United States of America v. Arthur Carter

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted February 22, 2023
Decided February 23, 2023
Before
DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
No. 22-2057
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ARTHUR CARTER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 01-CR-10041-001
Michael M. Mihm,
Judge.
O R D E R
Arthur Carter appeals the modification of his supervised release to include
120 days of home confinement. But his appointed counsel asserts that the appeal is
frivolous and moves to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). We
grant the motion and dismiss the appeal.
A defendant does not have an unqualified constitutional right to counsel in
revocation or modification proceedings, see Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790–91
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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No. 22-2057 Page 2
(1973), so the Anders safeguards need not govern our review. Even so, our practice is to
apply them. United States v. Brown, 823 F.3d 392, 394 (7th Cir. 2016). Because counsel’s
analysis appears adequate, we limit our review to the subjects she discusses. See id. (We
notified Carter of the motion, but he did not respond. See C IR . R. 51(b).)
We briefly summarize this case’s procedural history. Carter was released from
prison in 2020 after serving time for conspiracy to distribute cocaine. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A). While on supervised release, Carter repeatedly was found to
possess and use cannabis. In January 2022, Carter’s probation officer petitioned the
district court to modify Carter’s terms of supervised release to require 120 days in home
confinement.
At a hearing on the petition, Carter justified his cannabis possession on grounds
that he held a valid medical marijuana license and had bought the marijuana from a
licensed distributor, in compliance with state law. But the district judge, highlighting
several positive test results and instances in which Carter admitted marijuana use to his
probation officer, found that Carter violated the terms of his supervised release. The
judge, in turn, determined that these violations sufficed to modify Carter’s conditions of
supervised release to include 120 days’ home confinement.
In her motion to withdraw, counsel does not tell us, as she should, whether
Carter wants to challenge the modification of his supervised release. See United States v.
Wheeler, 814 F.3d 856, 857 (7th Cir. 2016). But as we explain below, any challenge to the
modification would be frivolous.
Counsel first considers and appropriately rejects challenging the judge’s
justification for modifying Carter’s conditions of supervised release. When imposing
home confinement as a condition of supervised release, a judge must consider the
sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and sufficiently explain his reasoning.
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(4); United States v. Nonahal, 338 F.3d 668, 671 (7th Cir. 2003). Here,
the judge said little, but his reason for approving the modification was apparent.
Alluding to the nature of the offense, he explained that Carter’s positive drug tests and
admissions of use were “certainly enough here to justify a modification.”
See § 3553(a)(1).
Counsel also considers challenging the procedure used at the hearing, but rightly
deems this challenge frivolous. Because counsel made no such challenge in the district
court, our review would be for plain error. See Wheeler, 814 F.3d at 857. And the
transcript of the hearing reflects that the judge complied with the requirements of Rule

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No. 22-2057 Page 3
32.1(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The judge held a hearing at which
the defendant had a right to counsel and provided an opportunity to the defendant to
make a statement and present mitigation arguments.
Counsel next correctly concludes that any challenge to the reasonableness of the
modification would be frivolous. We would review modifications of conditions of
supervised release for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Taylor, 796 F.3d 788, 792
(7th Cir. 2015). Judges do not abuse their discretion if the modification is reasonably
related to the § 3553(a) factors and consistent with the Sentencing Commission’s policy
statements. United States v. Evans, 727 F.3d 730, 733 (7th Cir. 2013). And the judge
adequately supported his ruling with reference to § 3553(a)(1).
We GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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