Logan Dyjak v. Joseph Harper

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted September 11, 2023*
Decided September 12, 2023
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
No. 22-1419
LOGAN DYJAK,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JOSEPH HARPER, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Illinois.
No. 3:18-CV-1011-MAB
Mark A. Beatty,
Magistrate Judge.
O R D E R
Logan Dyjak1 sued several employees of Chester Mental Health Center, a high-
security forensic mental health facility in Illinois for those committed by a court order
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
1 Dyjak uses they/them/their pronouns in the filings in this case, and we follow
suit as we have in Dyjak’s previous appeals (Dyjak v. Wilkerson, Nos. 21-2012 & 21-2119).
(continued)
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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or deemed an escape risk. Dyjak alleged that the medical care, nutrition, and other
conditions of confinement were constitutionally inadequate, and further that the facility
denied access to personal property without due process. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The
district court entered summary judgment for the defendants after determining that
Dyjak failed to produce sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find any
defendant liable. We affirm.
We recount the undisputed facts in the light most favorable to Dyjak as the non-
moving party and draw reasonable inferences in their favor. Lane v. Williams, 689 F.3d
879, 881 (7th Cir. 2012). Dyjak, who was involuntarily committed in 2013, was
transferred to the Chester Mental Health Center in February 2018 and remained there
for about six months. The defendants—Joseph Harper, Gregg Scott, Shirley Forcum,
Laurie Irose, and Bree Barnett—worked at Chester during the relevant period. Harper
was the Hospital Administrator until May 2018, when Scott replaced him. Forcum, a
licensed clinical social worker, was the Unit Director who oversaw the daily activities in
Dyjak’s living quarters. Irose, who was the Human Rights Chairperson, received and
reviewed patients’ formal complaints. And Barnett—a Licensed Practical Nurse—
assessed patients, delivered prescriptions, and assisted the doctors.
While at Chester, Dyjak raised numerous concerns about the living conditions.
First, Dyjak submitted several complaints about the 24-hour lighting in their room,
which Dyjak said exacerbated their mental illness and inhibited their sleep. They later
testified that the lighting caused “serious emotional distress” and that it was impossible
to tell whether it was day or night without checking the window. Irose responded to
Dyjak’s complaints, explaining that she consulted with the Chief of Security, who stated
the constant lighting was necessary because it permitted staff to monitor patients every
We note that, despite the potential for some confusion about number, this usage of
“they/them/their” has been accepted by numerous style guides and dictionaries as
appropriate in referring to a singular person of unknown or non-binary gender. See, e.g.,
MLA Handbook § 3.5 (9th ed. 2021); APA Publication Manual § 4.18 (7th ed. 2020); The
Associated Press Stylebook, they, them, their (55th ed. 2020); Farhad Manjoo, Opinion,
It’s Time for ‘They’, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/10/
opinion/pronoun-they-gender.html (noting that the Times stylebook allows the usage);
The Chicago Manual of Style ¶ 5.48 (17th ed. 2017). We see no reason to break with our
normal practice of using the pronouns adopted by the person before us, e.g., Balsewicz v.
Pawlyk, 963 F.3d 650 (7th Cir. 2020), as the Supreme Court did in Bostock v. Clayton
County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1738 (2020).

