National Foundation for Special Needs Integrity, Inc. v. Devon Reese , as Personal Representative for the Estate of Theresa A. Givens

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 17‐1817
NATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR SPECIAL NEEDS INTEGRITY, I NC.,
Plaintiff‐Appellee,
v.
D EVON R EESE , as Personal Representative for the
Estate of Theresa A. Givens,
Defendant‐Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
No. 1:15‐cv‐00545 — Tanya Walton Pratt, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED SEPTEMBER 27, 2017 — D ECIDED FEBRUARY 7, 2018
____________________
Before R IPPLE , SYKES , and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.
HAMILTON , Circuit Judge. In this case, we apply Indiana
law to a trust agreement to determine who receives the re‐
mainder funds upon the beneficiary’s death. Plaintiff National
Foundation for Special Needs Integrity signed an agreement
with Theresa Givens establishing a trust that the Foundation
was to manage for her benefit while she lived. In the agree‐
ment, Givens named herself as the only contingent remainder

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2 No. 17‐1817
beneficiary. Givens died just a month after funding the trust,
leaving more than $234,000 in the trust.
By naming herself, Givens failed to specify a surviving re‐
mainder beneficiary. The Foundation claims that the agree‐
ment entitles it as trustee to retain any remaining trust assets
in this situation. Givens’s son, defendant Devon Reese, is the
representative of her estate. The Estate argues that it is enti‐
tled to the money for the benefit of Givens’s children. The Es‐
tate argues that the agreement is ambiguous and should be
construed against the Foundation, and in the alternative that
the court should use its equitable power to reform, rescind, or
order deviation from the agreement’s terms.
The district court rejected the Estate’s arguments, finding
that the trust agreement is unambiguous and that the Estate’s
evidence does not warrant any equitable remedy. The court
also found that the equitable defense of laches would bar the
Estate’s equitable theories. We reverse. We find that the trust
agreement is ambiguous on the key question. Beyond the doc‐
ument, the overwhelming weight of evidence shows that Giv‐
ens intended that any remaining assets pass to her children as
the beneficiaries of her Estate rather than to the Foundation.
We therefore remand and direct entry of judgment for the Es‐
tate, without reaching the equitable theories or the laches de‐
fense. On remand the district court will need to award dam‐
ages and prejudgment interest in favor of the Estate.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
A. Theresa Givens and Her Assets
Theresa Givens was a Missouri resident and was sick for
many years before she died in November 2011. She suffered
from renal failure, was on dialysis for about ten years, and

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No. 17‐1817 3
had experienced multiple strokes. In 2009, she suffered an ad‐
ditional injury from gadolinium dye, a substance used in
MRIs. She then joined a class action related to the dye, with
the Missouri law firm Brown & Crouppen as her counsel.
When that suit settled in 2011, Givens received about $255,000
in net settlement proceeds.
B. The National Foundation for Special Needs Integrity
The National Foundation for Special Needs Integrity is an
Indiana not‐for‐profit corporation that is a trustee for a pooled
special needs trust. A special needs trust is a type of trust that
allows individuals with disabilities to avoid losing eligibility
for Medicaid, which is means‐tested. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396p(d)(4)(C). The Foundation acts as trustee for many
qualifying individuals across the country. Under federal law,
the Foundation must pool all beneficiaries’ assets for pur‐
poses of custody, management, and investment. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396p(d)(4)(C)(ii). The Foundation must also maintain a
separate sub‐account for each beneficiary. Id.
The key feature of the special needs trust is that, under
federal law, trust assets do not count against the beneficiaries’
eligibility for Medicaid during their lifetimes. Compare 42
U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(3) (counting assets in certain trusts as in‐
come and assets of individuals seeking Medicaid), with
§ 1396p(d)(4)(C) (exempting special needs trusts from this ac‐
counting). But upon a beneficiary’s death, the trustee must re‐
imburse the state for any medical assistance the state pro‐
vided. § 1396p(d)(4)(C)(iv). The trust agreement can direct
who should receive any assets that might remain after reim‐
bursement.

