United States of America v. Willie B. Haynes

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 17‐2044
U NITED STATES OF A MERICA ,
Plaintiff‐Appellee,
v.
W ILLIE B. HAYNES ,
Defendant‐Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Western Division.
No. 15CR50022‐1 — Philip G. Reinhard, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED J ANUARY 24, 2018 — D ECIDED FEBRUARY 14, 2018
____________________
Before BAUER , KANNE , and BARRETT , Circuit Judges.
P ER C URIAM. Willie Haynes was indicted after sheriff’s
deputies in Winnebago County executed a search warrant
and found drugs and a loaded handgun in his house. Haynes
pleaded guilty to possessing heroin and cocaine base with in‐
tent to distribute and to possessing a firearm in furtherance of
a drug‐trafficking crime; he was sentenced to 108 months’ im‐
prisonment. Haynes argues that the items found during the

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2 No. 17‐2044
search should have been suppressed because, he says, the af‐
fidavit supporting the warrant did not establish probable
cause. We affirm the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
A confidential informant (“CI”) contacted Deputy Fred
Jones in early April 2015 and told him that he had recently
purchased crack cocaine from “a larger black male” who was
selling drugs from his house and that the CI had spoken with
the suspect about purchasing more drugs in the future. The
CI agreed to participate in a controlled buy. He advised Jones
that the suspect would drive from his house and meet the CI
in the car to make the sale.
In the days following the CI’s tip, Jones periodically sur‐
veilled the house at the address the CI had reported. Several
times he saw a man fitting the CI’s description leave the
house, get into a car, drive away, and meet with different in‐
dividuals in the car for about four to ten minutes. Based on
his training and 10 years’ experience, Jones believed that these
episodes were drug sales.
Members of the County Narcotics Team then set up a con‐
trolled purchase of crack cocaine from the suspect. The depu‐
ties positioned surveillance on the house and in the surround‐
ing neighborhood. One of them searched the CI and found
that he had neither drugs nor money on his person. Deputy
Jones then gave the CI $60 for buy money. The CI called the
suspect and arranged the purchase; Jones could hear both
sides of the conversation. The suspect left the house, got into
a car, drove approximately four blocks, and met the CI at an
intersection. The CI entered the vehicle, sat in the passenger
seat, and exited minutes later. The suspect drove back to the

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No. 17‐2044 3
house and went inside. The deputies observed the suspect
with an unobstructed view from the time he left the house to
the time he reentered.
The CI returned and told Jones that he purchased crack
cocaine from the man in the car. He then handed over a bag
with 0.7 grams of a white, rocklike substance that later tested
positive for cocaine. Police again searched the CI and found
him free of cash and drugs.
Jones applied for a warrant to search the house and sub‐
mitted an affidavit that recounted the facts as we have sum‐
marized them. In the affidavit Jones described the CI’s partic‐
ipation but said almost nothing about the CI himself. The CI
also did not appear before the circuit judge. Based on Jones’s
affidavit, the judge issued a warrant that gave the sheriff’s
deputies four days to search the house and seize drugs, drug
paraphernalia, cash, and firearms, among other things.
The sheriff’s deputies timely executed the warrant. They
found approximately 16 grams of mixtures containing heroin;
8.4 grams of mixtures containing crack cocaine; 1.6 grams of
marijuana; a loaded pistol; drug paraphernalia including dig‐
ital scales, plastic baggies, Dormin (a sleep aid used to cut or
dilute heroin), and fake soda cans used to conceal drugs; and
$1,174 in cash. Haynes was arrested. At the sheriff’s depart‐
ment, Haynes admitted that everything seized was his, that
he intended to distribute the drugs, and that he kept the gun
for protection.
As relevant here, Haynes was charged with one count of
possession with intent to distribute heroin and cocaine base,
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and one count of possessing a firearm in
furtherance of drug trafficking, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(a).

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4 No. 17‐2044
Haynes moved to suppress the evidence found during the
search, arguing that the warrant was not based on probable
cause. The district judge denied the motion. The judge rea‐
soned that the CI’s tip, corroborated by surveillance and the
controlled buy, provided probable cause; alternatively, he de‐
termined that the good‐faith exception to the exclusionary
rule applied.
Haynes pleaded guilty. As part of the plea agreement,
Haynes reserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion
to suppress.
II. A NALYSIS
On appeal Haynes argues that the search warrant was is‐
sued without probable cause because, he says, the supporting
affidavit did not show that the CI was reliable. The govern‐
ment responds that the affidavit established probable cause
even independent from the information proffered by the CI
and that, in either case, the evidence should not be suppressed
because the officers executed the warrant in good faith.
Probable cause exists when the supporting affidavit pre‐
sents a total set of circumstances which create a “fair proba‐
bility” that a search will uncover evidence of a crime. Illinois
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983); United States v. Fifer, 863 F.3d
759, 764 (7th Cir. 2017). We assess whether the issuing judge
had a “substantial basis” for concluding that there was prob‐
able cause. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238; United States v. Aljabari, 626
F.3d 940, 944 (7th Cir. 2010). We review a denial of a motion
to suppress de novo, but give “great deference” to the issuing
judge’s finding of probable cause. Fifer, 863 F.3d at 764.