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No. 22-1419 Page 3
fifteen minutes. She also relayed that at night, the lights are dimmed as much as
possible while still maintaining safety and security.
Second, Dyjak filed complaints reporting that their room was excessively cold
and that they lacked adequate blankets and bedding. Dyjak testified that they believed
that the temperature in their room was below 55 degrees Fahrenheit; consequently,
Dyjak was often shivering and forced to layer clothes and hide extra blankets to keep
warm. In response to Dyjak’s complaints, Forcum encouraged Dyjak to request more
blankets—something the institution permits when enough are available. She also
assured Dyjak that she would address the issue at staff meetings and inform aides on all
shifts to comply with a request for more blankets.
Third, Dyjak insisted that they lacked enough clothing, and that the laundry was
unreliable. They said that, as a result, they often had to wear unclean clothes. Forcum
responded that she consulted with the office coordinator about laundry turnaround
times and expressed her hope to hire more staff to resolve any delays. Forcum later
testified that laundry was typically returned the day after it was collected unless the
facility was short-staffed; Dyjak experienced much longer turnaround times. But after
working with the building manager, Dyjak received more clothing.
Fourth, Dyjak stated in several complaints that they received inadequate dental
hygiene products. They reported that they were not given floss when needed and that
the state-issued toothbrushes were inadequate. The first time Dyjak asked for floss,
Irose responded that the supply was low and more had been ordered. In the meantime,
she recommended that Dyjak see the dental hygienist. According to Dyjak’s health
records, Dyjak requested and received floss on several later occasions. Regarding the
toothbrush, Irose and Forcum told Dyjak that this product was mandatory for
everyone’s safety because patients had recently used other toothbrushes as weapons.
Finally, Dyjak argued that they were subjected to excessive noise because other
patients used personal radios at all hours. Dyjak testified that ear plugs were not
permitted to mitigate the disturbance and that their efforts to get patients restricted
from playing the radios were unsuccessful. Forcum confirmed that patients could not
use ear plugs for safety reasons but that patients were encouraged to turn off radios by
10:30 p.m., though there was no official policy or enforcement measures.
Dyjak also submitted complaints about the medical care and diet at Chester.
Dyjak testified that their diet was improperly changed and did not provide enough
calories, and that their prescription medications were improperly discontinued when
they arrived at Chester. These problems resulted in rapid weight loss, hypertension,
and other health problems. In a response form, Irose explained that each state mental

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health facility has its own doctors and dieticians who have the authority to treat
patients using their own judgment. She noted that the Chester dietician prescribed a
diet based on Dyjak’s weight and body-mass index and accommodated Dyjak’s
requests for double portions after Dyjak reported weight loss. Irose also explained that
Dyjak was prescribed the proper dosage of their medications: Dyjak’s medical records
document their receipt of the requested medications (tretinoin, benzoyl peroxide,
Vaseline, fish oil, and thymine supplements). Barnett testified that she was in charge of
filling prescriptions and had passed on Dyjak’s concerns to the doctors. But Dyjak
testified that Barnett inconsistently dispensed the medications and was often hostile.
Dyjak’s last category of complaints concerned personal property. They filed
multiple complaints about the deprivation of possessions (including hats, glasses,
clothing, ear plugs, and an MP3 player) that they said they had been allowed to possess
at their prior facility. Dyjak complained that the defendants arbitrarily denied access to
personal property and that the rationales provided were inconsistent with Chester’s
written policies and state law. In response, Irose consulted with Dyjak’s assigned
therapist, who explained that she had given a list of the requested items to the Chief of
Security, who cited safety reasons for preventing Dyjak from having the items in the
room. Irose recommended that Dyjak keep working with the therapist to communicate
requests for access to any other property.
Dyjak sued the defendants over all the problems at Chester, and soon after, the
district court recruited counsel. In the operative complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
Dyjak asserted that (1) Harper, Scott, Irose, and Forcum subjected them to conditions of
confinement that violated the Eighth Amendment; (2) Harper, Scott, and Barnett
provided inadequate medical care and food in violation of the Eighth Amendment; and
(3) Harper and Scott deprived them of personal property in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
After discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment, and a magistrate
judge (presiding by consent, see 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)) granted the motion. The court first
explained that, as a civil detainee, Dyjak’s constitutional claims about their conditions of
confinement, medical care, and nutrition arose under the Fourteenth Amendment, not
the Eighth Amendment. See Davis v. Wessel, 792 F.3d 793, 799 (7th Cir. 2015). As a result,
Dyjak needed sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that they
suffered an objectively serious threat; that the defendants acted purposefully,
knowingly, or recklessly; and that the defendants’ actions were objectively
unreasonable. See Kinglsey v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 396–97 (2015); Miranda v. County
of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 353–54 (7th Cir. 2018).

