United States of America v. Sylvester Purham

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted December 2, 2022*
Decided December 5, 2022
Before
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
No. 22-1554
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
SYLVESTER PURHAM,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 12-30019
Sue E. Myerscough,
Judge.
O R D E R
Sylvester Purham appeals the denial of his motion for compassionate release
under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), arguing that, based on recent caselaw, his sentencing
judge applied an incorrect mandatory minimum sentence to him. The district court
concluded that new caselaw is not an “extraordinary and compelling reason” for a
reduction. We agree and thus affirm.
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the issues
have been authoritatively decided. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(B).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 22-1554 Page 2
Purham pleaded guilty in 2012 to conspiring to distribute cocaine. See 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 846. He had a prior Illinois conviction for unlawfully delivering
cocaine. See 720 ILCS 570/401. That prior “felony drug offense” increased his federal
mandatory minimum sentence from 10 to 20 years. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2010).
After Purham appealed his sentence successfully, the district court resentenced him to
324 months in prison. Purham again appealed, but we granted his attorney’s motion to
withdraw and dismissed the appeal as frivolous. See United States v. Purham, 667 F.
App'x. 552 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967)).
We then decided United States v. Ruth, 966 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2020). There, we
held that, because Illinois law defines “cocaine” more broadly than federal law, Ruth’s
Illinois conviction for possessing cocaine with intent to distribute did not qualify as a
prior felony drug offense and thus could not increase the mandatory minimum
sentence under § 841(b). Id. at 647, 649–50.
Seizing on Ruth, in 2021 Purham moved for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A). He argued that under Ruth his Illinois cocaine-trafficking conviction
should not have increased his mandatory minimum sentence. That new caselaw,
Purham continued, created an “extraordinary and compelling reason” for a sentence
reduction. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).
The district court denied the motion. At first, it decided that Ruth supplied an
extraordinary and compelling reason to consider reducing Purham’s sentence, but the
sentencing factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) weighed against the reduction. Upon
reconsideration, though, the court ruled that Purham had not shown an extraordinary
and compelling reason for a reduction because United States v. Martin, 21 F.4th 944, 946
(7th Cir. 2021), held that a potential error in a sentence is not such a reason.
Purham appeals, maintaining that Ruth creates an extraordinary and compelling
reason for a sentence reduction. But even if under Ruth Purham’s criminal history
would yield a lower mandatory minimum sentence today, we have rejected Purham’s
argument: “Ruth—even if viewed as announcing new law or a new interpretation of an
existing statutory provision—cannot alone constitute an ‘extraordinary and compelling’
reason” for a sentence reduction. United States v. Brock, 39 F.4th 462, 465 (7th Cir. 2022).
More broadly, a potential error in a sentence is not an extraordinary and compelling
reason to reduce the sentence under § 3582(c)(1)(A). Id.; Martin, 21 F.4th at 946.
In response, Purham argues that our caselaw on this issue runs afoul of
Concepcion v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2389 (2022), which, he contends, says that nothing

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No. 22-1554 Page 3
limits what a judge may consider “in deciding whether to impose a lower sentence.”
But our caselaw is consistent with Concepcion. In deciding a motion for a sentence
reduction, our circuit follows a two-step approach: (1) did the prisoner show an
extraordinary and compelling reason for a reduction and, if so, (2), is a reduction
appropriate under the sentencing factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)? United States v.
Kurzynowski, 17 F.4th 756, 759 (7th Cir. 2021). Concepcion reasoned that judges have
“broad discretion to consider all relevant information” when considering the § 3553(a)
factors, whether at the initial sentencing or when later modifying the sentence. 142 S. Ct.
at 2398. But Concepcion does not address how a judge may decide the preliminary
question whether the prisoner showed an extraordinary and compelling reason and is
thus eligible for sentence reduction and application of the § 3553(a) factors.
See United States v. King, 40 F.4th 594, 595–96 (7th Cir. 2022). Therefore our view that
errors at sentencing do not satisfy step one of the sentence-reduction process is
consistent with Concepcion’s requirement for broad discretion at step two. See id.
AFFIRMED

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