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4 No. 17‐1817
C. The Trust Agreement
On the advice of her lawyers, and to maintain her eligibil‐
ity for Medicaid, Givens agreed to contribute the settlement
proceeds to a special needs trust. She signed an agreement
with the plaintiff Foundation in August 2011. The agreement
identified the Foundation as the trustee and Givens as the
beneficiary during her lifetime. Givens funded the trust in Oc‐
tober 2011 but died a month later. In this rather unusual case,
Givens did not owe her state of residence any reimbursement
upon her death, leaving about $234,000 available to someone.
This dispute is about what happens to these remaining funds
that the government does not claim.
Section IV of the agreement is titled “Distributions upon
the Death of a Beneficiary” and states, as relevant here:
Except in the event that this Article Fourteen may be in
the future amended to effectuate the letter, spirit, and
purpose of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(C)(iv), The National
Foundation for Special Needs Integrity, Inc. shall not retain
any portion of the Beneficiary’s trust Sub‐Account upon his
or her death. Rather, all such amounts shall be reim‐
bursed to the state of Missouri, by and through the
Missouri Department of Health and Family Services,
up to the full amount that it has expended on the Ben‐
eficiary, both before and after the creation of this trust.
(Emphasis added.) Later in the same section, the Agreement
states: “If no secondary Contingent/Residual/Remainder Ben‐
eficiaries survive or if none are named in Section V below,
then and only then shall said money remain with the trust.”
Section V is titled “Contingent/Remainder/Residual Bene‐
ficiaries” and asks the life beneficiary (i.e., Givens) to list “to

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No. 17‐1817 5
whom you would like us to pay out the Remainder of your
trust Sub‐Account should there be any money left after the
state of Missouri has been reimbursed for the Medicaid ser‐
vices it has rendered to you during your lifetime.” The agree‐
ment states that the remainder beneficiary can be an individ‐
ual person, an organization, or an entity. On the lines below
this text, someone wrote “Theresa Givens” as the only re‐
mainder beneficiary. Givens signed the agreement on August
9, 2011. The Foundation signed on August 15, 2011. Givens
funded the trust on October 11, 2011 with almost $255,000.
The Foundation argues that Sections IV and V together are
unambiguous and provide that the Foundation will retain the
remainder if there is no surviving remainder beneficiary. Be‐
cause Givens named herself as the remainder beneficiary, the
Foundation argues, she must have intended both (1) not to
name any surviving remainder beneficiary at all, and thus (2)
to give any remainder to the Foundation. The Estate counters
that Sections IV and V are ambiguous and that we should con‐
strue the ambiguity in the Estate’s favor. In the alternative, the
Estate argues that Givens made a mistake warranting refor‐
mation, rescission, and/or deviation from the trust’s terms.
D. Givens’s Children
Because trust interpretation is a question of the settlor’s in‐
tent, Givens’s relationships with her adult children—who
would take through her Estate—have been a focus of this liti‐
gation. The Estate argues that Givens had close relationships
with her children and must have meant for the money to go
to them through her Estate. The Foundation counters that the
agreement itself expresses Givens’s intent to leave the remain‐
der to the trustee. According to the Foundation, Givens’s gen‐

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6 No. 17‐1817
eral relationship with her children is not sufficient to over‐
come the agreement’s text expressing Givens’s intent at the
moment she signed it.
The evidence shows that during her life, Givens relied
heavily on her children for help with her medical care and
daily living. Reese testified that Givens was unable to drive,
had trouble standing, was blind in one eye, and “maneuvered
around in  a chair.” In her final year, Givens lived with her
children, first with her daughter Whitney and later with her
son Stephen. Whitney provided Givens with in‐home
healthcare, prepared her for her dialysis treatments, and took
her shopping and to appointments. Sons Stephen and Devon
helped her with tasks and cooked her meals.
The Foundation does not dispute these facts. In fact, its
former general counsel Shane Service testified that Givens’s
“main concern was always about her children.” And the rec‐
ord shows that at least initially, Givens intended to spend
most of her settlement proceeds on her children. She told the
Foundation in June 2011 that she wanted to buy a home and
a car for Stephen and a car for Whitney. On July 20, 2011, Giv‐
ens also told her attorneys that she wanted to buy a car for
Whitney and give $50,000 to one of her sons. On August 9,
2011, Givens wrote in the agreement that she wanted to “help
son” with “student loans.” And Reese testified that shortly
before the surgery that would lead to his mother’s death, she
told him “to get that money out of that trust and help” his
siblings. We assume these would not have been permissible
uses of trust assets during Givens’s life, see 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396p(d)(4)(C)(iii), but they show her interest in helping her
children financially. There is no evidence, apart from the in‐

