William Anthony Fly v. Warden of United States Penitentiary, Tucson

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted December 21, 2022*
Decided December 22, 2022
Before
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
No. 21-1495
WILLIAM ANTHONY FLY,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
WARDEN OF UNITED STATES
PENITENTIARY, TUCSON,
Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 20-cv-1412-CSB
Colin S. Bruce,
Judge.
O R D E R
William Anthony Fly, a transgender woman who now goes by Toni, appeals the
denial of her petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. She challenged
both her underlying conviction and the conditions at the Federal Correctional
Institution at Pekin, Illinois. (She has since been transferred elsewhere.) Fly also
mentioned that the prison revoked some of her good-time credits without due process.
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 21-1495 Page 2
But, given the chance to elaborate on her loss of good-time credits, she fails to support
any due-process violation. That was the only potentially cognizable claim, so we affirm.
Fly’s habeas petition includes allegations of sexual assault, inadequate medical
care, and other potential violations of her Eighth Amendment rights during her
imprisonment, as well as errors and constitutional violations during the criminal
proceedings that led to her conviction and sentence. Upon its initial review under
28 U.S.C. § 2243, the district court concluded that Fly’s § 2241 petition could not be used
to challenge the conditions of her confinement, including the alleged abuse and denials
of medical care. See Robinson v. Sherrod, 631 F.3d 839, 840–41 (7th Cir. 2011). The court
also ruled that her petition could not be used to challenge her conviction and sentence
because she had been through a collateral attack already, and the claims did not fall
within the savings clause of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). See Camacho v. English, 872 F.3d 811, 813
(7th Cir. 2017).
On appeal, we instructed Fly to explain why we should not summarily affirm the
judgment. After reviewing the letter and memorandum that Fly submitted in response,
we allowed the appeal to proceed to briefing. We concluded that Fly might have a
nonfrivolous argument that she pleaded an appropriate ground for § 2241 relief that
was unaddressed by the district court. Namely, amid her other claims, she asserted that
prison officials “issued several retaliatory incident reports … which have resulted in
loss of liberty or good time.”
A due-process challenge to the loss of good-time credits as punishment for a
violation of institutional rules is properly brought in a § 2241 petition. Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973). Due process requires that a federal inmate receive
“(1) written notice of the claimed violation at least 24 hours before hearing; (2) an
opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence (when consistent with
institutional safety) to an impartial decision-maker; and (3) a written statement by the
fact-finder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action.” Jones v.
Cross, 637 F.3d 841, 845 (7th Cir. 2011). “[S]ome evidence” must support the discipline.
Id.
Fly did not, however, state facts in her petition supporting her due-process
challenge, as she was required to do under Rule 1(b) and Rule 2(c) of the Rules
Governing Section 2254 Cases. And on appeal, although we specifically noted before
briefing that, based on the loss of her good-time credits, Fly might have a single
nonfrivolous argument cognizable under § 2241, she provides no details about any

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No. 21-1495 Page 3
potential due-process violations. She makes the conclusory statements that she was
subjected to “false incident reports” as “retaliation” for reporting sexual assault, and
that she was denied “due process in the proceedings” and “witnesses and discovery.”
But she gives no specifics, even about how many distinct proceedings she challenges.
Beyond the generalized nods to due process that close out her brief, she otherwise
repeats the same allegations that the district court correctly concluded cannot proceed
in a habeas petition. See Robinson, 631 F.3d at 840–41; Camacho, 872 F.3d at 813. Without
reason to believe that Fly has a nonfrivolous due-process challenge to develop on
remand, we will not overturn the judgment. Cf. Anderson v. Hardman, 241 F.3d 544, 545
(7th Cir. 2001).
AFFIRMED

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