010) (citation modified).
Although equitable tolling “is a rare remedy to be applied in unusual circumstances, not a cure-
all for an entirely common state of affairs,” Abbey alleges extraordinary hardships caused by her
arrest, including criminal prosecution, homelessness, loss of employment, separation from her
child, a miscarriage, and the death of a newborn. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 396 (2007).
Rather than briefly mentioning the “notions of equity,” counsel could have developed an
equitable tolling argument based on those circumstances. (Appellant Br. 14.) Although this
issue is not before us, I encourage future litigants confronting similarly difficult circumstances to
argue for equitable tolling.

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II.
Because the lead opinion understates the scope of Brady, I likewise concur only in the
judgment of the lead opinion’s analysis of Abbey’s Brady claims against Metro in Part II.B. To
prove a Brady violation, the state must have failed to disclose evidence, the undisclosed evidence
must favor the defendant by showing innocence or impeaching an unfavorable witness, and the
nondisclosure must prejudice the defendant. Clark v. Louisville-Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov’t,
130 F.4th 571, 578 (6th Cir. 2025) (per curiam). Such “prejudice” occurs when the undisclosed
evidence is “‘material’—meaning that there is a ‘reasonable probability’ that the trial outcome
would have changed if the prosecution had turned over the evidence.” Id. (quoting Turner v.
United States, 582 U.S. 313, 324 (2017)). The lead opinion is therefore correct that Brady
generally protects “trial-related” rights. Lead Op. 11 (quoting United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S.
622, 631 (2002)).
But Brady’s disclosure obligations may extend beyond trial in certain circumstances. For
example, this court has not resolved whether the government must disclose material exculpatory
evidence before a defendant enters a guilty plea, and the circuits are divided on that question.
See Robertson v. Lucas, 753 F.3d 606, 621–22 (6th Cir. 2014); Miller v. Gettel, Nos. 22-
1034/1046, 2023 WL 2945340, at *7 (6th Cir. Apr. 14, 2023). I therefore do not agree that
Abbey’s failure to stand trial “poses an insurmountable obstacle” for her Brady claim. Lead Op.
12. Rather, her Brady claim fails because the prosecution ultimately dismissed the charges
against her. See Snow v. Nelson, 634 F. App’x 151, 155–56 (6th Cir. 2015). On that basis, I
concur in the judgment.
III.
Today’s decision should not be understood as approving of the conduct alleged in
Abbey’s complaint. If her allegations are true, Officer Stuckey and the prosecutors committed
serious official misconduct that inflicted profound and lasting harm. The expiration of the
statute of limitations does not render that conduct lawful, acceptable, or excusable. It simply
deprives this court of authority to provide relief. Because the governing law leaves no
alternative, I concur in the judgment as to Parts II.A. and II.B.

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_________________
DISSENT
_________________
CLAY, Circuit Judge, dissenting. Contrary to my colleagues’ opinions, Naya Abbey did
not surrender her Fourth Amendment claims against Officer Terrance Stuckey based on statute
of limitations grounds. Two separate reasons support that conclusion. First, law enforcement’s
inexcusable years-long withholding of exculpatory evidence delayed the filing of this lawsuit.
Law enforcement’s actions impeded Abbey’s knowledge of Stuckey’s Fourth Amendment
violations and should toll the statute of limitations. Second, under this Court’s discovery rule,
the limitations period for Abbey’s Fourth Amendment claims did not begin to run until Abbey
had notice that Stuckey lacked probable cause to search and seize her. The face of Abbey’s
complaint sets forth the plausible contention that Abbey did not have reason to know of her
cause of action until the government released the dispatch tapes from the day of her arrest.
Penalizing Abbey by discrediting her account of what facts she reasonably should have known
from her encounter with Stuckey is unjust, to say the least. I would reverse the district court’s
dismissal of Abbey’s claims against Stuckey.
According to the facts alleged in Abbey’s complaint, which we accept as true at the
pleading stage, Romero v. City of Lansing, 159 F.4th 1002, 1006 (6th Cir. 2025), on August 14,
2019, Stuckey and another officer tailed Abbey’s car, eventually activating their siren and lights
to initiate a traffic stop. When Abbey complied and pulled over, the officers emerged with
firearms drawn, yelled at Abbey, removed her from her car, searched it, held Abbey to the
ground, handcuffed her, and placed her in their car. They told Abbey that she had committed the
felonies of driving recklessly and evading arrest. Stuckey’s story, from the day of the arrest
through a preliminary hearing in Abbey’s criminal case, was “that Abbey did not stop for the
[police vehicle’s] blue lights and siren, but instead sped through [two] intersection[s,]” until
finally stopping at a third light, “where Stuckey, for a third time, engaged his sirens and lights.”
Am. Compl., R. 42, PageID #265.