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No. 17‐2044 5
When the information used to support a finding of proba‐
ble cause is derived from a CI’s tip “the legitimacy of a prob‐
able cause determination turns on that ‘CIʹs reliability, verac‐
ity and basis of knowledge.’” United States v. Olson, 408 F.3d
366, 370 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 289
F.3d 1034, 1038 (7th Cir. 2002)). When assessing an inform‐
ant’s credibility, an issuing judge must consider “as a whole”
(1) the degree of police corroboration; (2) the informant’s
firsthand knowledge; (3) the detail provided; (4) the time be‐
tween the reported events and the warrant application; and
(5) whether the informant appeared before the judge. United
States v. Johnson, 655 F.3d 594, 600 (7th Cir. 2011).
Haynes insists that these factors show that the CI was not
reliable enough for his tip to create probable cause. For exam‐
ple, the CI did not name the suspect, describing him only as
“a larger black male.” Indeed, in United States v. Peck, 317 F.3d
754, (7th Cir. 2003), we determined that an informant pro‐
vided insufficient detail, and thus there was no probable
cause, when the informant was able to describe the defendant
only as “a black male.” Id. at 756. The CI in this case also did
not appear before the judge. Finally, the CI’s failure to say
when he last bought drugs from the suspect, Haynes says,
brings the recency of the information provided into question.
Although the factors go both ways, on balance they sup‐
port the CI’s reliability. Most significantly, the deputies cor‐
roborated the CI’s story with their own investigation by con‐
ducting surveillance and executing a controlled buy. See John‐
son, 655 F.3d at 601 (stating that a controlled buy was “the
strongest bit of evidence supporting the warrant”). And the
CI had personal knowledge because he had previously pur‐
chased drugs from the suspect and they had discussed future

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6 No. 17‐2044
sales (something not in his interest to report). See United States
v. Hansmeier, 867 F.3d 807, 812 (7th Cir. 2017). The circum‐
stances thus differ from those in Peck where there was no in‐
dependent corroboration and the affidavit did not say how
the informant had personal knowledge that drugs were pre‐
sent. 317 F.3d at 756–57. Taken together, the factors, particu‐
larly corroboration, support the CI’s reliability and thus the
conclusion that there was probable cause.
Even excluding the CI’s tip, however, the totality of the
circumstances described in the warrant support a finding of
probable cause. A properly executed controlled buy can es‐
tablish probable cause, even when the tip that prompted it
might not have been reliable. See United States v. Singleton,
125 F.3d 1097, 1103 (7th Cir. 1997); see also United States v. Sid‐
well, 440 F.3d 865, 869 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Generally, a controlled
buy, when executed properly, is a reliable indicator as to the
presence of illegal drug activity.”). In Fifer, the affidavit at is‐
sue described two controlled buys. A confidential informant
arranged a drug purchase over the phone while in the pres‐
ence of police. The officers searched the informant for drugs
and money, and finding neither, they gave the informant buy
money. The informant met the suspect, returned to the officer
minutes later with a substance that tested positive for heroin,
and reported that the defendant sold the substance to him.
863 F.3d at 764. We concluded that “faced with these facts, a
reasonably prudent person could easily conclude that a
search of [the defendant’s] apartment would reveal contra‐
band or evidence of a crime.” Fifer, 863 F.3d at 764. In this case
Jones used the same procedure in conducting a controlled buy
that we found reliable in Fifer. The surveillance and the con‐
trolled buy thus established a “fair probability” that the house

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No. 17‐2044 7
contained evidence of illegal activity. United States v. Kelly,
772 F.3d 1072, 1080 (7th Cir. 2014).
Because we conclude that there was probable cause, we
need not assess whether the good‐faith exception to the exclu‐
sionary rule would apply.
Haynes makes a few additional arguments, but none is
availing. First he argues that the affidavit does not explain
why drugs would be at the house and not, for example, in the
car where the sale took place. But judges may permissibly in‐
fer that evidence of drug dealing is “likely to be found where
the dealer[] live[s].” See Kelly, 772 F.3d at 1080 (concluding
there was probable cause to search residence where con‐
trolled buy took place “in the neighborhood”); Singleton, 125
F.3d at 1102–03 (same where controlled buy took place “in the
vicinity” of the residence). Haynes next protests that the affi‐
davit cannot establish probable cause because it does not spe‐
cifically identify the defendant. But this was a search warrant,
not an arrest warrant; the subject is a location, not a person.
The affidavit creates a fair probability that a drug dealer lived
at the house, and thus that the house contained evidence of
crime. See Kelly, 772 F.3d at 1080. Finally Haynes suggests
there should have been a hearing to determine if there was
probable cause. Because Haynes did not raise a material fac‐
tual dispute (or any factual dispute for that matter), no hear‐
ing was necessary. See United States v. McGaughy, 485 F.3d
965, 969 (7th Cir. 2007).
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
court is AFFIRMED.

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