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No. 17‐1817 7
ference drawn from the mistaken designation of Givens her‐
self as the surviving contingent beneficiary in the trust agree‐
ment, that Givens would have wanted to leave her assets to
the Foundation.
The Foundation responds to these facts in two ways: (1) by
pointing out that they do not definitively reveal Givens’s in‐
tent on August 9, 2011 when she signed the agreement; and
(2) by relying on one witness who contradicted Reese’s testi‐
mony about the children’s happy relationships with their
mother. Andrea McGaughey, a paralegal for Brown & Croup‐
pen, testified that in late July 2011, Givens called to say she
wanted to fund the trust with the full settlement proceeds be‐
cause she worried that “the kids were going to take the money
from her and that she was going to be left homeless.”
E. Funding the Trust
Givens was initially unsure about funding a special needs
trust at all. If she put her money in the trust, federal law
would prevent her from spending it on her children during
her lifetime. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(C)(iii) (requiring as‐
sets in special needs trust to be used “solely for the benefit of
individuals who are disabled”). But Brown & Crouppen re‐
peatedly told her that if she did not fund a trust, she would
lose her eligibility for Medicaid. At first, Givens said that she
needed time to think about the idea. She later requested that
Brown & Crouppen fund the trust with $184,000 and give her
the rest of the settlement in cash, which she wanted to use for
herself and her children. Brown & Crouppen repeated its ad‐
vice to fund the trust with all her settlement proceeds, and on
July 28, 2011 Givens agreed to do so.

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8 No. 17‐1817
Just how Givens actually completed and signed the agree‐
ment is unclear. Reese testified that his mother could not read
because she had poor vision and was illiterate. Yet someone
filled in the 19‐page form for Givens. McGaughey signed the
agreement as a witness, but she swore that the paperwork was
already filled in when she saw it and that she could not “say
who completed the Joinder Agreement.” The firm of Brown
& Crouppen, although it persuaded Givens to put her settle‐
ment money in the trust, denies having advised her on the
agreement’s contents or reviewed the signed copy (with the
obviously mistaken beneficiary designation) before forward‐
ing it to the Foundation. However the agreement transpired,
the trust was funded on October 11, 2011 with $254,847.76.
F. Procedural History
Givens died intestate on November 19, 2011 with about
$234,000 remaining in her trust sub‐account. This litigation
did not begin until 2015, after the Foundation refused the Es‐
tate’s written demand that it pay the remainder to the Estate
for the benefit of Givens’s children. On April 6, 2015, the Foun‐
dation filed this action seeking a declaratory judgment that
the Foundation rightfully retained the remaining assets of the
trust. The Estate counterclaimed, arguing that the court
should order the Foundation to pay the remaining money to
the Estate.
Both parties moved for summary judgment. The district
court first concluded that the trust agreement provides unam‐
biguously that the remaining assets should go to the Founda‐
tion. Moving on to the Estate’s equitable theories, the court
found no basis for rescission or deviation but found that gen‐
uine issues of material fact barred summary judgment on the

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No. 17‐1817 9
Estate’s reformation theory and the Foundation’s laches de‐
fense. The court denied summary judgment on those ques‐
tions, and the case went to trial.
The court held a bench trial on two questions: (1) whether
the Estate could overcome the agreement’s language with
clear and convincing evidence that Givens intended her Es‐
tate to receive the money; and (2) whether the Estate’s delay
was unreasonable and prejudicial to the Foundation. The
court found that the Estate’s evidence was insufficient to over‐
come the agreement’s text. The court noted that the Estate’s
evidence about Givens’s relationship with her family did not
address her intent when she signed the agreement. Accord‐
ingly, the court declined to reform the trust and instead al‐
lowed its text, as the court understood it, to control.
The court also found that laches would bar the Estate’s eq‐
uitable claims in any event. The court found that the family
knew as early as November 23, 2011 that the Foundation in‐
tended to keep the funds. It concluded that laches applied be‐
cause the Estate unreasonably delayed and that the delay
prejudiced the Foundation. The court entered judgment for
the Foundation.
II. Analysis
Reese’s claim for equitable reformation has considerable
force, but we find that the agreement was ambiguous and that
construing it offers the more straightforward resolution. On
the Foundation’s motion for summary judgment, the district
court found that the agreement unambiguously provided that
Givens’s failure to name a proper remainder beneficiary
meant that the Foundation was entitled to keep the money.