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Three years later, much of the damage of Abbey’s ongoing criminal prosecution had
already been done. As a direct result of the charges against her, Abbey lost her job and her home
and could not secure new employment or a new lease. Unhoused, she suffered malnourishment,
physical and sexual assault, battery, and exposure to the elements. Abbey’s stress and
circumstances took a toll on her physical health and cost her the loss of a pregnancy and then the
death of a newborn. She lost all “meaningful contact” with her living son, D.H., who is non-
verbal and autistic and began residing with his father in another state after Abbey’s arrest. Id. at
PageID #269.
Throughout those three years, while Abbey’s criminal charges wreaked havoc on her life,
the government held onto dispatch tapes, which Abbey claims are exculpatory, from the date of
date of Abbey’s arrest. On August 24, 2022, the government finally produced the tapes of
Stuckey’s calls with dispatch from August 14, 2019. According to Abbey, those tapes revealed
that Stuckey did not have a basis to stop her, contrary to his contemporaneous assertions.
Stuckey had claimed that he arrested Abbey for driving dangerously and evading arrest and
testified that she had been speeding through intersections while his sirens and lights operated.
But on the recordings, Stuckey “advised [dispatch] that Abbey was driving normal speeds and
[that he] was not in pursuit . . . .” Id. at PageID #266. He “did not advise that Abbey had fled at
multiple intersections, and the time stamps were inconsistent with Stuckey’s testimony.” Id.
The prosecution dismissed the charges against Abbey one week after disclosing the dispatch
recordings.
In the case on appeal, Abbey claims that Stuckey violated her Fourth Amendment rights
by seizing her, searching her car, and using excessive force against her. The district court
dismissed Abbey’s Fourth Amendment claims as untimely. Abbey v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville
& Davidson Cnty., No. 3:23-CV-00300, 2025 WL 1901344, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. July 9, 2025).
Abbey asserts that her claims did not accrue until law enforcement disclosed the dispatch tapes.
Defendants contend that the Fourth Amendment claims were time-barred because Plaintiffs filed
the complaint more than one year after the date of Abbey’s arrest.

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We review de novo the district court’s dismissal on timeliness grounds. J. Endres v. Ne.
Ohio Med. Univ., 938 F.3d 281, 292 (6th Cir. 2019). To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff
must plead sufficient facts that the claim is “plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Facial
plausibility means that the court may reasonably infer from the facts alleged that the defendant is
liable. Chrestman ex rel. Wooden v. Metropolitan Gov’t & Davidson Cnty., 156 F.4th 694, 700
(6th Cir. 2025) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). “[W]e credit all well-pleaded factual
allegations in [the] complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in [Abbey’s] favor.” Romero,
159 F.4th at 1006.
The prosecution’s alleged conduct in Abbey’s criminal case weighs in favor of allowing
Abbey’s civil rights claims to proceed. Evidently, law enforcement possessed dispatch
recordings, which the government had reason to know contradicted Stuckey’s central testimony
about his perceptions of Abbey on the day of her arrest. Viewing the prosecution’s actions in a
generous light, the prosecution failed to diligently review and disclose the presumably small
amount of evidence relevant to Abbey’s charges. Viewed more candidly, the prosecution
committed misconduct by deliberately sitting on exculpatory evidence for three years without
explanation. Cf. Allah-U-Akbar v. Bradshaw, 154 F.4th 482, 495 (6th Cir. 2025 (“[S]ubstantial
inequitable conduct . . . includes ‘wrongfully retaining and delaying the production of . . .
exculpatory evidence[.]’” (third and fourth alterations in original) (quoting Mason v. Mitchell,
729 F.3d 545, 552 (6th Cir. 2013))), cert. denied sub nom. Allah-U-Akbar v. May, No. 25-6909,
2026 WL 1513290 (U.S. June 1, 2026). Neither of my colleagues offers an explanation for those
actions. Fairness counsels adjudicating Abbey’s delayed claims, given the prosecution’s role in
delaying them. Cf. Agristor Leasing v. Saylor, 803 F.2d 1401, 1405 (6th Cir. 1986) (“Fraudulent
concealment of a cause of action tolls the statute of limitations.” (citation omitted)); Smith v.
Hilliard, 578 F. App’x 556, 566 (6th Cir. 2014) (“Tennessee courts have long held that
‘fraudulent concealment will toll the running of a statute of limitations[, and] . . . the doctrine of
fraudulent concealment is aligned with the discovery rule.’” (citation omitted)); Lutz v.
Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., 717 F.3d 459, 474 (6th Cir. 2013) (describing in the context of
Ohio law that “[u]nder the fraudulent concealment doctrine, a statute of limitations may be tolled

