United States of America v. Omarr D.teague

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 17‐1725
U NITED STATES OF A MERICA ,
Plaintiff‐Appellant,
v.
OMARR D.T EAGUE ,
Defendant‐Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Illinois.
No. 3:16‐cr‐30079 — Staci M. Yandle, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED D ECEMBER 8, 2017 — D ECIDED MARCH 8, 2018
____________________
Before KANNE and R OVNER , Circuit Judges, and D URKIN,
District Judge. *
KANNE , Circuit Judge. Prior convictions for crimes of vio‐
lence subject a defendant to a higher base offense level under
the federal Sentencing Guidelines. Because the district court
* The Honorable Thomas M. Durkin, United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.

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2 No. 17‐1725
below erroneously concluded that the offense of second de‐
gree murder under Illinois law is not a crime of violence, we
reverse.
I. BACKGROUND
Omarr Teague pled guilty to possession of a weapon by a
felon. In a Presentence Investigation Report, the United States
Probation Department assigned a base offense level of 14. The
government objected, claiming the base level should be 20 be‐
cause Teague had previously been convicted of a crime of vi‐
olence, namely second degree murder under Illinois law. At
the sentencing hearing, the district court overruled the gov‐
ernment’s objection, concluding second degree murder as de‐
fined in Illinois law is not a crime of violence because it is not
limited to intentional murder. Based on this conclusion, the
court found that the total offense level was 15, that Teague
had a category II criminal history, and therefore that the ap‐
plicable Guideline range was 21–27 months’ imprisonment.
The court sentenced Teague to a term of 21 months’ impris‐
onment, a two‐year term of supervised release, a $150 fine,
and a $100 special assessment. The government appeals, chal‐
lenging only the district court’s conclusion that second degree
murder under Illinois law is a crime of violence.
II. A NALYSIS
The Sentencing Guidelines provide that if a defendant
convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm commit‐
ted any part of the offense subsequent to sustaining a felony
conviction for a crime of violence, the base offense level
should be 20. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A). The Guidelines define
“crime of violence” as:

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No. 17‐1725 3
“any offense under federal or state law punishable
by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that
(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person
of another, or (2) is murder, voluntary manslaugh‐
ter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, a forcible sex
offense, robbery, arson, extortion, or the use or un‐
lawful possession of a firearm described in 26 U.S.C.
§ 5845(a) or explosive material as defined in 18
U.S.C. § 841(c).”
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2. The first clause is referred to as the “elements
clause” and the second is known as the “enumerated of‐
fenses” clause. See Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583, 589 (7th
Cir. 2013).
On appeal, the government contends that the Illinois of‐
fense of second degree murder is a crime of violence under
both prongs, and that the district court’s erroneous interpre‐
tation of the Illinois statute led to an improperly computed
Guideline range. A sentence based on an improperly com‐
puted Guideline range must be vacated and remanded unless
“the sentencing court firmly indicated that it would impose
the same sentence regardless of any sentencing error.” United
States v. Zahurksy, 580 F.3d 515, 528 (7th Cir. 2009). The district
court made no such indication in this case. So Teague must be
resentenced if his second degree murder conviction qualifies
as a crime of violence. Our review of this issue is de novo.
United States v. Edwards, 836 F.3d 831, 834 (7th Cir. 2016).
A. Elements Clause
To be a crime of violence, the offense must have as an ele‐
ment the intentional or knowing use, attempted use, or threat‐

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4 No. 17‐1725
ened use of physical force against the person of another. “‘El‐
ements’ are the ‘constituent parts’ of a crime’s legal defini‐
tion—the things the ‘prosecution must prove to sustain a con‐
viction.’” Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2248 (2016)
(quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 634 (10th ed. 2014)). To sus‐
tain a second degree murder conviction under Illinois law, the
prosecution must prove that the defendant “commit[ed] the
offense of first degree murder” plus one of the following mit‐
igating factors:
“(1) at the time of the killing he is acting under a sud‐
den and intense passion resulting from serious
provocation by the individual killed or another
whom the offender endeavors to kill, but he negli‐
gently or accidentally causes the death of the indi‐
vidual killed; or (2) at the time of the killing he be‐
lieves the circumstances to be such that, if they ex‐
isted, would justify or exonerate the killing under
the principles stated in Article 7 of this Code, but his
belief is unreasonable.”
720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/9‐2 (2001).
A person commits the Illinois offense of first degree mur‐
der when he:
“kills an individual without lawful justifica‐
tion … [and] in performing the acts which cause the
death: (1) he either intends to kill or do great bodily
harm to that individual or another, or knows that
such acts of will cause death to that individual or an‐
other; or (2) he knows that such acts create a strong
probability of death or great bodily harm to that in‐
dividual or another; or (3) he is attempting or com‐
mitting a forcible felony other than second degree
murder.”

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No. 17‐1725 5
720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/9‐1 (2001).
The district court focused on the language “negligently or
accidentally causes the death of the individual killed” in the
second degree murder statute to conclude that the offense did
not include as an element the intentional or knowing use of
force. But this language only refers to situations in which a
person has the intent to kill one person but his actions result
in the death of another. This is still intentional murder. See
People v. Thompson, 730 N.E.2d 118, 123 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000)
(“Under the doctrine of transferred intent, if a defendant
shoots at one person, with the intent to kill, but kills an unin‐
tended victim, he may be convicted of the crime of murder for
the death of the unintended victim.”). The second degree
murder statute incorporates the intentional or knowing use of
force element from the first degree murder statute. Because
an offender cannot be convicted of second degree murder
without the government proving beyond a reasonable doubt
that the offender acted with the intent or knowledge that their
actions would cause the death of another, the offense is a
crime of violence under the elements clause.
B. Enumerated Offenses Clause
Second degree murder under Illinois law is also a crime of
violence under the enumerated offenses clause. To determine
whether an offense is a crime of violence under this clause,
the court looks to whether the charged offense fits within the
generic definition of one of the enumerated offenses. The gov‐
ernment contends the offense fits within the generic defini‐
tions of murder or voluntary manslaughter.

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6 No. 17‐1725
“Voluntary manslaughter in most jurisdictions consists of
an intentional homicide committed under extenuating cir‐
cumstances which mitigate, though they do not justify or ex‐
cuse, the killing.” 2 Subst. Crim. L. § 15.2 (3d ed.). The Model
Penal Code defines manslaughter as criminal homicide “com‐
mitted recklessly” or “a homicide which would otherwise be
murder … committed under the influence of extreme mental
or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable expla‐
nation or excuse.” Model Penal Code § 210.3.
The Illinois offense of second degree murder fits squarely
within these generic definitions of manslaughter. This is con‐
sistent with the history of the Illinois statute. In 1986, Illinois
restructured its criminal code and the offense of “voluntary
manslaughter” was renamed “second degree murder.” Ill.
Pub. Act 84‐1450, eff. July 1, 1987. The language of the ele‐
ments were modified somewhat but the core offense re‐
mained the same—“murder plus mitigation.” See id. So we
conclude the offense of second degree murder under Illinois
law fits within the definition of manslaughter, and thus is a
crime of violence under the enumerated offenses clause.
III. CONCLUSION
Second degree murder under Illinois law qualifies as a
crime of violence under both prongs of section 4B1.2 of the
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. Therefore, the judgment of the
district court is REVERSED and this case is REMANDED to
the district court for resentencing consistent with this opinion.

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