Angela K. Crowell v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI , Commissioner of Social Security

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-3097
A NGELA K. C ROWELL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
K ILOLO K IJAKAZI , Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Wisconsin.
No. 2:20-cv-00343-BHL — Brett H. Ludwig, Judge.
____________________
S UBMITTED M AY 25, 2023 — DECIDED J ULY 7, 2023
____________________
Before EASTERBROOK, R OVNER , and LEE, Circuit Judges.
R OVNER , Circuit Judge. Angela Crowell filed an application
for Supplemental Social Security Insurance benefits on
February 11, 2010, alleging that she was disabled beginning
August 1, 2007—a date she later revised to January 1, 2012.
The Social Security Administration denied her application
and she appealed. This case has a complex history with
several appeals and remands through the administrative law

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2 No. 22-3097
system and two appeals to the federal district court. For
current purposes, we need focus only on the October 25, 2022
district court opinion denying Crowell’s motion seeking
reversal of the decision of the Social Security Administration,
and the decision upon which the district court’s opinion was
based—that of the Social Security Administration from June
12, 2018.
We review the district court’s decision de novo, but like
the district court, we defer to the agency’s factual findings and
consider those findings to be conclusive provided they are
supported by substantial evidence. Biestek v. Berryhill, 139
S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2019). “[S]ubstantial evidence ... is ‘such rel-
evant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as ade-
quate to support a conclusion.’” Simila v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 503,
513 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 673
(7th Cir. 2008)). “[W]hatever the meaning of ‘substantial’ in
other contexts,” the Supreme Court has made clear that in the
disability context, “the threshold for such evidentiary suffi-
ciency is not high.” Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154. We will reverse
an administrative law judge’s decision only if it is the result
of an error of law or it is not supported by substantial evi-
dence, which is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Butler v.
Kijakazi, 4 F.4th 498, 501 (7th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation
omitted). “As such, our role is extremely limited.” Elder v.
Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2008). “We will not reweigh
the evidence, resolve debatable evidentiary conflicts, deter-
mine credibility, or substitute our judgment for the ALJ’s de-
termination so long as substantial evidence supports it.” Geda-
tus v. Saul, 994 F.3d 893, 900 (7th Cir. 2021). But even under
this deferential standard of review, an administrative law
judge “must provide a logical bridge between the evidence

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No. 22-3097 3
and [her] conclusions.” Butler, 4 F.4th at 501 (internal quota-
tion omitted).
Crowell asserts that the administrative law judge’s deci-
sion lacked substantial evidence to support the conclusions
both that Crowell was not disabled within the meaning of the
Social Security Act, and that she retained a residual functional
capacity for the range of work identified in the decision. This
is a hard path for Crowell, however, because as we noted, the
threshold for evidentiary sufficiency is not high, and our def-
erence to the administrative law judge’s findings is great.
Crowell also claims that the administrative law judge erred
by failing to consider properly Crowell’s bipolar disorder in
the residual functional capacity determination.
Crowell has submitted to this court a lengthy statement of
facts, including detailed lists of every piece of evidence that
supports each of her claimed disabilities. Although we have
reviewed all of the facts extensively, we need not reiterate
them here, as the administrative law judge weighed the evi-
dence and adduced which of those facts to give the most cre-
dence, and, as we discuss further below, we see no reason to
disturb the administrative law judge’s factual determina-
tions.1 In broad brushstrokes, Crowell alleged that she was
unable to work due to ADHD, social anxiety, fibromyalgia,
bipolar disorder, borderline personality disorder, chronic
pain, panic attacks, arthritis, shoulder pain, back pain, OCD,
anxiety, depression, insomnia, asthma, and chronic
1 A fuller rendition of the facts can be found in the administrative law
judge’s decision in the district court’s record below at R. 9-15 at 40–54 (AR
1043–1057). We cite first to the record as it appears in the district court
docket, and then to the pages as they appear in the administrative record
(AR).

