United States of America v. Rickey Dale Brown, Jr.

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted May 4, 2023*
Decided May 11, 2023
Before
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 22-2667
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
RICKEY DALE BROWN, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Indiana,
Hammond Division.
No. 2:17-CR-131-JVB-JEM
Joseph S. Van Bokkelen,
Judge.
O R D E R
Years after his conviction, Rickey Brown moved the district court to compel the
government to respond to his request seeking documents related to its investigation
and prosecution of him. The district court denied the motion, finding Brown’s
justification for the request to be insufficient in a closed criminal case. We affirm.
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. FED. R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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No. 22-2667 Page 2
Brown pleaded guilty to production of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a),
and possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4), and was sentenced in 2019
to 360 months in prison. As part of his agreement with the government, Brown waived
his right to challenge his conviction on any ground other than ineffective assistance of
counsel. He also waived “all rights” to “request or receive from the United States any
further records, reports, or documents pertaining to the investigation or prosecution.”
Two years later, Brown began filing a flurry of post-judgment motions to obtain
records relating to his underlying case. First, he sought assistance in obtaining
documents from the lawyer who represented him in the district court. After counsel
informed the court that he did not have any relevant documents, the court denied the
motion as moot. Brown later asked for the court’s help getting his case file from the
government in preparation for a collateral attack. The court denied the request,
characterizing it as a “fishing expedition” that was insufficient to warrant discovery in a
closed criminal case. About six months later, Brown moved to compel the Assistant U.S.
Attorney to respond to his letters seeking access to his case file. For the same reason, the
court denied this motion.
Finally, Brown filed the motion that is the subject of this appeal. In it, he renewed
his request for the court to compel the government’s response. The court, citing its
previous orders, again denied the request because Brown “provided no basis on which
the [c]ourt can order discovery.”
On appeal, Brown contends that the district court ignored his express purpose in
seeking this information—to support an application for collateral relief that he hoped to
pursue. He now adds that he plans to assert an ineffective-assistance claim over trial
counsel’s role in plea negotiations and in the decision not to challenge the validity of a
search. Brown compares his case to Socha v. Boughton, 763 F.3d 674, 679 (7th Cir. 2014),
in which we vacated the dismissal of a federal habeas corpus petition in part because
the petitioner’s “lack of access to his file [from his public defender] seriously impeded
his ability to raise the two arguments he wished to press.”
The district court properly denied Brown’s motion. To begin, Brown, whose
criminal case is closed and who does not have a pending motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255,
does not identify any statute or rule that would entitle him to discovery, and a “post-
judgment motion needs a source of authority for the judge to act.” United States v. Scott,
414 F.3d 815, 816 (7th Cir. 2005). Socha is of no help to Brown because the petitioner
there had a pending collateral attack. Moreover, merely pursuing collateral relief is

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No. 22-2667 Page 3
insufficient to entitle Brown to discovery. See Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904 (1997)
(petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254). To satisfy federal rules, a petitioner seeking discovery
must make a colorable claim of a constitutional violation and show good cause.
See Hubanks v. Frank, 392 F.3d 926, 933 (7th Cir. 2004) (petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254);
see also Rule 6(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Cases in the United States District
Courts. But even after Brown clarified his intent to pursue collateral relief, his request
was “speculative [and] conclusory,” so the court reasonably categorized it as a “fishing
expedition.” Famous v. Fuchs, 38 F.4th 625, 632 n.24 (7th Cir. 2022) (petition under
28 U.S.C. § 2254) (citation omitted). Socha, which addresses equitable tolling and not a
discovery-related motion, does not alter our analysis.
We have considered Brown’s other arguments, and none has merit.
AFFIRMED

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