Raven Griffin v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted June 30, 2023*
Decided July 7, 2023
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 22-2767
RAVEN GRIFFIN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.
No. 21-CV-63
Nancy Joseph,
Magistrate Judge.
O R D E R
Raven Griffin applied for Social Security disability and supplemental security
income benefits, alleging that pain, physical problems, and mental ailments left her
unable to work. An administrative law judge denied her application after finding that
Griffin was able to perform certain light work and was therefore not disabled. The
district court affirmed. Substantial evidence supports these rulings, so we also affirm.
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
the record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would
not significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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We begin with her physical issues and pain. In 2014, Griffin’s primary care
physician diagnosed her with chronic back pain and limited her to “light work” (lifting
no more than five pounds) and sitting. Griffin then had three car accidents. After the
first, which yielded a concussion, spinal problems, torn ligaments, pain in her neck and
back, and headaches, she received physical therapy that reduced pain and the severity
and frequency of headaches. She also saw doctors for pain management. The first
observed tenderness and spasms along her spine and limits to her range of motion but
found that strength and coordination were normal and recommended physical therapy
and pain relievers. Two more specialists made similar findings and recommendations.
The third noted that Griffin’s medical imaging was “unremarkable” with no evidence of
fracture or significant degeneration. She did not seek more care from these specialists.
Griffin had two more car accidents. After the second, she reported hand and
neck pain to a pain-management doctor, who noted tenderness in her neck, spine, and
right hand, as well as “severely compromised” range of motion of her neck and back.
He recommended a short time off work, physical therapy, and pain relievers. Another
doctor prescribed a muscle relaxer, physical therapy, and imaging. Griffin did not
follow up with these doctors. She later told her primary doctor, after her third accident,
that she hit her head during it, fainted at her home, and had daily headaches. Her
physician observed lower back tenderness and spasms and recommended physical
therapy. She attended physical therapy sessions, and Griffin reported relief from her
headaches.
Once she applied for benefits, Griffin’s health was further evaluated. First, the
psychologist Richard Ertl assessed her mental health. He said she had an “adjustment”
disorder: she could understand, remember, and follow simple orders; was “mildly-to-
markedly” limited in dealing with coworkers and supervisors, stress, and change; and
was moderately limited in maintaining concentration, attention, and work pace. A
second psychological evaluator assessed Griffin with depression, anxiety with panic
attacks, memory impairment, posttraumatic stress disorder, and paranoia. But he also
found that she could understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions; her
concentration, attention, and work pace were manageable, subject to her physical
condition; and she may have some trouble interacting with others. Two other
consulting physicians also reviewed Griffin’s record. One said she could perform
medium work; the second, relying on additional records, found her capable of only
light work with limitations.

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Agency proceedings came next. First, an ALJ held a hearing, and after an
unfavorable ruling, Griffin appealed and the Appeals Council remanded her claims for
further consideration of Griffin’s headaches and a more thorough review of Dr. Ertl’s
opinion. At the next hearing, a new ALJ heard testimony from Griffin. She testified that
she had severe headaches every other day, difficulty using her right hand, limited range
of motion, and neck and back pain while sitting or standing. She added that she would
not have difficulty interacting with supervisors but might have some difficulty
interacting with coworkers or the public.
Applying the five-step analysis, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4) (disability insurance
benefits); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4) (supplemental security income), the ALJ determined
that Griffin was not disabled. The ALJ first found that Griffin was not working (step
one) and had severe impairments including degenerative disc disease, headaches, and
an adjustment disorder (step two), but none were automatically disabling (step three).
Before step four, the ALJ found that Griffin had the residual capacity for light work
with some restrictions. These were lifting (only 10 pounds frequently), standing (six
hours per day), noise (moderate) and light (no greater than a typical office setting), neck
movement (frequent—but not constant), and stress level (low with only occasional
decisions, changes, and interactions with supervisors, coworkers, and the public). With
these restrictions, the ALJ credited a vocational expert’s testimony that Griffin could not
handle her past work as a janitor (step four) but could work at jobs like cafeteria
attendant or cleaner, of which the national economy had many (step five).
The ALJ detailed her rationale regarding Griffin’s residual capacity to work. The
opinion of her primary care physician—that Griffin could not lift more than five pounds
and must sit—deserved little weight because it conflicted with the contemporaneous
objective evidence of normal imaging and no fractures or degeneration. The ALJ gave
some weight to the opinion from the consulting doctor who said that Griffin could
perform light work, but added other limitations based on the record. Finally, the ALJ
gave the opinions of Dr. Ertl and the other mental-health doctor limited weight. Some
of their proposed limitations were consistent with the record—moderate limitations on
concentration, persistence, pace, interactions with others, and stress. But others were
either too vague or relied on Griffin’s subjective reports that conflicted with other
objective evidence: Despite her claims of disabling pain, Griffin inexplicably did not
pursue continuous care for it. For example, she saw four pain-management specialists,
but only for one initial exam each. And regarding her claim of nearly daily headaches,
Griffin did not report them at all during some of her pain-management consultations,
and she later reported that physical therapy relieved them.