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4 No. 22-3097
obstructive pulmonary disease. The administrative law judge
agreed that the following impairments were severe as defined
under the regulations: fibromyalgia, depressive disorder,
anxiety disorder, and impairments of her left shoulder which
remained after surgical correction. Id. at 41 (AR 1044). The ad-
ministrative law judge also considered Crowell’s claims that
she suffered from asthma, back problems, substance abuse,
and “absence” spells, but deemed that none of those condi-
tions met the criteria of severe impairments.
In making his determination, the administrative law judge
considered the reports of approximately seventeen different
medical providers. For each of those reports, he summarized
the evidence and then described extensively the relative
weight given to each report and the reason for that decision.
The judge considered Crowell’s treatment history, records,
her own accounts of her symptoms and activities, and those
of her boyfriend and mother. He also considered the evidence
in 184 exhibits (citing approximately 50 of them), carefully as-
sessing the medical claims as well as the claims of the activi-
ties Crowell was able to perform currently, and those which
she was not. It was, in short, a very thorough decision.
The administrative law judge followed the five-step pro-
cess set forth in the administrative regulations for evaluating
whether a plaintiff is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. In that
process, “[t]he ALJ must consider whether: (1) the claimant is
presently employed; (2) the claimant has a severe impairment
or combination of impairments; (3) the claimant’s impairment
meets or equals any impairment listed in the regulations as
being so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity;
(4) the claimant’s residual functional capacity leaves [her] un-
able to perform [her] past relevant work; and (5) the claimant

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No. 22-3097 5
is unable to perform any other work existing in significant
numbers in the national economy.” Butler, 4 F.4th at 501 (quot-
ing Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351–52 (7th
Cir. 2005)); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.
The administrative law judge determined that Crowell
had not performed substantial gainful activity since her al-
leged onset of disability on January 1, 2012. He determined
that of her severe impairments (listed above), none singly or
in combination, met or medically equaled an impairment
listed in the regulations. At step four the administrative law
judge assessed Crowell’s residual functional capacity, (her
maximum work abilities) using treatment notes, medical
opinions, and Crowell’s statements regarding her activities
and symptoms. 2 He concluded that she had moderate limita-
tions in understanding, remembering, or applying infor-
mation, interacting with others, and in her ability to concen-
trate, persist, and maintain pace. He further found mild limi-
tations in her ability to adapt and manage herself. All of these
presumptions led the administrative law judge to conclude
that Crowell could perform light work involving only simple,
routine, and repetitive tasks; simple work-related decisions;
occasional workplace changes; and occasional interaction
with the public, co-workers, and supervisors. According to
his conclusions, she would have to avoid fast-paced work;
concentrated exposure to unprotected heights and hazards;
use of dangerous machinery; and some jobs that involved too
2 The administrative law judge made extensive findings under each
step of the sequence, in a nineteen-page, single-spaced opinion that set
forth detailed and thorough evidence for each conclusion. We offer only a
very brief summary description of the relevant evidence here. See R. 9-15
at 38–69 (AR 1041–1072).

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6 No. 22-3097
much use of certain movements involving her upper extrem-
ities. Despite these limitations, the administrative law judge
found that there were significant numbers of jobs in the na-
tional economy that Crowell could perform.
Crowell objects to the administrative law judge’s findings
that were then accepted by the district court, arguing that the
administrative law judge failed to consider enough of the
medical records, and to give sufficient weight to the opinions
of the treating providers. An administrative law judge, how-
ever, is not required to spell out in the record every piece of
evidence that he considered and then accepted or rejected.
Gedatus, 994 F.3d at 901; Loveless v. Colvin, 810 F.3d 502, 507
(7th Cir. 2016) (“[A]n ALJ is not required to list each docu-
ment he considered, but must only weigh the relevant evi-
dence.”). It is enough that the administrative law judge build
a logical bridge between the evidence and his conclusions.
Butler, 4 F.4th at 501. This he did.
One of Crowell’s primary complaints is that the
administrative law judge should have given controlling
weight to her treating physician, Dr. Gary Steele, rather than
rely so heavily on the opinions of state agency psychologists
Dr. Roger Rattan and Dr. Stacey Fiore. An administrative law
judge, however, is not obligated to give controlling weight to
the treating physician if he finds that opinion not worthy of
such weight. See, e.g., Prill v. Kijakazi, 23 F.4th 738, 750–51 (7th
Cir. 2022). In this case, the administrative law judge
considered the fact that Crowell had asked Dr. Steele to
provide her with a letter describing her disabilities, but Dr.
Steele initially refused, stating that most of her ailments
concerned her mental health and he “advised her that [he] did
not think [he] was the appropriate person to fill” out the