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‘where there is some conduct of the adverse party . . . which excludes suspicion and prevents
inquiry.’” (citation omitted)); Lashlee v. Sumner, 570 F.2d 107, 110 (6th Cir. 1978) (“Deliberate
concealment by a defendant of the plaintiff’s cause of action will toll the statute of limitations.”).
Equitable tolling “allows courts to toll a statute of limitations when ‘a litigant’s failure to
meet a legally-mandated deadline unavoidably arose from circumstances beyond that litigant’s
control.’” Robertson v. Simpson, 624 F.3d 781 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Graham-Humphreys v.
Memphis Brooks Museum of Art, Inc., 209 F.3d 552, 560–61 (6th Cir. 2000)). That suppression
or failure by the prosecution to disclose, which was beyond Abbey’s control, was the true cause
of the delay in this litigation. Although Abbey does not present an equitable tolling argument,
per se, this case speaks to the same underlying principles of fairness, which argue in favor of
allowing Abbey to proceed. This Court should not overlook the government’s troubling and
seemingly deliberate withholding of crucial evidence for three years while Abbey’s life fell
apart.
In any event, Abbey did not need to rely on equitable tolling principles, because under
the discovery rule, the limitations period did not begin until August 2022, and the complaint was
timely. As Judge Murphy explains in the lead opinion, the time at which a § 1983 claim accrues
depends on whether the occurrence rule or the discovery rule is operable. Under the occurrence
rule, the limitations period begins “on the first day that every element of a claim has occurred
such that the plaintiff may sue in court over the claim.” Reguli v. Russ, 109 F.4th 874, 879 (6th
Cir. 2024) (per curiam). By contrast, the discovery rule triggers the period only once “the
plaintiff [has] discovered, or reasonably should have discovered, basic facts about the claim.” Id.
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that the occurrence rule “presumptively” applies, it
has acknowledged in the same breath that “the answer is not always so simple.” McDonough v.
Smith, 588 U.S. 109, 115 (2019) (quoting Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007)). In fact,
the Court reflected that it had “never suggested that the date on which a constitutional injury first
occurs is the only date from which a limitations period may run.” Id. at 123.
Exercising that flexibility, the Sixth Circuit has maintained the discovery rule with
respect to our § 1983 cases. Reguli, 109 F.4th at 879; Bozzo v. Nanasy, 159 F.4th 1111, 1116

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(6th Cir. 2025) (“Despite Supreme Court precedent suggesting otherwise, our Court’s cases have
applied a ‘discovery rule’ to § 1983 claims.”); Snyder-Hill v. Ohio State Univ., 48 F.4th 686, 698
(6th Cir. 2022) (“[W]e have long held that the discovery rule applies in the § 1983 context.”);
Dibrell v. City of Knoxville, 984 F.3d 1156, 1162 (6th Cir. 2021) (noting “tension” with the
Supreme Court’s standard occurrence rule but acknowledging that “[o]ur § 1983 caselaw . . . has
started the accrual analysis with the competing discovery rule”).
Defendants would like to create ambiguity as to which rule applies in this case, where
none exists under our case law. See United States v. Moody, 206 F.3d 609, 615 (6th Cir. 2000)
(noting that absent an intervening decision by the Supreme Court or the en banc Court of
Appeals, the panel must adhere to binding precedent). Even if we may apply the occurrence
rule, it would be inappropriate to do so here. Defendants offer no substantive argument in favor
of ignoring the application of the discovery rule in the factual circumstances of this case. And
ignoring the delayed disclosure of exculpatory evidence—which disclosed to Abbey the basis for
her cause of action—would be both unfair to Abbey and contrary to the broad remedial purpose
of § 1983, “which is to ensure that individuals whose federal constitutional or statutory rights are
abridged may recover damages or secure injunctive relief.” Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 55
(1984).
Under the discovery rule, the limitations period starts when “the plaintiff discovered, or
reasonably should have discovered, basic facts about the claim.” Reguli, 109 F.4th at 879. The
question then is, when did Abbey discover, or when should she have reasonably discovered, the
basic facts about her Fourth Amendment claims? In order to answer that question, we must
identify which facts are the “basic facts.” Id. That task is sometimes open to interpretation.
Generally, “we have looked to what event should have alerted the typical lay person to protect
his or her rights.” Eidson v. Tenn. Dep’t of Children’s Servs., 510 F.3d 631, 635 (6th Cir. 2007)
(quoting Kuhnle Bros., Inc. v. Cnty. of Geauga, 103 F.3d 516, 520 (6th Cir. 1997)). The plaintiff
must know enough “to plead factual allegations that impliedly establish[] at least one viable
theory.” Dibrell, 984 F.3d at 1160 (first citing Johnson v. City of Shelby, 574 U.S. 10, 11–12
(2014) (per curiam); and then citing Tchankpa v. Ascena Retail Grp., Inc., 951 F.3d 805, 817
(6th Cir. 2020)). To further complicate matters, the kinds of facts that would alert a plaintiff to

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protect her rights and establish a viable legal theory may vary across types of claims. The
inquiry “turns on the ‘specific constitutional right’ at issue[, s]o we start by identifying the
elements . . . .” Reguli, 109 F.4th at 880 (quoting Reed v. Goertz, 598 U.S. 230, 235–36 (2023)).
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .” U.S. Const.
amend. IV. The unreasonableness of a search or seizure is a basic fact and an essential element
of a Fourth Amendment claim. See Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 806 (1984) (“By its
terms, the Fourth Amendment forbids only ‘unreasonable’ searches and seizures.”); Howell v.
McCormick, 148 F.4th 834, 844 (6th Cir. 2025) (“The Fourth Amendment’s text prohibits only
‘unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .’”). A search or seizure is unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment if an officer performs it without the requisite objective level of suspicion,
which is typically probable cause. See Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, 602 U.S. 556, 562 (2024)
(explaining that the “gravamen” of an unreasonable seizure is lack of probable cause (quoting
Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 43 (2022))); United States v. Collazo, 818 F.3d 247, 253–54
(6th Cir. 2016) (noting that a traffic stop is a Fourth Amendment violation only if the officer
lacks the requisite probable cause or reasonable suspicion); Alman v. Reed, 703 F.3d 887, 896
(6th Cir. 2013) (noting that an arrest violates the Fourth Amendment if the officer lacks a
warrant and probable cause); Camara v. Mun. Ct. of City & Cnty. of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 528–29,
535 (1967) (noting that a search violates the Fourth Amendment if executed without a warrant
supported by probable cause, except in rare and defined exceptions). Similarly, an officer’s use
of force is excessive only if it is not “objectively reasonable in light of the facts and
circumstances confronting” the officer. Chrestman, 156 F.4th at 701 (quoting Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989)).
Abbey alleges that on August 14, 2019, Stuckey unconstitutionally seized her, searched
her vehicle, and used excessive force against her. Therefore, Abbey’s statute of limitations
began to run when she should reasonably have known that Stuckey took those actions without
probable cause or an objectively reasonable justification for the use of force. Until she knew
those facts, she did not know of her injury. See Hopkins v. City of Westland, 21 F.3d 427 (6th
Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision) (“[S]ince there was probable cause to arrest

