EDWARD E. RONKOWSKI, J R . and JOA NN RONKOWSKI v. United States of America

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 18‐2269
EDWARD E. R ONKOWSKI, J R . and J OA NN R ONKOWSKI,
Plaintiffs‐Appellants,
v.
U NITED STATES OF A MERICA ,
Defendant‐Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Western District of Wisconsin.
No. 3:17‐cv‐226 — Barbara B. Crabb, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED D ECEMBER 5, 2018 — D ECIDED D ECEMBER 28, 2018
____________________
Before FLAUM, R OVNER , and SCUDDER , Circuit Judges.
SCUDDER , Circuit Judge. Edward and JoAnn Ronkowski
own 120 acres of undeveloped land in Bayfield County,
Wisconsin. Since the Ronkowskis acquired the property in
1972, they have accessed it via an unpaved road that crosses
over neighboring land, including land owned by the United
States Forest Service. The Ronkowskis brought suit against
the United States under the Quiet Title Act seeking
recognition of an easement to access their property by way

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of the unpaved road. The district court held that the
Ronkowskis had not established entitlement to an easement.
We affirm.
I
The only public road that reaches the Ronkowski
property is a forest service road known as FR822A. This
unpaved road connects the Ronkowski property to another
public road, Oswald Road. The easement the Ronkowskis
seek allows a more direct route to their property. It connects
their property to a different public road, Blue Moon Road,
and shortens the trip to the Ronkowski property by about
two miles. The proposed easement is comprised of three
segments: a segment of FR822A that connects to the
Ronkowski property; a middle segment that crosses over
United States Forest Service land; and a segment that passes
over the land of a private landowner, Eric Allen, and reaches
Blue Moon Road.
The Ronkowskis have reached their property by driving
this route since 1972. And Edward Ronkowski has per‐
formed necessary routine maintenance on the proposed
easement so that it continues to remain accessible for motor
vehicles. This has included removing downed trees, filling
ruts and potholes, cutting saplings and brush along the side
of the roadway, and even bulldozing the length of the road‐
way to assist with logging operations taking place on the
Ronkowskis’ property. The United States, on the other hand,
has not devoted resources to maintaining FR822A or the
segment of the proposed easement that crosses over its
property.

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No. 18‐2269 3
In 2008 Edward Ronkowski submitted an application
seeking the Forest Service’s acknowledgment of the
easement. In 2016, after some back and forth between the
parties, the Forest Service informed Ronkowski that he had
not substantiated his claim for an easement by necessity or
an easement by implication, and accordingly, any continued
use of the easement would violate federal law. In denying
the requested easement, however, the Forest Service stated
that it would consider granting a special use permit for the
Ronkowskis to continue to use the portion of the road
crossing over the Forest Service’s land. The Ronkowskis
never applied for the permit. Instead, they filed this lawsuit,
seeking recognition of their entitlement to an easement for
vehicular access to their property.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
the United States, holding that the Ronkowskis were not en‐
titled to an easement. It concluded that the Ronkowskis had
not made the required showing for an easement by necessity
or an easement by implication because the existing forest
service road, FR822A, provided them an alternate route by
which to reach their property. The court therefore deter‐
mined that the Ronkowskis could not demonstrate that the
easement was necessary for them to access their property. In
so concluding, the court emphasized that even if traveling by
way of FR822A would be “inconvenient, difficult or require
a high clearance vehicle, plaintiffs have submitted no evi‐
dence that it is impossible.”
On appeal, the Ronkowskis renew their contention that
they are entitled to both an easement by necessity and an
easement by implication.

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II
We first address the scope of the easement the
Ronkowskis seek. They assert that they are entitled to
recognition of an easement not only with respect to the
portion of the proposed easement that passes over the land
of the United States but also with respect to the segment of
FR822A leading to their property as well as the segment
crossing over Eric Allen’s property. They argue that this
court should address their entitlement to all three segments
of the proposed easement. We disagree and decline the
invitation.
The first segment of the proposed easement—the portion
of FR822A leading to the Ronkowski property—is a public
road. We know of no authority indicating that a party needs
an easement to access a public road. The third segment—the
portion of the road crossing over Allen’s property—is owned
by an individual who is not a party to the case and, in any
event, who has already granted the Ronkowskis an easement
over his property. Allen would be a necessary party to any
claim for an easement burdening his property. See Richards
v. Land Star Grp., Inc., 593 N.W.2d 103, 112 (Wis. Ct. App.
1999). So we address only the portion of the proposed ease‐
ment crossing over the land of the United States.
An easement is an interest that encumbers the land of
another. See AKG Real Estate, LLC v. Kosterman, 717 N.W.2d
835, 838 (Wis. 2006). Under Wisconsin law, an easement by
necessity arises “where an owner severs a landlocked
portion of his [or her] property by conveying such parcel to
another.” Schwab v. Timmons, 589 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Wis. 1999). A
property owner seeking an easement by necessity must
demonstrate the following: first, there was common