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Griffin contests the ALJ’s decision. She unsuccessfully sought review of it before
the Appeals Council and in district court, where a magistrate judge presided with the
parties’ consent. In this court, we review the ALJ’s decision directly and affirm if the
ALJ’s decision is supported by “substantial evidence,” see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), which is
“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion." Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2019).
Griffin first asserts that the ALJ never considered the opinion of Dr. Ertl, the
psychologist who initially evaluated her mental health. But the ALJ did discuss his
evaluation and findings and incorporated them into the assessment of Griffin’s residual
capacity to work. In any event, Griffin does not state what, if any, additional limitations
she believes would be appropriate based on Dr. Ertl’s evaluation.
Next, Griffin contends that the ALJ improperly discredited her testimony that
her pain prevented her from working. We defer to the ALJ’s credibility rulings unless
they are “patently wrong.” Zoch v. Saul, 981 F.3d 597, 601 (7th Cir. 2020). For allegations
of disabling pain, the ALJ may consider objective medical evidence and any conflict
between Griffin’s allegations and the record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c). Griffin does not
specify the pain she refers to, but, construing her pro se brief liberally, Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), we assume that she means her headaches and neck and
back pain.
The ALJ permissibly discredited Griffin’s testimony of consistently disabling
pain because it conflicted with objective medical evidence. See Zoch, 981 F.3d at 601.
First, as the ALJ noted, although Griffin reported regular headaches to her doctor, she
also reported that physical therapy lessened their severity and frequency. Second,
although physical exams revealed spinal tenderness and reduced range of motion,
imaging scans were “unremarkable,” and one specialist reported that her strength and
coordination were normal. Based on this record, it was not “patently wrong” for the
ALJ to decline to credit Griffin’s subjective reports that her pain was continuous and
disabling. Id.
Griffin also contends that the ALJ improperly ignored the medical opinions of
her primary care and pain-management doctors. An ALJ should generally give
controlling weight to treating physicians’ opinions if they are supported by medical
findings and consistent with the record but may discount them otherwise. Id. at 602.
Here the ALJ adequately justified her rulings. She reasonably explained that she did not

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give the primary doctor’s view of Griffin’s lifting and standing limitations controlling
weight because it conflicted with the results of contemporaneous imaging showing no
fractures or significant degeneration. Also, the ALJ reasonably explained that she
discounted Griffin’s reports of pain to her pain-management specialists because she did
not seek further treatment from any of them.
Finally, Griffin contends that the ALJ improperly credited the vocational expert’s
testimony that she could perform certain jobs. She notes that the ALJ concluded at step
four that she could not perform her past work as a janitor but adopted at step five,
inconsistently in Griffin’s view, the expert’s finding that Griffin could work as a
“cleaner.” But the expert explained that these jobs are different—the janitor’s position
involves medium-duty work, whereas a cleaner job requires only light work. See U.S.
DEP ’ T OF LABOR , DICTIONARY OF O CCUPATIONAL TITLES , §§ 382.664-010, 323.687-014
(4th ed. 1991). The ALJ’s conclusion that Griffin could work as a cleaner is thus
internally consistent and supported by substantial evidence.
We therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

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