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plaintiff, he suffered no injury.”); Hall v. Navarre, 118 F.4th 749, 764 (6th Cir. 2024) (Griffin, J.,
concurring) (“[W]hen police make a seizure unsupported by probable cause, the injury is the
wrongful seizure itself. Consequently, the presence of probable cause will defeat a Fourth
Amendment claim because there is no injury.”).
A person subject to an unlawful search or seizure often will immediately have a basis to
allege that the officer lacked probable cause. Perhaps that is why the limitations period in Fourth
Amendment search and seizure cases generally begins to run on the date of the search or seizure,
as indicated by the cases cited by the lead opinion. The facts and circumstances of those cases
reflect the likelihood that the plaintiffs doubted the reasonableness of the officers’ conduct at the
outset. Typically, a lay person would be alerted to protect his rights, for example, if an officer
struck him without cause until he lost consciousness or caused him serious physical injury and
the need for surgical intervention. See, e.g., Wynn v. City of Covington, No. 24-5840,
2025 WL 2093032, at *1 (6th Cir. July 25, 2025) (noting that officers had allegedly “slammed”
plaintiff against police car, hit him until he lost consciousness, placed him in a chokehold, and
placed knees and a boot on his back and neck); Miller v. Cocke Cnty., No. 21-5585, 2022 WL
103143, *1–2 (6th Cir. Jan. 11, 2022) (explaining that plaintiff “had reason to know of his injury
at the time of his detainment” when “a police officer grabbed him by the neck, body slammed
him on the floor, and then picked him up and threw him hard against a wall[,]” causing “eight
broken ribs and a punctured lung[,]” and then officers initially refused him medical attention
before finally allowing him to be treated in hospital); Hodge v. City of Elyria, 126 F. App’x 222,
223 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting that officers had allegedly choked plaintiff, forced him to the ground,
and kneed him until he coughed up blood, requiring him to undergo surgery).
In some of those cases, the plaintiffs actively resisted arrest or complained of their
injuries immediately, signaling that they considered themselves wronged at the time. See Dibrell
v. Rex, No. 25-5334, 2025 WL 3285587, at *1, *3 (6th Cir. Nov. 25, 2025) (noting that plaintiff
had resisted arrest and responded to officer’s allegation that he was driving with a suspended
license and concluding that “[h]ere, the event that would have alerted [plaintiff] to his excessive-
force claim was the . . . arrest” (emphasis added)); Wynn, 2025 WL 2093032, at *1–2 (noting

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that plaintiff resisted arrest and “‘complained of his injuries’ during his detention immediately
following the incident” (citation omitted)).
Notably, none of the cases cited in the lead opinion dealt precisely with a plaintiff who
argued, or could have plausibly argued, that delayed knowledge about probable cause affected
the statute of limitations. See, e.g., Codrington v. Dolak, 142 F.4th 884, 891 (6th Cir. 2025)
(noting that plaintiff had conceded and forfeited arguments about the timeliness of his search and
seizure claims); Fox v. DeSoto, 489 F.3d 227, 233–35 (6th Cir. 2007) (stating that excessive
force claim accrues at time of arrest “[a]bsent some . . . delay in accrual[,]” rejecting argument
under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), that plaintiff’s unlawful search and excessive
force claims would accrue only after an “anticipated future conviction” was set aside, and
alternatively holding that the officer had qualified immunity (emphasis added)), abrogated on
other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009); Hodge, 126 F. App’x at 26
(rejecting plaintiff’s Heck argument); Wynn, 2025 WL 2093032, at *3 (addressing argument that
plaintiff had been unaware of extent of injury and identities of officers at time of arrest). In fact,
in Ruffin v. Kudley, No. 19-3534, 2020 WL 7062665 (6th Cir. Sept. 1, 2020), the district court
had acknowledged that the plaintiff’s claims possibly could have accrued months after his arrest,
once he became aware of certain procedural issues and the state court dismissed his criminal
case. 2020 WL 7062665, *1–2. Although this Court stated that the claims accrued on the date
of the arrest, the weight of that holding is diminished because (1) the plaintiff did not establish
that he had filed a suit even by the latest hypothetical deadline, and (2) the panel did not confront
an argument that the plaintiff ever lacked knowledge that the officers’ conduct was
unconstitutional. Id. at *2–3.
This case is different from those. From the complaint, the inference that Abbey
discovered Stuckey’s lack of justification when she received the dispatch tapes is plausible—that
lack of justification is a basic component of her Fourth Amendment claims. The complaint does
not indicate that Stuckey caused Abbey bodily harm akin to the flagrant violence that some of
Judge Murphy’s cited cases describe. Nor does it state that Abbey contemporaneously
complained that Stuckey was violating her rights. Abbey’s point is not that she was ignorant of
the extent of her injury on August 14, 2019, but that she did not know of her constitutional injury