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10 No. 17‐1817
We review this conclusion de novo, and we respectfully disa‐
gree with our colleague on the district court. 1
Under Indiana law, which governs this trust agreement,
the meaning of a trust instrument is a question of law, and the
court’s primary role is to discern the settlor’s intent. University
of Southern Indiana Found. v. Baker, 843 N.E.2d 528, 531–32 (Ind.
1 As noted, the district court found that laches would bar the Estate’s
claim for equitable relief, whether on theories of mistake, reformation, or
rescission. The district court’s laches finding was based on clearly errone‐
ous findings of fact. Givens died in November 2011. In finding delay and
prejudice, the district court appears to have focused on the fact that in
early 2012 the Foundation told Reese, as representative of his mother’s Es‐
tate, that the Foundation did not intend to transfer the money to the Estate.
The rest of the story, however, was that the Foundation told Reese that the
money would go to the State of Missouri, which would be the most com‐
mon outcome for a special needs trust upon the death of the life benefi‐
ciary. There is no evidence that the family knew before early 2015 that the
Foundation intended to retain Givens’s money for itself. Instead, all the
relevant evidence indicates that the Foundation led the family to believe
that Givens owed the full remainder to Missouri. The Foundation’s inter‐
nal records indicate that by November 2013, it had not notified the family
it intended to retain the money. None of the Foundation’s witnesses could
recall ever telling the family how they interpreted the agreement, or even
reaching a final decision to keep the remaining money. Yet the Foundation
began to transfer money out of Givens’s sub‐account to other Foundation
accounts less than two months after her death. By February 2014, the
Foundation had spent it all. But it was not until early 2015 that the Foun‐
dation told the Estate that the Foundation itself had kept the money and
did not intend to pay either Missouri or the Estate. The Foundation then
quickly filed this declaratory judgment action. We see in this record no
factual basis for finding that the Estate, having been misled by the Foun‐
dation, delayed unreasonably in asserting its rights, let alone that the
Foundation reasonably relied to its detriment on the inaction of the Estate,
which it had misled about the destination of the money left in Givens’s
trust account.

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No. 17‐1817 11
2006). To discern intent, Indiana follows the four corners rule.
If the instrument is clear, then the court will consider only its
language. Id. at 532. This rule is based on the strong but not
irrebuttable presumption that an unambiguous document
“accurately expresses” the settlor’s intent. Restatement
(Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers,
§ 10.2 cmt. i. But when a trust instrument is ambiguous as ap‐
plied to the circumstances, its text alone is not sufficient to de‐
cide the case. University of Southern Indiana Found., 843 N.E.2d
at 535 (ʺ[W]here an instrument is ambiguous, all relevant ex‐
trinsic evidence may properly be considered in resolving this
ambiguity.”).
A. Ambiguity
Language of a contract, will, or trust is not ambiguous of
course simply because two parties argue for different mean‐
ings. In re Estate of Stayback, 38 N.E.3d 705, 711 (Ind. App.
2015). Rather, it is ambiguous if reasonable people could come
to contrary conclusions about its meaning under the circum‐
stances. University of Southern Indiana Found., 843 N.E.2d at
532. The Foundation contends that the agreement is unambig‐
uous, but its arguments fail to address the ambiguity posed
in Section IV, especially where the evidence shows that the
Foundation intentionally drafted the agreement to confuse
readers as sophisticated as government officials. In our anal‐
ysis, we put to one side Givens’s infirmities and limitations,
which would only strengthen her case.
For the Foundation to succeed, the agreement must clearly
provide that the Foundation will retain the money if there is
no surviving remainder beneficiary. Otherwise, Givens’s fail‐

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12 No. 17‐1817
ure to name a remainder beneficiary does not express her in‐
tent to give the money to the Foundation. On this point, the
agreement is ambiguous because it contradicts itself.
First, the agreement says flatly in Section IV, subject to an
inapplicable exception, that the Foundation itself “shall not
retain any portion of the Beneficiary’s trust Sub‐Account upon
his or her death.” Three sentences later, it says that if there are
no surviving remainder beneficiaries, “then and only then
shall said money remain with the trust.” One could read the
latter sentence as qualifying the former, but the former sen‐
tence (“shall not retain”) includes no signal that another qual‐
ification or exception is coming. The text itself does not re‐
solve the contradiction. Given these two contradictory sen‐
tences, reasonable people could come to two conclusions
about whether, in the absence of a surviving beneficiary, the
agreement awards the money to the Foundation. Readers
who emphasize the former sentence will conclude that the
Foundation will never retain remainder funds. Readers who
emphasize the latter will conclude that failing to name a re‐
mainder beneficiary gives any leftover money to the Founda‐
tion. The Foundation points to the latter sentence to support
its position, but fails to come to grips with the former sentence
that contradicts its argument.
B. Intent
Having found ambiguity, we may look beyond the agree‐
ment’s language when construing it. University of Southern In‐
diana Found., 843 N.E.2d at 535. Our goal is still to determine
the settlor’s intent, but we no longer presume that the trust’s
language accurately expresses it. Restatement (Third) of Prop‐
erty: Wills and Other Donative Transfers, § 10.2 cmt. i. In‐
stead, we consider other facts, including “the circumstances

