Ryan P. O’boyle v. Gilbert Carrasco

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted April 5, 2023*
Decided April 13, 2023
Before
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
No. 22-1912
RYAN P. O’BOYLE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
GILBERT CARRASCO, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin.
No. 16-cv-0959-bhl
Brett H. Ludwig,
Judge.
O R D E R
Ryan O’Boyle, a Wisconsin prisoner, appeals the summary judgment against his
claim that several Milwaukee police officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights by
arresting and detaining him without probable cause. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district
court concluded that the officers obtained valid consent to enter O’Boyle’s home, and
that a state judge made a timely probable-cause determination. We affirm.
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. FED. R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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No. 22-1912 Page 2
O’Boyle was a primary suspect in a stabbing at a Milwaukee music festival in
2011. (He had been identified by the victim from a photo array.) The police issued a
temporary felony warrant for his arrest. Later that night, officers went to O’Boyle’s last
known address—a residence where he lived with his girlfriend. They were met at the
door by his girlfriend’s mother, Noreen Esselman, who identified herself as the
homeowner. She confirmed that her daughter was O’Boyle’s girlfriend and that O’Boyle
was inside the house. According to the officers, they told Esselman there was probable
cause for O’Boyle’s arrest, and she agreed to let them in. They then proceeded upstairs
to Boyle’s bedroom and knocked on the door. When he answered, the officers asked if
he would answer a few questions, and arrested him when he refused. O’Boyle, for his
part, asserts that the officers never received consent from Esselman and instead forced
their way into the house.
The officers took O’Boyle to a police station, where he was held pending a state
judge’s determination on probable cause. About 38 hours after the arrest, the judge
signed a probable-cause determination stating that O’Boyle committed the stabbing.
O’Boyle was eventually tried before a jury and convicted.
Meanwhile, O’Boyle brought this civil-rights suit, asserting that the officers had
entered his home without consent, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. He added
that he suffered prolonged detention because the state judge did not timely determine
that the arrest was supported by probable cause. He also brought constitutional claims
against the stabbing victim, a prosecutor, state court judges, and other police officers
involved in his arrest and criminal proceedings.
At screening, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, Judge Pepper allowed O’Boyle to proceed
with his Fourth Amendment claims against the officers who arrested him. She also
permitted O’Boyle to proceed on a claim that an officer interrogated him without a
lawyer present. For reasons not relevant here, she dismissed his claims against the
stabbing victim, state court judges, a prosecutor, and a paralegal.
The remaining defendants then moved to dismiss the case on the pleadings.
See FED. R. C IV. P. 12(c). Judge Ludwig, who had been reassigned the case, determined
that O’Boyle could proceed on unlawful-entry and unlawful-detention claims against
the officers who arrested and detained him. But the judge dismissed O’Boyle’s
unlawful-seizure claim (as barred by collateral estoppel) and his unlawful-interrogation
claim (O’Boyle had not substituted a successor for a defendant officer who died before
being served).

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No. 22-1912 Page 3
Discovery ensued, and O’Boyle sought to subpoena the stabbing victim and
police officers to obtain signature samples to show that certain documents were forged
and that his seizure was illegal. A magistrate judge quashed the request on grounds
that the victim and officers had been dismissed from the case, and any attempt on
O’Boyle’s part to try to invalidate his conviction was barred by Heck v. Humphrey.
See 512 U.S. 477, 482 (1994).
Judge Ludwig then granted the defendant officers’ motion for summary
judgment. He concluded that the officers had lawfully entered the home after Esselman
gave her undisputed consent. The judge noted that officers may not rely on the consent
of a co-occupant if a second occupant is physically present and objects, see Georgia v.
Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 122 (2006), but O’Boyle had not offered any evidence that he was
present during the officers’ interaction with Esselman or posed any objection to their
entry into the home. The judge also determined that O’Boyle failed to rebut the officers’
evidence that a judicial determination of probable cause was made within the
permissible timeframe of 48 hours after his arrest. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin,
500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991).
On appeal, O’Boyle primarily challenges the district court’s ruling that the
officers had consent to enter the home and arrest him. He acknowledges that there is no
Fourth Amendment violation where an entry is conducted with an occupant’s consent,
see Wonsey v. City of Chicago, 940 F.3d 394, 399 (2019), but invokes a narrow exception to
this rule when a co-occupant makes a contemporaneous objection to the search.
According to that exception, “if a potential defendant with self-interest in objecting is in
fact at the door and objects, the co-tenant’s permission does not suffice for a reasonable
search.” Randolph, 547 U.S. at 121. O’Boyle argues that he was inside the home when the
officers arrived and would have objected to their entry had he been present for their
conversation with Esselman.
The district court here properly determined that Esselman’s consent justified the
officers’ entry into the home. As the court explained, O’Boyle offered no evidence to call
into question the reasonableness of the officers’ belief that she had consented to their
entering. As for the exception in Randolph, O’Boyle concedes that he was not at the door
when the officers interacted with Esselman. In his telling, he did not interact with them
until they already had entered the home. And once the officers secured Esselman’s
consent to enter, they did not need to seek his.

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No. 22-1912 Page 4
O’Boyle next generally argues that the evidence of Esselman’s consent is
underdeveloped. But he introduced no evidence to counter the officers’ testimony about
the manner and circumstances in which she consented. In a § 1983 case, once the
defendants presented evidence of consent to the search, the burden shifts to the plaintiff
to establish the lack of consent to search. See Wonsey, 940 F.3d at 399–400. O’Boyle
offered nothing to meet this burden.
O’Boyle next generally challenges the court’s ruling that the state judge made a
timely determination of probable cause. But that determination needed to be made only
within 48 hours of O’Boyle’s arrest, see McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 56, and the state judge’s
signed determination—which is self-authenticating, see FED. R. EVID. 902; United States v.
Hampton, 464 F.3d 687, 689 (7th Cir. 2006)—indicates that it was made 38 hours after
O’Boyle’s arrest.
Finally, O’Boyle argues that the district court did not comply with Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 45(d)(3) when it quashed his subpoenas seeking signature samples
from the stabbing victim and nonparty officers. O’Boyle maintains that he needed the
signatures to prove that the photo array and other evidence were fabricated. But the
magistrate judge overseeing discovery appropriately determined that the subpoenas
were Heck-barred because O’Boyle’s only discernible motive for issuing the subpoenas
was to challenge the validity of his conviction. See 512 U.S. at 482.
We have considered O’Boyle’s remaining arguments and none merit discussion.
AFFIRMED

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