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at all. Only when she heard the dispatch tapes did she have the factual basis she would need to
plead that Stuckey lacked probable cause to stop her, exercise force against her, search her car,
and arrest her. Cf. Rapp v. Putman, 644 F. App’x 621, 625 n.1 (6th Cir. 2016) (“[If p]laintiff
[had] allege[d] that he did not know or did not have reason to know that he was injured (i.e., that
he was being prosecuted . . . without probable cause) . . . , a different accrual date might apply.”).
Defendants and the lead opinion frame Abbey’s argument as advocating to “delay accrual
until a plaintiff has proof of every element of her claim[,]” Defs.’ Br. 12, or “learn[s] of both her
injuries and their cause,” Murphy Op. 7. But those statements misrepresent Abbey’s argument.
Far from pursuing a “broad expansion of the discovery rule[,]” the analysis that Abbey correctly
recommends is a strict application of it. Id. at 8. The dispatch tapes were not merely evidence to
support a percolating allegation that probable cause was absent, nor were they evidence of the
cause of Abbey’s injuries; instead, they were the principal factual basis available for alleging the
injuries themselves: an unreasonable search and seizure and excessive force. Unlike other kinds
of injuries, which the injured may detect regardless of the perpetrator’s point of view, a Fourth
Amendment injury exists only if the conduct complained of was unreasonable. In that way, a
Fourth Amendment plaintiff such as Abbey differs materially from, say, a medical malpractice
plaintiff, who knows that a drug from the hospital harmed him, even if he does not know that the
hospital breached a legal duty. See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 122–23 (1979) (“We
thus cannot hold that Congress intended that ‘accrual’ of a claim must await awareness by the
plaintiff that his injury was negligently inflicted. A plaintiff . . . armed with the facts about the
harm done to him[] can protect himself . . . .”).
Concepts that the lead opinion extracts from other areas of law only underscore the
exceptionality of Fourth Amendment cases. Reference to the distinction between “actual injury”
and “legal wrong” falls flat in the Fourth Amendment context because, at the risk of being
repetitive, there is no Fourth Amendment injury without a probable cause problem. Murphy Op.
8–9. This Court has recognized that “in the context of the discovery rule, ‘injury’ means
something more than ‘harm[,]’” and that rings true for Abbey. Snyder-Hill, 48 F.4th at 702 n.81.

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The lead opinion cites New Castle County v. Halliburton NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116 (3d
Cir. 1997). In the leadup to that case, the United States had sued New Castle County and others
under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601–9675, to require the defendants to clean a hazardous substance site. New Castle Cnty.,
111 F.3d at 1119. The Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) contracted with Halliburton
NUS Corp. to investigate and advise on the necessary response actions and then executed
consent decrees with New Castle County and the other defendants, requiring them to remediate
the pollution of the property. Id.
In New Castle’s lawsuit against NUS, New Castle claimed that NUS had improperly
installed monitoring wells, causing some of the damage NUS later reported. Id. The court
distinguished between New Castle’s “actual injury,” i.e., that it would “undertake costly
remedial action at the landfill,” and “legal wrong[,] . . . [i.e.,] that it was agreeing to incur NUS’
potential fair share of the clean-up costs . . . .” Id. at 1125. New Castle was clearly aware of its
injury upon signing a consent decree with the EPA, since New Castle was “aware that other
persons were partially responsible for the landfill’s condition” and “that NUS’ activity and report
played a significant role in the determination of New Castle’s potential liability.” Id. The
economic injury of having to shoulder the costs of repairing damage for which others were
partially responsible was an injury by itself; the statute of limitations began to run when New
Castle became aware of the injury and signed a consent decree. Id. That New Castle did not
know “that it was agreeing to incur NUS’ potential fair share of the clean-up costs” did not delay
the period. Id. That example does not map onto Abbey’s Fourth Amendment claims. New
Castle was harmed no matter how responsible NUS had been, but Abbey only had a Fourth
Amendment injury if Stuckey lacked probable cause. One final demerit to New Castle’s utility
in Abbey’s case is that New Castle’s “waive[r of] its discovery rule argument” was “an
independent reason . . . not to apply the discovery rule” in that case. Id. at 1125 n.10.
Reguli v. Russ, 109 F.4th 874 (6th Cir. 2024) (per curiam) does not help my colleagues’
argument either. That case pertains to a First Amendment retaliation claim rather than a Fourth
Amendment claim. Reguli, 109 F.4th at 876. That difference is material in the statute of
limitations analysis. See id. at 880 (“Whether a plaintiff has a ‘complete and present cause of