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No. 17‐1817 13
existing at the time the instrument was executed.” Mala‐
chowski v. Bank One, Indianapolis, 590 N.E.2d 559, 566 (Ind.
1992). The issue is what Givens intended when she signed the
agreement naming herself as the remainder beneficiary.
We find no reason to believe that Givens intended any re‐
maining money to go to the Foundation, which was a stranger
to her, rather than to her children. Berry v. Ford, 829 N.E.2d
1052, 1055 (Ind. App. 2005) (reasoning that where intent is in
doubt, “a construction should be used which considers the
natural impulses of people”). The only plausible conclusion is
that Givens intended the money to go to her Estate and thus
to her children upon her death. When Givens signed the
agreement, she was an uncounseled layperson (at least on this
record—the Estate is also pursuing a legal malpractice claim
against the Missouri law firm that advised her to fund the
trust). She certainly was not familiar with the intricacies of
trusts and estates. When “it clearly and distinctly appears that
the testator did not intend to employ the terms in their tech‐
nical sense,” then the court will apply “the meaning which the
testator intended they should receive.” Grise v. Weiss, 11
N.E.2d 146, 149 (Ind. 1937), quoting Ridgeway v. Lanphear, 99
Ind. 251, 252 (1884); see also University of Southern Indiana
Found., 843 N.E.2d at 534 (considering extrinsic evidence
when ambiguity in a trust instrument “creates substantial
doubt” that the settlor intended words to have their “technical
meaning”). When a layperson drafts a donative transfer, it
should “be construed to have the meaning that a lay drafter
would have intended.” Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills
and Other Donative Transfers, § 10.2 cmt. e. Givens wrote that
her money should return to her upon her death. The most sen‐
sible construction of this ambiguous document is to construe

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14 No. 17‐1817
Section V as if Givens had named her Estate, not herself, as
the remainder beneficiary.
Our conclusion is consistent with the principles that heirs
“are not to be disinherited by conjecture” and that words will
not be given their ordinary meaning if “absurdity or some re‐
pugnance” would result. Berry v. Ford, 829 N.E.2d 1052, 1055
(Ind. App. 2005); Haworth v. Hubbard, 44 N.E.2d 967, 970 (Ind.
1942). We think it highly improbable that when Givens iden‐
tified herself as the remainder beneficiary, she actually in‐
tended to give the money to the Foundation. There is no other
evidence that she would have wanted that result. The Foun‐
dation provided Givens with a service by managing her assets
for what turned out to be just a few weeks before she died—a
service for which Givens paid the Foundation. There is no
plausible reason she would have intended to give it all the
money that might be left upon her death.
Finally, we must note that the Foundation’s counsel, Shane
Service, testified that he intentionally drafted Section IV to con‐
fuse Missouri government officials. When a trust document is
ambiguous, Indiana applies the rules of contract interpreta‐
tion. Stayback, 38 N.E.3d at 710–11. Ordinarily, when “there is
ambiguity in a contract, it is construed against its drafter.”
MPACT Construction Group LLC v. Superior Concrete Construc‐
tors, Inc., 802 N.E.2d 901, 910 (Ind. 2004). That rule of construc‐
tion applies here, where the trustee seeks to benefit from lan‐
guage that it drafted with the intent to confuse.2
We thus conclude that the agreement is best construed as
providing that the remainder funds go to the Estate of Theresa
2 The Indiana Roll of Attorneys indicates that Mr. Service’s law license
has been suspended indefinitely.

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No. 17‐1817 15
Givens. Having reached this conclusion as a matter of legal
interpretation, we need not reach the Estate’s equitable claims
or the Foundation’s dubious invocation of the equitable de‐
fense of laches. The judgment of the district court is
REVERSED and the case is REMANDED for entry of judg‐
ment ordering the Foundation to pay the Estate $234,181.23
plus prejudgment interest.

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