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No. 22-3097 7
forms, as he was not a psychiatrist. R. 9-3 at 158 (AR 454).
Moreover, the judge noted that although Dr. Steele concluded
that she was unable to hold a job due to her mental
impairments and pain, he also made clear that “supporting
this contention will require that [Crowell] visit with a
physiatrist and a psychiatrist for specific evaluation and
recommendations.” R. 9-3 at 108 (AR 404). He eventually
capitulated and issued an opinion stating that Crowell had
several marked mental limitations due to anxiety disorder
with panic, and that she could not tolerate even low stress
work. The administrative law judge decided to give little
weight to Dr. Steele’s opinions, finding that they were
rendered well before the relevant period, and some of his
assertions were “vague, conclusory, outside his area of
expertise (he has no vocational training), and are factual
findings reserved for the Commissioner.” R. 9-15 at 50–51 (AR
1053–54). Additionally, the administrative law judge found
that Dr. Steele’s opinions were “not consistent with
subsequent records showing the claimant had improved with
treatment and counseling … .” Id. at 51 (AR 1054). It was
certainly within the administrative law judge’s reasonable
discretion to decide that Dr. Steele’s medical opinion was
deserving of less weight. An administrative law judge may
choose to give more weight to the state agency psychologists
provided the judge examines the appropriate factors under
agency regulations and minimally articulates its reasoning for
crediting the opinions of the non-treating agency medical
experts. Grotts v. Kijakazi, 27 F.4th 1273, 1278 (7th Cir. 2022).
Factors that an administrative law judge might consider
include the length, nature, and extent of the physician and
claimant’s treatment relationship, whether the physician
supported the medical opinions with sufficient explanations,

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8 No. 22-3097
and whether the physician specializes in the medical
conditions at issue. Elder, 529 F.3d at 415. Although the judge
did not note the length of the treatment relationship, he did
discuss the sufficiency of the doctor’s explanations and his
credentials relative to the claimed disability. An
administrative law judge may also discount a treating
physician’s opinion where the judge suspects that the treating
physician might be “bend[ing] over backwards to assist a
patient in obtaining benefits.” Hofslien v. Barnhart, 439 F.3d
375, 377 (7th Cir. 2006). At the end of the day, once the
administrative law judge properly considers these factors,
“we must allow that decision to stand so long as the
administrative law judge minimally articulated his reasons—
a very deferential standard that we have, in fact, deemed
‘lax.’” Elder, 529 F.3d at 415 (cleaned up) (citing Berger v.
Astrue, 516 F.3d 539, 545 (7th Cir. 2008)). We conclude that the
administrative law judge properly considered Dr. Steele’s
opinion, articulated his reasons for giving it less weight, and
was within his discretion for giving it the weight he did.
In addition to supporting the decision about what weight
to give Dr. Steele’s opinions, the administrative law judge me-
ticulously discussed each of the approximately seventeen
medical providers who offered opinions on Crowell’s condi-
tion and abilities. He explained the amount of weight he gave
to each opinion and why. For example, as noted, he gave the
most weight to the opinions of state agency providers Dr.
Fiore and Dr. Rattan, as he found that their opinions, read as
a whole, were consistent with the overall record showing that
Crowell’s longstanding panic disorder, anxiety, and depres-
sion were controlled with treatment. To support this conclu-
sion, the judge pointed to several different exhibits for evi-
dence that Crowell’s mental health conditions improved and

