James Stewart v. Credit Control, LLC

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted April 28, 2021 *
Decided April 29, 2021
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
No. 20-2466
JAMES STEWART,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CREDIT CONTROL, LLC, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division.
No. 18-cv-03916
John F. Kness,
Judge.
O R D E R
Invoking the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681, and the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act, id. § 1692, James Stewart sued businesses that attempted to
collect an unpaid debt. Discovery was contentious. During its course, Stewart violated
three court orders to appear for his deposition despite a warning from the court that
noncompliance could lead to dismissal. The defendants moved for dismissal as a
* We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the briefs
and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would
not significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

-- 1 of 4 --

No. 20-2466 Page 2
sanction for his refusal, and the district court granted the motion and ended the suit.
Because that ruling was a permissible response to Stewart’s disobedience, we affirm.
Discovery disputes, referred to a magistrate judge, began early. After the
defendants said that some requested documents did not exist, Stewart moved to compel
their production and sought sanctions. He filed 18 discovery-related motions, including
four motions about sanctions. To resolve the matters, the magistrate judge asked the
defense lawyers to submit a letter organizing the parties’ discovery disputes. Stewart
claimed he did not receive a copy of that letter before the next hearing, and so in
addition to his motions to compel and for sanctions, he moved the magistrate judge to
recuse himself as biased for having received an ex parte communication. The magistrate
judge denied Stewart’s motions. He ruled that the defendants had complied with the
document requests, Stewart had received everything that the defendants had sent to the
court, and the letter did not prejudice Stewart or establish judicial bias.
Stewart responded to these adverse rulings by defying orders to attend his
deposition. In July 2019, the magistrate judge ordered him to appear for his deposition
within 30 days. Just before the deadline, Stewart refused to obey that order, explaining
that he wanted to hire a lawyer. At a hearing afterward, the magistrate judge excused
Stewart’s disobedience, giving him one month to secure counsel after which the judge
would reschedule the deposition. The judge warned Stewart that if he again disobeyed
an order to attend, there were “going to be some consequences.” The month passed,
and Stewart had not hired an attorney. As a result, the magistrate judge ordered his
deposition to occur in the next month. The evening before that deadline, Stewart again
told the defendants that he would not appear and again disobeyed the order.
Based on Stewart’s defiance, the defendants moved for dismissal, but after a
hearing, the magistrate judge gave Stewart one last chance to obey. Stewart defended
his refusal by relitigating the discovery rulings about unproduced documents and
judicial bias, grounding his arguments in the language of “due process.” The magistrate
judge patiently explained that, despite Stewart’s dissatisfaction with the earlier rulings,
he may not ignore court orders to attend a deposition. The judge admonished Stewart
that he could recommend dismissing the case now as a result of Stewart’s intransigence,
but showing more forbearance, the judge denied the defendants’ motion without
prejudice, in order to give Stewart a third and “last chance.” The judge ordered Stewart
to appear at his deposition within 21 days. He warned that, if Stewart did not appear,
there would “be severe consequences up to and including the dismissal of [his] case.”

-- 2 of 4 --

No. 20-2466 Page 3
Stewart violated the court’s order a third time, and the suit ended soon after.
Instead of appearing for his deposition, Stewart moved to stay discovery “pursuant to
due process concerns.” The defendants renewed their motion for dismissal, and Stewart
replied with his previously rejected defense that the defendants had not produced
documents. This time, the magistrate judge recommended that the district court dismiss
the case. In objecting to the recommendation, Stewart argued that the deposition
violated his right against self-incrimination, dismissal was an “extreme” sanction for a
pro se litigant, and the magistrate judge’s refusal to recuse himself and the defendants’
discovery violations justified his refusal to appear. The district court overruled the
objections and accepted the magistrate judge’s recommendation to dismiss the case. It
explained that the Fifth Amendment does not allow civil litigants to avoid their own
depositions; Stewart had received adequate time to find a lawyer; and he had three
chances to obey an order to appear for his deposition. In light of his obstinate
relitigation of discovery arguments that the magistrate judge had rejected and refusal to
comply with the court’s orders to appear for his deposition, the court reasoned that “no
sanction short of dismissal … [would] put these issues to rest.”
On appeal, Stewart argues that the district court impermissibly dismissed the
case. When a party willfully disobeys a discovery order, including an order to attend a
deposition, the district court may sanction that party with dismissal. FED. R. C IV. P.
37(b)(2)(A)(v). We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s decision to dismiss a
case as a sanction for a plaintiff’s willful disobedience of its orders. See Aura Lamp &
Lighting v. Int’l Trading, 325 F.3d 903, 907, 909–910 (7th Cir. 2003). In arguing that the
court abused its authority to dismiss, Stewart again cites his unanswered discovery
requests, contests other discovery-management orders, and insists that he was “denied
the opportunity to be heard.”
The district court permissibly dismissed the case. First, it did so only after
Stewart showed uncorrected and prolonged defiance, evincing willfulness: He violated
three orders to appear for his deposition, even after the court warned him that defiance
could lead to dismissal. Second, he received opportunities to explain his refusal, but his
excuses—his desire for more documents—were deficient and persisted even after he
was told that they were deficient. He never asserted, let alone established, that without
the documents, or without discovery proceeding in a different order, he was incapable
of complying with an order to show up at his deposition. Given his inexcusable, willful,
and steadfast disobedience, the court’s enforcement of its orders by dismissing the case
was reasonable. See Aura Lamp, 325 F.3d at 909–10. Finally, to the extent that Stewart
argues that the magistrate judge was “biased,” the district judge reviewed de novo the

-- 3 of 4 --

No. 20-2466 Page 4
magistrate judge’s recommendation to dismiss and Stewart’s objections to it. As we
have just explained, the district judge’s decision to dismiss was reasonable. We see no
evidence of any bias on the magistrate judge’s part. In fact, the magistrate judge
patiently addressed the voluminous discovery disputes in this case.
AFFIRMED

-- 4 of 4 --