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action’ . . . turns on the ‘specific constitutional right’ at issue.” (quoting Reed, 598 U.S. at 235–
36)). The elements of Reguli’s First Amendment retaliation claim included (1) engagement in
protected speech, (2) adverse action, and (3) a causal connection between the speech and the
adverse action. Id. (citing cases). The conclusion that knowledge of the first two elements was
enough to put Reguli on notice of her First Amendment injury for statute of limitations purposes,
id. at 881, 883, does not control in a Fourth Amendment case with completely distinct elements.
Nor do employment law cases control the outcome of Abbey’s case. Public employment
discrimination law under § 1983 develops in the shadow of the larger pool of private
employment discrimination cases under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e–2000e–17, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 621–34. See Lukovsky v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 535 F.3d 1044, 1048 n.3 (9th Cir. 2008)
(“Although the plaintiffs’ actions in this case arise under §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986, . . . the
majority of employment cases involve private employers. We therefore consider cases arising
under other federal laws, such as Title VII or the ADEA, to be instructive.”). Both of those
statutes contain express limitations periods anchored to the date of the alleged unlawful practice.
Thompson v. Fresh Prods., LLC, 985 F.3d 509, 520–21 (6th Cir. 2021); 29 U.S.C. §§ 626(d)–(e);
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(e)–(f). In fact, the Sixth Circuit case that the lead opinion cites in this
regard, Amini v. Oberlin Coll., 259 F.3d 493 (6th Cir. 2001), adjudicated the timeliness of Title
VII and ADEA claims—not § 1983 claims. 259 F.3d at 498–99. The Court focused on the
statutory text as a basis for concluding that “the Title VII and ADEA limitations provisions [run]
from the date on which the alleged discriminatory act . . . was communicated to the plaintiff.”
Id. at 499. Amini therefore should not guide our statute of limitations analysis under § 1983,
which has no self-contained statute of limitations.
Just as easily as Judge Murphy invokes employment cases, we could consider sex
discrimination cases that favor Abbey. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,
20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–88, provides a remedy “to those who face discrimination on the basis of sex
in the American education system.” Snyder-Hill, 48 F.4th at 699 (quoting Doe v. Univ. of Ky.,
971 F.3d 553, 557 (6th Cir. 2020)). Title IX, like § 1983, contains no statute of limitations. Id.
at 698. In Snyder-Hill v. Ohio State University, 48 F.4th 686 (6th Cir. 2022), this Court held that

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Title IX “plaintiffs’ claims accrued when they knew or had reason to know that Ohio State was
‘deliberately indifferent to sexual harassment, of which [the school had] actual knowledge . . . .’”
Id. at 704. The “plaintiff’s knowledge [of abuse was] not enough to start the clock.” Id. at 705.
Like Abbey’s, the plaintiffs’ injuries and claims hinged on facts related to what the defendant
knew and how its actions measured against that knowledge. Without knowing those facts, the
Title IX plaintiffs could not state their claim.
The argument that a more stringent standard should apply to Fourth Amendment cases
because they “do not turn on facts peculiarly in the defendant’s control” is wrong. Murphy Op.
9. Probable cause is indeed an objective standard, as is the standard for excessive force. Yet
those standards contemplate the stimuli confronting an officer at the time of a given encounter:
observations, background, training, and experience that a plaintiff cannot necessarily access.
Probable cause turns on “‘the facts and circumstances within [] the officers’[] knowledge and . . .
reasonably trustworthy information . . . .” United States v. Lewis, 504 F.2d 92, 100 (6th Cir.
1974) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)). Reasonable suspicion turns
on “the totality of the circumstances,” including “all of the information available to law
enforcement officials at the time[,]” and the officer’s “experience[,] specialized training[,]
inferences[,] deductions[,] . . . direct observations, dispatch information, directions from other
officers, and the nature of the area and time of day . . . .” United States v. Lyons, 687 F.3d 754,
763 (6th Cir. 2012) (first quoting Humphrey v. Mabry, 482 F.3d 840, 846 (6th Cir. 2007); then
quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002); and then quoting United States v.
Campbell, 549 F.3d 364, 371 (6th Cir. 2008)). And excessive force turns on “‘the facts that were
knowable’ to the officer at the time[,]” Chrestman, 156 F.4th at 701 (quoting White v. Pauly, 580
U.S. 73, 77 (2017) (per curiam)), such as “(1) ‘the severity of the crime at issue’; (2) ‘whether
the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others’; and (3) ‘whether he
is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight[,]’” id. (quoting Graham, 490
U.S. at 396). With all of those inputs at her fingertips, a Fourth Amendment plaintiff may be
equipped to assess “the objective reasonableness of the officer’s actions[,]” Murphy Op. 9, but,
as Judge Cole concedes, those inputs are not necessarily within reach.