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No. 22-3097 9
were well-controlled with medication, including evaluations
by treating providers Kathleen Ludwikowski, APNP, and Dr.
Candace Cohen, and consultative psychologist, Dr. Leslie
Baird. R. 9-15 at 46, 49, 50, 52–54 (AR 1049, 1052, 1053, 1055–
57). The administrative law judge did more than minimally
support his reasoning. He gave very full explanations of why
he believed that Drs. Fiore and Rattan’s opinions were sup-
ported by the record as a whole. See Allord v. Astrue, 631 F.3d
411, 417 (7th Cir. 2011) (An administrative law judge who
chooses not to assign controlling weight to a treating physi-
cian’s opinion must “articulate sufficient reasons for not do-
ing so.”).
In forming the residual functional capacity, the adminis-
trative law judge primarily considered the limitations de-
scribed by the reports of Drs. Fiore and Rattan, as well as
other evidence of Crowell’s improved mental health, and her
demonstrated abilities. For example, the judge noted that she
was able to babysit both for others, and for her boyfriend’s
son in her home, and was able to prepare meals, go to doctors’
appointments, take medications, shop, read, play games,
comply with treatment, and participate in her healthcare and
in the legal proceedings. He agreed that the evidence sup-
ported the assessments of Drs. Fiore and Rattan which con-
cluded that Crowell remained moderately limited in the areas
of understanding, remembering, or applying information;
maintaining concentration, pace, and persistence for ex-
tended periods of time; and interacting with the public. He
furthermore agreed that she had mild limitations in her abil-
ity to manage her mood and adapt to change. Consequently,
he included all of those limitations in the residual functional
capacity analysis. The administrative law judge assumed that
Crowell would be limited to “simple, routine, and repetitive

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10 No. 22-3097
tasks, with no fast-paced work, only simple work-related de-
cisions, occasional workplace changes, and occasional inter-
action with the public, co-workers and supervisors.” R. 9-15
at 43 (AR 1046). He also included limitations on exposure to
heights, hazards, and dangerous moving machinery, along
with restrictions that took into account her shoulder immobil-
ity. In some places he included restrictions that were more
generous to Crowell than Drs. Rattan and Fiore advised, for
example, by noting her limited ability to interact with others.
And in other instances, he rejected Drs. Fiore and Rattan’s
opinions. For example, he concluded that the evidence did not
support moderate limitations in her abilities to complete a
fairly normal work schedule and to work in coordination with
or in proximity to others without distraction. The administra-
tive law judge supported these latter conclusions with evi-
dence from the medical providers’ reports, and evidence of
her improved mental state, babysitting and caregiving his-
tory, and ability to concentrate while reading. In sum, the ad-
ministrative law judge described any areas of disagreement
with the experts and provided supporting evidence any time
he deviated from their assessments of her abilities.
Crowell takes particular exception to the administrative
law judge’s use of her babysitting work and Facebook usage
as evidence of her ability to perform work in the economy.
The administrative law judge, however, could certainly con-
sider her part time work babysitting in his big-picture evalu-
ation of her capabilities. See, e.g., Berger, 516 F.3d at 545–46.
Although it is true that “there are critical differences between
keeping up with activities of daily living and holding down a
full-time job,” Jarnutowski v. Kijakazi, 48 F.4th 769, 776 (7th Cir.
2022 (internal quotation omitted), an administrative law
judge “is not forbidden from considering statements about a

