Christopher Dixon v. SHERRI FRITTER and DIANE THEWS

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted August 16, 2023*
Decided August 18, 2023
Before
DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
No. 22-2507
CHRISTOPHER DIXON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
SHERRI FRITTER and DIANE THEWS,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Indiana,
South Bend Division.
No. 3:20-CV-155-JD
Jon E. DeGuilio,
Judge.
O R D E R
Christopher Dixon, an Indiana state prisoner with respiratory problems, appeals
from a summary judgment rejecting his claims of medical deliberate indifference. See 42
U.S.C. § 1983. We affirm.
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 22-2507 Page 2
In October 2018, Dixon, housed at Indiana State Prison in Michigan City, Indiana,
submitted a healthcare-request form seeking evaluation of, and treatment for, sleep
apnea—a diagnosis he had received before being incarcerated. Sherri Fritter, the
prison’s Health Services Administrator, asked Dixon to help her identify where she
could obtain prior medical records to substantiate his diagnosis and facilitate his
treatment. Fritter later testified that she did not otherwise interact with Dixon about his
sleep apnea or need for treatment, and it is unclear whether Dixon provided Fritter the
information she requested. That same month, Diane Thews, an Advance Practice Nurse,
saw Dixon for a routine visit concerning other health issues. The nurse’s contemporary
notes did not indicate that Dixon raised concerns about his sleep apnea or need for
treatment.
Dixon sued Fritter, Thews, and other prison staff for ignoring his requests to be
evaluated and treated for sleep apnea. The district court screened his complaint, see
28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and allowed him to proceed on a deliberate indifference claim
against only Fritter and Thews. Dixon then repeatedly moved for assistance in
recruiting counsel. The court, noting that Dixon’s filings were coherent and that Dixon
appeared competent to litigate himself given the limited nature of his claims, denied his
request.
The court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, noting that no
reasonable jury could conclude that either Thews or Fritter was deliberately indifferent
to Dixon’s medical needs. With regard to Thews, the court explained that Dixon offered
no evidence that she was aware of Dixon’s sleep apnea and, even if she were, he
introduced nothing to show that she knew or had reason to know he sought evaluation
and treatment for his sleep apnea in October 2018. As for Fritter, the court explained
that undisputed evidence showed that she responded reasonably to Dixon’s October
2018 request for treatment by requesting additional records to verify his condition and
facilitate treatment.
On appeal, Dixon primarily addresses a different issue entirely—the confiscation
of a continuous positive airway pressure (CPAP) machine by a Lieutenant Lott. But we
will not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal except in rare
circumstances inapplicable here. See Frazier v. Varga, 843 F.3d 258, 262 (7th Cir. 2016).
To the extent that Dixon challenges the summary judgment ruling, no reasonable
jury could, on this record, conclude that these two defendants were deliberately
indifferent to an excessive risk to Dixon’s health. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847
(1994). Dixon needed to provide evidence that the defendants knew of but deliberately
disregarded his serious medical needs. See Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 409 (7th Cir.

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No. 22-2507 Page 3
2014). But as the district court rightly explained, Dixon introduced nothing to suggest
that Thews—whom he visited for a matter unrelated to sleep apnea—was aware of his
diagnosis. Nor does his evidence suggest that Fritter ignored his request for treatment
when she acted within her limited authority by asking him to help her obtain outside
medical records to substantiate his condition.
Dixon also contends that the court wrongly refused to recruit counsel to
represent him. But the court acted well within its discretion to deny the request,
see Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 655 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc), determining based on the
quality of Dixon’s filings and the complexity of the case that he was competent to
litigate himself.
AFFIRMED

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