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No. 18‐2269 5
ownership of the servient and dominant estates at the time
of the severance that created the landlocked condition, and
second, the landlocked parcel had no access to a public
roadway after it was severed and the lack of access
continues. See McCormick v. Schubring, 672 N.W.2d 63, 66–67
(Wis. 2003).
An easement by implication, while similar, is legally dis‐
tinct from an easement by necessity. See Schwab, 589 N.W.2d
at 6. An easement by implication arises when there has been
a separation of land from a larger parcel and a use before
separation took place which continued “so long and was so
obvious or manifest as to show that it was meant to be per‐
manent.” Id. Further, the easement by implication must be
necessary to the beneficial enjoyment of the land and the
need for the easement “so clear and absolute that without
the easement the grantee cannot enjoy the use of the proper‐
ty granted to him for the purpose to which similar property
is customarily devoted.” Id.
Although easements by necessity and by implication are
distinct, the same facts defeat the Ronkowskis’ entitlement to
an easement under either approach. The Ronkowskis have
an ability to reach and enjoy the property by traveling by
FR822A, the existing forest service road. They are thus una‐
ble to demonstrate, as required for an easement by necessity,
that they “cannot access a public roadway” from their prop‐
erty. Id. at 7. For the same reason, the Ronkowskis cannot
show, as required for an easement by implication, that the
need for the easement is “so clear and absolute” that, with‐
out it, they would be unable to enjoy the use of their proper‐
ty. Id. at 6.

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In the district court, the Forest Service submitted video
evidence of a forest ranger traveling the length of FR822A
from Oswald Road to reach the Ronkowski property. The
video demonstrates that FR822A is passable, even if not an
ideal route. For their part, the Ronkowskis point to evidence
demonstrating that FR822A becomes difficult to traverse
following rain, sometimes necessitating the use of a high‐
clearance or four‐wheel drive vehicle. They further point to
evidence showing that FR822A is narrow, has deep ruts, and
is overgrown in places with vegetation that hits the
windshields and the sides of vehicles using the road. They
also rightly observe that the video of the forest ranger shows
him traveling on FR822A on a clear day when the roads
were dry and in a high‐clearance vehicle. These observations
only go so far, though, for an easement—whether by
necessity or by implication—does not arise merely because it
is the best or most convenient way of reaching the property.
In light of the evidence brought forward by the Forest
Service, the Ronkowskis have not shown an inability to
traverse FR822A.
Wisconsin law is clear that the Ronkowskis bear this ex‐
act burden. For an easement by necessity, a property owner
“is not landlocked when he or she has difficulty getting from
his or her land to a public road as long as he or she can get
from his or her land to a public road.” Schwab, 589 N.W.2d at
8. In Schwab, the Wisconsin Supreme Court noted that the
parcel at issue was surrounded by water on one side and a
bluff on the other but nonetheless declined to find an ease‐
ment by necessity. See id. at 7. The court explained and em‐
phasized that “it may be more convenient for the petitioners
to seek an extension of the private road to their parcels ra‐
ther than travel across the property above the bluff and nav‐

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No. 18‐2269 7
igate the bluff, but that in itself does not create the right to an
easement by necessity.” Id. at 8. So, too, here. Some difficulty
in traversing FR822A does not mean that the Ronkowskis
have demonstrated the need for an easement by necessity.
And this same fact prevents the Ronkowskis from estab‐
lishing their entitlement to an easement by implication,
which imposes an even higher burden on the Ronkowskis: a
“clear and absolute” necessity must exist for the easement to
arise. Id. at 6. The existence of a passable, alternative route
allowing them to enjoy their property forecloses the ability
of the Ronkowskis to satisfy the necessity element of an
easement by implication.
Because the Ronkowskis have not demonstrated the
easement is necessary—a required showing both for an
easement by necessity and an easement by implication—we
need not address the remaining elements of either type of
easement.
We owe a final observation in response to the Forest
Service’s assertion that the Ronkowskis could apply for a
special use permit to traverse their preferred route. The
record shows—and the Forest Service’s counsel confirmed at
oral argument—that such a permit would likely be available
to the Ronkowskis at a reasonable sum. The Ronkowskis
have never attempted to apply for the permit and do not
argue that their application would be met by an unfair
process or undue administrative burden. We recognize that a
revocable permit is not the same as a permanent right of
way. But as a practical matter, we find it significant that the
route the Ronkowskis prefer is likely available to them if
they simply apply for a permit. See House v. Pasko, 789
N.W.2d 754 (Wis. Ct. App. 2010) (noting that “the clear and

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absolute necessity for an easement by implication does not
exist where an alternative means to enjoy the land may be
acquired for a reasonable sum”).
For these reasons, we AFFIRM.

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