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No. 22-3097 11
claimant’s daily life. In fact, agency regulations instruct that,
in an assessment of a claimant’s symptoms, the evidence con-
sidered includes descriptions of daily-living activities.” Jeske
v. Saul, 955 F.3d 583, 592 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing 20 C.F.R. §
404.1529(a), (c)(3)). The judge was well within his discretion
in considering Crowell’s ability to care for her own children
and others as well as her ability to keep up with daily living
functions. See, e.g., Grotts, 27 F.4th at 1279.
Crowell spends some time arguing about whether the ad-
ministrative law judge should have considered the hours she
whiles away on Facebook as a reflection of her ability to work.
Were we weighing evidence on our own, as a matter of first
impression, we might come to different judgments about
whether spending hours on idle tasks on Facebook accurately
reflects on one’s ability to concentrate on productive tasks in
the economy. However, this was a judgment call for the ad-
ministrative law judge, and not this court. See Gedatus, 994
F.3d at 900. And, in any event, the judge’s application of this
fact was minimal in the larger picture. The administrative law
judge considered all of the substantial evidence described
above in formulating his assessment, including Crowell’s
part-time employment as a babysitter, her ability to care for
her boyfriend’s autistic child, her ability to read novels (even
if limited, as Crowell asserts, to thirty minutes at a time), her
limited leisure activities, and ability to comply with medical
treatment. We cannot say that the assessment was not sup-
ported by substantial evidence, and the judge certainly spent
considerable time explaining the logic used to connect the ev-
idence to his conclusions.
Crowell’s brief reiterates all of the evidence that she be-
lieves the administrative law judge overlooked, but as we

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12 No. 22-3097
have noted, he was not required to list everything he consid-
ered. Loveless, 810 F.3d at 507. Crowell’s arguments amount to
disagreements with the administrative law judge’s conclu-
sions, and we decline her invitation to reweigh the evidence.
Grotts, 27 F.4th at 1279 (“[w]hen assessing an ALJ’s credibility
determination, we do not ... undertake a de novo review of
the medical evidence that was presented to the ALJ. Instead,
we merely examine whether the ALJ’s determination was rea-
soned and supported.”) (citing Elder, 529 F.3d at 413).
Crowell also contends that the administrative law judge
erred by failing to include bi-polar disorder in step two of the
analysis. If this was error, it was harmless. Although it is true
that the administrative law judge did not specifically list
bipolar disorder at step two as one of Crowell’s severe
impairments, he did consider her bipolar disorder when
analyzing her mental health. At the start, the administrative
law judge mentioned that Crowell alleged that she had been
unable to work since January 1, 2012, due to bipolar disorder,
among other conditions. R. 9-15 at 44 (AR 1047). And then,
when listing the psychological conditions he was considering,
he specifically mentioned her “fluctuating moods of
euthymia and depression” and that both treating and
examining providers diagnosed Crowell with bipolar
disorder (along with depression, anxiety disorder, OCD,
panic disorder, and avoidant personality disorder). Id. at 46
(AR 1049). The administrative law judge also considered the
March 2016 psychological consultative examination by Dr.
Baird wherein she diagnosed Crowell with, among other
conditions, bipolar disorder. Although the administrative law
judge gave limited weight to Dr. Baird’s assessments of
Crowell’s ability to work, there is no indication that the judge
ignored her mental health diagnoses. The administrative law

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No. 22-3097 13
judge also considered the stability of her mood as assessed in
2012 and 2015 after medication. Crowell asserts that her
bipolar disorder caused mood swings, depression, panic
attacks, poor decision-making, crying at work, aggressive and
irritable behavior, and the “inability to safely care for her 6
children.” Crowell Br. at 32–33. The administrative law judge
discussed these symptoms—mood swings, R. 9-15 at 43, 46
(AR 1046, 1049); depression, id. at 44, 46–47, 49 (AR 1047, 1–
49–50, 1052); panic attacks, id. at 44, 46–47, 49–51 (AR 1047,
1049–50, 1052–53); crying spells, id. at 46 (AR 1049); and
irritability and difficulty managing anger, id. at 42, 46 (1045,
1049). He considered each of these symptoms when crafting
the residual functional capacity assessment.
In short, the administrative law judge did not ignore
Crowell’s bipolar disorder. Instead, he concluded that when
considering all of the evidence, despite Crowell’s asserted
claims that she has difficulty managing her mood, those im-
pairments did not meet the criteria for a disability as defined
in the Social Security Act.
Having found the administrative law judge’s conclusions
to be supported by substantial evidence and no error affecting
those conclusions, we AFFIRM the decision of the Commis-
sioner of Social Security.

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