Shanon A. Wood v. Milwaukee County

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted August 16, 2023*
Decided August 21, 2023
Before
DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
No. 22-3030
SHANON A. WOOD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MILWAUKEE COUNTY, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.
No. 19-CV-619
Nancy Joseph,
Magistrate Judge.
O R D E R
Shanon Wood spent three days in the Milwaukee County Jail, enduring
unpleasant conditions and a skin irritation. Once released, he brought suit under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that a lack of medical care and the conditions of confinement
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 22-3030 Page 2
violated his constitutional rights. The court entered summary judgment for the
defendants because Wood had insufficient evidence supporting his claims. We affirm.
We present the facts from the record in the light most favorable to Wood.
See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Wood was arrested in May
2017 and spent three days in jail. During intake, Wood expressed an intent to harm
himself, so he was placed on suicide watch and in a restrictive housing unit. Wood
remained on suicide watch for most of his confinement (all but the last eight hours
before his release) and in restrictive housing for all of it.
Wood was repulsed by the conditions in his cell. He was cold with only a “skirt”
(suicide smock) to wear, had feces-stained and inferior mattresses that caused an itchy
allergic skin irritation, and he experienced flooding in his cell for at least three hours
when another detainee deliberately blocked a toilet. Wood repeatedly complained to
unidentified jail staff about these conditions and asked for treatment for his itchy skin.
At one point, Wood had a brief conversation with Kevin Johnson—a sheriff’s lieutenant
who supervised jail staff but was not a correctional officer—about some of his
problems. Wood asked for a new mattress, a blanket, and a cell in unrestricted housing.
Jail policy does not allow people on suicide watch to have blankets, but Wood received
another mattress within hours of speaking to Johnson.
Wood sued Johnson and Milwaukee County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, contending
that the conditions at the jail violated his constitutional rights. (His complaint included
other defendants, but they were dismissed at various stages, and Wood does not contest
those decisions.) After the district judge screened the complaint, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2),
Wood proceeded on claims of inadequate medical care and unconstitutional conditions
of confinement against Johnson, as well as a claim under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,
436 U.S. 658 (1978), against Milwaukee County. Shortly after screening, a magistrate
judge began presiding by consent, 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), and Johnson unsuccessfully
moved for summary judgment based on a failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
After discovery, Johnson filed a second motion for summary judgment, this time
joined by Milwaukee County, and the court granted it. The court agreed with the
defendants that no reasonable factfinder could conclude that Johnson had violated
Wood’s constitutional rights. The court explained that Wood’s itchy skin was not a
serious medical need, and that Johnson’s response to Wood’s complaints about his
conditions of confinement was not objectively unreasonable. As for Milwaukee County,
the court stated that Monell liability was unavailable because Wood did not link
Johnson’s actions to a municipal policy, practice, or custom.

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No. 22-3030 Page 3
On appeal, Wood generally contests the entry of summary judgment against
him, focusing mainly on his conditions of confinement. Because Wood was a pretrial
detainee, his § 1983 claims stem from the Fourteenth Amendment, and we apply the
standard described in Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015). Under that standard,
for his claims to survive summary judgment, Wood needed to provide evidence from
which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Johnson responded in an “objectively
unreasonable” way to unconstitutional conditions of confinement or to a serious
medical need. See Hardeman v. Curran, 933 F.3d 816, 821–22 (7th Cir. 2019) (conditions);
Miranda v. Cnty. of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 351–52 (7th Cir. 2018) (medical care).
Wood argues that the district court impermissibly credited Johnson’s account
over his, but even Wood’s account alone, if believed, would not allow a reasonable
factfinder to infer that Johnson subjected him to conditions that were “‘excessive in
relation to’ any legitimate non-punitive purpose.” Hardeman, 933 F.3d at 824 (quoting
Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 398). According to Wood, he complained to Johnson during a brief
conversation; he requested a blanket, a clean mattress, and a transfer from restricted
housing. But Wood was on suicide watch at the time, so a reasonable factfinder could
not find that denying the requests for a blanket and a different cell was objectively
unreasonable. And Wood acknowledges that he received another mattress within
hours—not an unreasonable interval. See Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1429–30
(7th Cir. 1996) (being without mattress for one evening not an unconstitutional harm
under deliberate indifference standard). And to the extent that Wood argues that
Johnson is liable for the actions of correctional staff because he was in charge, there is
no supervisory liability under § 1983. See Kemp v. Fulton Cnty., 27 F.4th 491, 497–98
(7th Cir. 2022); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009).
As for his medical treatment claim, Wood did not produce evidence that he had a
serious medical need. He self-describes an “allergic” reaction to conditions in his cell,
but nothing more, and he does not say that it persisted after his detention. On this
record, a reasonable factfinder could not infer that Wood had a serious medical need.
See Perry v. Sims, 990 F.3d 505, 511 (7th Cir. 2021). Wood also argues generally that his
detention negatively affected his mental health, but he has not linked this to any
purportedly unreasonable action of Johnson’s.
Finally, Wood broadly disputes the entry of summary judgment for Milwaukee
County on the Monell claim, insisting that “Milwaukee County Jail was in control.” But
that assertion, while true, does not alone provide a basis for liability on the part of the
county for the actions of its employees; a policy, practice, or custom of the county must

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have caused an injury. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. But Wood does not address the
“critical question” of what policy, practice, or custom deprived him of his constitutional
rights. Glisson v. Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 849 F.3d 372, 379 (7th Cir. 2017); see also Los Angeles
Cnty. v. Humphries, 562 U.S. 29, 36 (2010) (explaining Monell’s “policy or custom”
requirement). Therefore, entering summary judgment for the county was proper.
AFFIRMED

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