Waseem Daker v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted February 3, 2023*
Decided February 3, 2023
Before
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
No. 21-3210
WASEEM DAKER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY
COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 1:20-cv-01052
Joe Billy McDade,
Judge.
O R D E R
More than a year after he suffered property damage, Waseem Daker sued State
Farm Fire and Casualty Company for insurance coverage, despite knowing that his
policy with State Farm required that he file suit within a year of loss. The district court
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 21-3210 Page 2
granted State Farm’s motion to dismiss. It correctly ruled that the policy’s provision
was enforceable and Daker’s suit was time-barred; therefore we affirm.
Daker, who has been in prison in Georgia for over a decade, has maintained
ownership of a home in Georgia. According to Daker, the property was insured by State
Farm, a company incorporated in Illinois. Daker alleges that two incidents warrant
coverage: First, tenants “abused and vandalized” the home through June 2017; then, in
January 2018, Daker’s brother burglarized the home, damaging it further.
Daker filed two insurance claims with State Farm for the damage to his property
(one claim relating to each incident). State Farm denied both claims. In the denial letter,
which Daker received in March 2018, State Farm alerted Daker to the provision of his
insurance policy that required him to sue within one year of the dates of damage:
Suit Against Us. No action shall be brought unless there has been
compliance with the policy provisions and the action is started within
one year after the date of loss or damage.
About two years later, in February 2020, Daker sued in a federal court in Illinois,
asserting diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. As relevant on appeal, he alleged
that State Farm breached its insurance policy by declining coverage for his property
damage. Daker conceded that he sued past the one-year limitations period in his
contract with State Farm, but he argued that the period did not matter because, among
other reasons, the provision was unreasonable and State Farm had misled him about it.
After permitting Daker to amend his complaint three times, the district court
granted State Farm’s motion to dismiss it with prejudice. It ruled that Illinois law
applied to Daker’s claims based on Illinois’s choice-of-law rules, which Erie Railroad Co.
v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), required it to apply. And under Illinois contract law, the
one-year limitations provision in State Farm’s policy was enforceable because it was
reasonable, accepted voluntarily, and not contrary to any statute or public policy.
Moreover, Daker lacked a valid defense to the provision, given that State Farm told him
of it in denying his claims. Thus, the one-year limitations provision barred Daker’s suit,
which he filed nearly two years after the most recent date of property damage. Daker
moved to reconsider under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), raising a related
contention. He argued that he had relied on a broken promise by his State Farm agent
to mail him another copy of the full policy, which he asserted he needed in order to sue.
The court denied Daker’s motion.

