United States of America v. Vernon Chapman

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted March 10, 2023*
Decided March 13, 2023
Before
F RANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. K IRSCH II, Circuit Judge
No. 22-3272
U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
VERNON C HAPMAN ,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United
States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division.
No. 10 CR 961
Sharon Johnson Coleman,
Judge.
O R D E R
Last year we held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Vernon Chapman’s motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. §3582(c)(1).
United States v. Chapman, No. 21-1338 (7th Cir. Feb. 1, 2022) (nonprecedential disposi-
tion). Chapman promptly filed another motion, contending that his original sentence
should have been shorter and that he remains at risk of COVID-19 in prison even after
* This appeal has been referred to the panel that resolved Chapman’s appeal from an earlier denial of
compassionate release. See Operating Procedure 6(b). As Circuit Judge Jackson-Akiwumi is unavailable,
the appeal is being resolved by a quorum of the panel. 28 U.S.C. §46(d). After examining the briefs and the
record, we have concluded that oral argument is unnecessary. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); Cir. R. 34(f).

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No. 22-3272 Page 2
being fully vaccinated and receiving a booster. The district court denied this renewed
motion, and Chapman has appealed again.
Chapman has not supplied or cited to any data suggesting that prisoners who
have been fully vaccinated against COVID-19 are at risk of serious illness should they
become “breakthrough” cases who contract the disease despite the vaccinations. Nor
does Chapman suggest that medical data show that he is at greater risk of COVID-19 in
prison than he would be outside, which means that releasing him would not produce a
medical benefit to offset the loss in punishment and deterrence. The district judge did
not abuse her discretion in denying Chapman’s motion for release.
The judge observed that Chapman’s additional ground is not properly pre-
sented, because he has not exhausted his administrative remedies on this subject. See
United States v. Williams, 987 F.3d 700 (7th Cir. 2021). The judge added that this ground
also does not identify anything “extraordinary and compelling”. We have repeatedly
held that disputes about the propriety of a sentence must be raised on direct appeal or
by motion under 28 U.S.C. §2255 or a statute such as the First Step Act that allows retro-
active reassessment of the appropriate sentence. See, e.g., United States v. Thacker, 4 F.4th
569 (7th Cir. 2021); United States v. Von Vader, 58 F.4th 369 (7th Cir. 2023).
These decisions apply to Chapman with full force. So even if Chapman had ex-
hausted all administrative remedies, he could not obtain compassionate relief by con-
tending that his original sentence was too long. That is just not the sort of claim for
which §3582(c)(1) was designed. And, because the judge found that the threshold of an
“extraordinary and compelling” reason has not been satisfied, the judge did not need to
canvass the criteria in 18 U.S.C. §3553(a) that would be pertinent if resentencing were
called for. See United States v. King, 40 F.4th 594 (7th Cir. 2022).
A FFIRMED

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