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Certainly, Abbey’s own subjective experience did not provide her with the knowledge to
trigger the limitations period. Both of my colleagues point out that Abbey’s complaint described
her as driving lawfully on the date of her arrest. But Abbey drafted the complaint with the
benefit of hindsight and knowledge of the dispatch tapes. Abbey’s knowledge as it existed at the
time that she filed the complaint does not belie that she might have accepted the officer’s
prevarications as true four years earlier.
Abbey’s argument in that regard is both plausible and fact-specific. The setting and the
nature of the allegations Stuckey levied against Abbey during the stop are significant, and their
specificity negates Judge Murphy’s concern about a “broad expansion of the discovery rule . . . .”
Murphy Op. 8. They affect what events would “alert[] the typical lay person to protect . . . her
rights.” Eidson, 510 F.3d at 635 (quoting Kuhnle Bros., 103 F.3d at 520). When Stuckey pulled
Abbey over, he accused her of driving recklessly and evading arrest. Drivers constantly shift
their focus and might not notice every flashing light or every pedestrian. Accused by a police
officer, any driver might doubt herself and believe that the officer observed conduct that made
him genuinely suspicious of a traffic offense. One might be familiar with the experience of
receiving an unexpected speeding ticket in the mail, despite having had only lawful intentions on
the road. Abbey could reasonably have believed that she had inadvertently inched over the speed
limit or failed to notice Stuckey’s lights earlier than she did. The same logic might not
necessarily apply in a case where a plaintiff was accused of an offense such as drug trafficking,
robbery, or homicide, where an accused person might be more certain that she had not
committed the offense.
Even if Abbey was certain that she had followed the law, the position that Abbey should
have “rel[ied] on her own testimony to pursue th[e] case” is overly simplistic and untenable.
Murphy Op. 10. First, it is not clear that courts would have accepted such a factual basis as
comporting with the pleading standards. See Rice v. Jones, No. 22-3972, 2023 WL 8369996, at
*2 (6th Cir. June 23, 2023) (affirming dismissal where plaintiff “did not allege any facts to
support an inference that the defendants lacked probable cause to arrest him” and “simply
alleged that . . . the troopers ‘falsely accused and arrested [him] for trespassing’ and other
‘conjured up’ charges” (second alteration in original)); Brown v. City of Albion, 136 F.4th 331,

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343 (6th Cir. 2025) (“[W]here the plaintiff’s allegations fail to plausibly suggest the absence of
probable cause, dismissal is appropriate. . . . No jury issue is presented.”); cf. Bender’s, Inc. v.
Walker, 1 F. App’x 317, 325–26 (6th Cir. 2001) (affirming judgment as a matter of law where
plaintiff argued defendant “did not have probable cause . . . because he did not and currently
does not believe the property was stolen[,]” since “[p]laintiff’s claim of innocence, and even
actual innocence, does not negate the then-existing probable cause underlying his arrest”).
Abbey should not be precluded from bringing her lawsuit based on counterfactual speculation
about how courts might have treated these kinds of allegations.
Second, that position runs contrary to Fourth Amendment law. Abbey had to plead the
elements of her claims, including that Stuckey lacked probable cause. Cf. Wesley v. Campbell,
779 F.3d 421, 429 (6th Cir. 2015) (stating plaintiff alleging wrongful arrest must “plausibly
allege that it was unsupported by probable cause”). Even had she known that she had done
nothing wrong, Abbey could plausibly have accepted Stuckey’s observations that the
circumstances of the stop provided Stuckey with probable cause. Probable cause is not a matter
of certainty or even knowledge of a suspect’s guilt. It is the objective presence of sufficient
“‘facts and circumstances . . . to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that’ an
offense has been or is being committed.” Lewis, 504 F.2d at 100 (quoting Carroll, 267 U.S. at
162); see also Weser v. Goodson, 965 F.3d 507, 513–14 (6th Cir. 2020) (explaining that probable
cause means “a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution” would believe “that the suspect has
committed, is committing or is about to commit an offense” (quoting Thacker v. City of
Columbus, 328 F.3d 244, 255 (6th Cir. 2003))); Lyons, 687 F.3d at 763 (noting that reasonable
suspicion requires even less certainty than probable cause); Chrestman, 156 F.4th at 701 (noting
that “the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of
hindsight” dictates the objective reasonableness of force (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396));
Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 399 (2015) (“[A] court must judge the reasonableness of
the force used from the perspective and with the knowledge of the defendant officer.”). The
subjective experience of the suspect is irrelevant as to whether the officer’s conduct violated her
rights. If a person cannot avoid a search or seizure based on the fact of her actual innocence, we
should not expect her to argue the constitutionality of a search or seizure on that basis alone. Cf.

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Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 (1979) (stating that “innocence . . . is largely irrelevant”
because “[t]he Constitution does not guarantee that only the guilty will be arrested”).
Moreover, our qualified immunity doctrine grants officers the benefit of the doubt on the
issue of probable cause. We sometimes excuse Fourth Amendment violations where the
“defendants . . . mistakenly but reasonably conclude that probable cause exists.” Lester v.
Roberts, 986 F.3d 599, 607 (6th Cir. 2021); see also Harville v. City of Warren, No. 24-1953,
2025 WL 1912769, at *3 (6th Cir. July 11, 2025) (stating that to overcome a qualified immunity
defense, a Fourth Amendment plaintiff must show that the defendant “not only lacked probable
cause . . . but knew that he lacked it” (citing Robertson v. Lucas, 753 F.3d 606, 616 (6th Cir.
2014))); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1986) (“Only where the warrant application is
so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence unreasonable
will the shield of immunity be lost.” (citation omitted)). For a cause of action to arise, the
circumstances must have been such that “an official could be expected to know that certain
conduct would violate statutory or constitutional rights . . . .” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 819 (1982); see also Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 105 (2018) (“An officer ‘cannot be
said to have violated a clearly established right unless . . . any reasonable official in the
defendant’s shoes would have understood that he was violating it.’” (quoting Plumhoff v.
Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 778–779 (2014))).
That paradigm presents a Fourth Amendment plaintiff with the uphill battle of showing
that, regardless of what she knows to be true, the officer knew he was acting without probable
cause. To hold that Abbey’s statute of limitations lapsed would be to say that a plaintiff’s cause
of action accrues before she has knowledge that an officer’s behavior resulted from an intention
to violate the law, even though an officer is liable based only on that intention. And “[t]o say to
one who has been wronged, ‘You had a remedy, but before the wrong was ascertainable to you,
the law stripped you of your remedy,’ makes a mockery of the law.” Snyder-Hill, 48 F.4th at
699 (quoting City of Aurora v. Bechtel Corp., 599 F.2d 382, 388 (10th Cir. 1979)).
Abbey could have reasoned that perhaps Stuckey had interpreted an innocent but sudden
turn while driving as an attempt to evade the police. Perhaps Stuckey could have reasonably