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No. 21-3210 Page 3
On appeal Daker contends that his complaint was not time-barred because
promissory estoppel, equitable estoppel, and equitable tolling defeat the limitations
defense. Daker relies primarily on his argument in his motion for reconsideration—that
State Farm never delivered to him a copy of the policy that he says he needed to timely
sue. He repeats that before he began preparing his complaint, he contacted his State
Farm agent in early 2018 to ask for another copy of his insurance policy, and she
promised to send it to him, but never did. (According to Daker, he did not receive one
until May 2020—after he had sued—when defense counsel provided him with a
courtesy copy.) Daker contends that he detrimentally relied on the State Farm agent’s
promise, so that promissory and equitable estoppel should toll the limitations period.
Daker adds that equitable tolling also applies because he was unable for a time to access
his prison’s law library, which he also needed to prepare his complaint.
We begin with the applicable law. We review dismissals of complaints de novo,
Consumer Health Info. Corp. v. Amylin Pharm., Inc., 819 F.3d 992, 995 (7th Cir. 2016), and
denials of motions to reconsider for abuse of discretion. Selective Ins. Co. of South
Carolina v. City of Paris, 769 F.3d 501, 507 (7th Cir. 2014). Also, in a diversity case, we
apply the substantive law of the forum state—Illinois—including its choice-of-law rules.
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., Inc., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). And under Illinois law,
limitations rules—and defenses to it—are governed by the law of the forum. Heiman v.
Bimbo Foods Bakeries Distrib. Co., 902 F.3d 715, 718 (7th Cir. 2018).
Illinois’s law regarding the validity of contract terms that displace statutes of
limitations, and tolling, is well-settled. Generally, such a contract term is upheld if it
was accepted knowingly and voluntarily, is reasonable, and is consistent with public
policy. Taylor v. Western and Southern Life Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 1188, 1202–04 (7th Cir. 1992).
(Georgia law, which Daker prefers, is similar: these provisions are generally enforced if
they are not unconscionable or so unreasonable that they raise a presumption of undue
advantage. See, e.g., Langley v. MP Spring Lake, LLC, 307 Ga. 321 (Ga. 2019).) For Daker to
establish tolling based on promissory estoppel, he must show that State Farm made a
promise on which he detrimentally and foreseeably relied. See Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A., 673 F.3d 547, 566 (7th Cir. 2012) (Illinois law). For equitable estoppel, he must
show, among other things, that State Farm lied about or concealed material facts
knowing that Daker would detrimentally act upon the untrue representations.
See Geddes v. Mill Creek Country Club, Inc., 196 Ill.2d 302, 313–14 (Ill. 2001). Finally, an
equitable-tolling defense requires a showing that, despite exercising due diligence,
Daker could not discover the facts essential to his claim within the limitations period.
See Williams v. Sims, 390 F.3d 958, 960 (7th Cir. 2004) (Illinois law).

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No. 21-3210 Page 4
Reviewing the matter de novo, we agree with the district court that the one-year
limitations provision in State Farm’s policy is valid. First, the provision is reasonable
because it allowed Daker sufficient time to sue after his dates of loss. The first loss
ended in June 2017 and the second occurred in January 2018; as a result, his suit on the
first loss had to be filed by June 2018, and his suit on the second loss by January 2019.
He knew about these deadlines. When State Farm notified him of its denial of his claim
in March 2018, it reminded him about the one-year deadlines; he thus knew that he still
had three more months to sue about the first loss. Because Daker bases this suit on State
Farm’s refusal to cover his losses, he had adequate time to sue before that time ran out.
Finally, Daker does not argue the one-year provision was imposed upon him without
his consent or knowledge, or that it violates any Illinois statute or public policy. See, e.g.,
Taylor, 966 F.2d at 1202–06 (six-month limitations period in employment contract was
reasonable in Illinois because plaintiff had sufficient time to investigate and file an
action). Thus, the provision is enforceable.
Even if the provision is enforceable, Daker contends, the district court wrongly
rejected his arguments that its one-year time limit should be tolled. Whether the district
court’s rulings are reviewed through a de novo or abuse-of-discretion lens, we uphold
them. Regarding promissory estoppel, we will assume that State Farm falsely promised
in early 2018 to mail Daker a copy of the full policy. Even so, his reliance on that
promise was neither detrimental to his ability to sue nor foreseeable. He asserts that he
needed the policy to help him prepare his complaint, but his own actions refute that
assertion: He successfully prepared and filed his complaint without the promised copy
of the policy, and no one has suggested that his complaint inadequately alleges breach
of contract. Similarly, Daker has not argued that the State Farm agent foresaw that he
would delay his suit in reliance on her promise. See Wigod, 673 F.3d at 566. Likewise, his
defense of equitable estoppel is unavailing because, for the same reason, Daker did not
detrimentally rely on any false statement from State Farm. See Geddes, 196 Ill.2d at 313–
14. Last, he cannot rely on equitable tolling. He bases that defense on his inability to
access his prison’s law library. But he did not need the library to allege that State Farm
breached its contract, which he tells us he knew when he received the letters from it
declining coverage. See Williams, 390 F.3d at 960.
We have considered Daker’s other arguments, and none has merit.
AFFIRMED

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