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perceived a careful maneuver by Abbey as a near miss of another pedestrian or another driver.
Perhaps Stuckey could have confused Abbey with someone else driving a similar vehicle.
Whatever explanation Abbey might have reasonably adopted to rationalize Stuckey’s actions, a
jury should have the opportunity to consider it. See Am. Premier Underwriters, Inc. v. Nat’l R.R.
Passenger Corp., 839 F.3d 458, 464 (6th Cir. 2016) (noting that “courts should not dismiss
complaints on statute-of-limitations grounds when there are disputed factual questions relating to
the accrual date” such as “claims that the defendant fraudulently concealed facts, thereby
preventing the plaintiff from learning of its injury and complex issues about whether information
in the plaintiff’s possession sufficed to alert it of the claim” (citations omitted)). Stuckey has not
shown that Abbey must have known of her constitutional injury on August 14, 2019, as a matter
of law.
Judge Cole agrees that the discovery rule applies to this case but inexplicably believes
that Abbey’s complaint, which states that Abbey had been following the traffic laws on the date
of her arrest, reveals that she had reason to know of her injury on that date.1 The points made
elsewhere in this dissent are worth reiterating. First, the complaint speaks to Abbey’s knowledge
only as of the time of drafting that document. Even if Abbey knows today that she was driving
lawfully on August 14, 2019, Stuckey could have temporarily convinced her that she was not.
Second, even if Abbey knew on the date of her arrest that she was obeying the law, that
knowledge would not have necessarily informed her that Stuckey lacked probable cause to think
otherwise. Then there are the questions of whether the prosecution knew of Stuckey’s
prevarications and committed misconduct by participating in them by delaying disclosure of the
audio tapes—all questions for the jury.
There is an argument to be made that Abbey failed to state a Brady claim against Metro
because Abbey’s Brady rights cannot be effectuated unless the case goes to trial. See United
1Judge Cole notes that equitable tolling may have been appropriate in this case. He cites a definition of
equitable tolling as “the doctrine that the statute of limitations will not bar a claim if the plaintiff, despite diligent
efforts, did not discover the injury until after the limitations period had expired.” Cole Op. 15 (quoting Mezo v.
Holder, 615 F.3d 616, 620 (6th Cir. 2010)). His invocation of that description suggests, contrary to his concurrence,
alignment with Abbey’s contention that she should be afforded some grace as a result of not discovering her injury
until the later date asserted by her.

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States v. Farley, 2 F.3d 645, 654 (6th Cir. 1993) (“This Court has held that due process requires
only that disclosure of exculpatory material be made in sufficient time to permit the defendant to
make effective use of that material at trial.” (citing United States v. Presser, 844 F.2d 1275, 1284
(6th Cir. 1988))); Snow v. Nelson, 634 F. App’x 151, 156 (6th Cir. 2015) (“Perhaps [plaintiff]
would have been released earlier had the [evidence] come to light sooner, but . . . [t]he fifty-two
days [he] spent in jail . . . is simply not the type of deprivation Brady claims are intended to
remedy.”). Additionally, it would seem that the district court improperly dismissed D.H.’s
claims against Stuckey sua sponte. Further, I strongly disagree with the contention that Abbey’s
claims against Stuckey were time-barred. Accepting as true the well-pled facts as alleged in the
complaint, one could reasonably infer that Abbey did not possess the basic facts of her claim
until she obtained the dispatch tapes and had a factual basis to doubt Stuckey’s assertions of
probable case. Accord Deary v. Three Un-Named Police Officers, 746 F.2d 185, 199 (3d Cir.
1984) (Higginbotham, J., concurring in part) (“The gravamen of plaintiff’s section 1983 claims is
deprivation of liberty without probable cause. Thus, her claims accrued when she knew or had
reason to know that she was arrested without probable cause.”) Abbey is especially entitled to
that inference because of the government’s disturbing and prolonged concealment of exculpatory
evidence. Cf. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 483–84 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(“The maxim of unclean hands comes from courts of equity. But the principle prevails also in
courts of law. . . . Where the government is the actor, the reasons for applying it are even more
persuasive.” (footnote omitted)), overruled by Berger v. State of N.Y., 388 U.S. 41 (1967), and
overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Because I would reverse the dismissal of Abbey’s Fourth Amendment claims against
Stuckey, I respectfully dissent.

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