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Applying this standard, the court concluded that Harper and Scott were entitled
to summary judgment on the claims involving the 24-hour lighting, cold temperatures,
and inadequate clothing because Dyjak provided no evidence that Harper and Scott
knew about Dyjak’s complaints or were responsible for the conditions. Although Dyjak
testified that they had written Harper and Scott about the conditions, Dyjak lacked
evidence about when they sent the letters, what information they provided, and
whether Harper and Scott had received any letters. Meanwhile, Harper and Scott
testified that they did not review Dyjak’s written complaints and did not recall
receiving—from Dyjak or other patients—complaints about the lighting, temperature,
or clothing. The district court concluded that Irose and Forcum also were entitled to
summary judgment on these claims because no reasonable jury could find that their
responses to Dyjak’s complaints were objectively unreasonable. The court then
dispensed with Dyjak’s arguments about the dental hygiene products and excessive
noise, determining that Dyjak had not presented sufficient evidence that these
conditions were objectively serious threats to their health.
With respect to Dyjak’s claims of inadequate medical care and diet, the court
again pointed to the absence of evidence that Harper and Scott knew of Dyjak’s
complaints, and, regardless, Harper and Scott were entitled to rely on the judgment of
the medical staff. Dyjak also failed to produce evidence that Barnett, the nurse, was
objectively unreasonable because she could not prescribe medications or diet changes.
Finally, the court determined that no reasonable jury could find in Dyjak’s favor
on the claim about their property. It noted a “dearth of evidence” and pointed out that
Dyjak’s opposition to the summary judgment motion failed to discuss what personal
items they were unable to access, what staff members denied the access, or what state or
facility policies were at issue when complaining about uneven application.
Dyjak now appeals, pro se, and we review the summary judgment decision
de novo, Lane, 689 F.3d at 881. First, Dyjak argues that the district court should have
evaluated their conditions-of-confinement claims under the professional judgment
standard in Youngberg v. Romero, 457 U.S. 307 (1982). In Youngberg, the Court explained
that the Constitution requires the exercise of professional judgment when providing
mental health treatment to someone who is involuntarily committed. See id. at 321–22.
Dyjak interprets this to mean that all aspects of civil confinement must meet this
standard and argues the defendants did not demonstrate that they used professional
judgment regarding the lighting, temperature, dental products, and noise.
But Dyjak’s reliance on the professional judgment standard of Youngberg is inapt.
As we have previously explained, Youngberg does not require professional judgment to

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dictate every aspect of civil commitment—just decisions about mental health treatment.
See, e.g., Lane, 689 F.3d at 882–83. Thus, the district court was not required to consider
whether the defendants exercised professional judgment about every subject of Dyjak’s
complaints. The court appropriately asked whether the evidence showed that the
defendants’ actions were objectively reasonable. See Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 396–97.
Dyjak next contends that a reasonable jury could find that the defendants acted
objectively unreasonably because the defendants did not show—or try to show— a
legitimate government interest for the conditions of their confinement. Instead, Dyjak
continues, the defendants’ summary judgment filings wrongly relied on the Eighth
Amendment standard of cruel and unusual punishment. (Dyjak does not mention that
their own briefing did the same.)
The magistrate judge, however, applied the appropriate legal standard and
determined that Dyjak failed to create a genuine issue of material fact on the
reasonableness of the defendants’ actions. The court explained that Irose or Forcum
responded to each of Dyjak’s written complaints about the room lighting, temperature,
and laundry. Both spoke with other staff when necessary (checking with the Chief of
Security about lighting, instructing aides to provide more blankets, and discussing
laundry staffing at meetings). And both explained to Dyjak the institutional concerns in
tension with Dyjak’s complaints (that the lighting was required for safety and security)
or offered Dyjak solutions (suggesting Dyjak request more blankets or clothing and
keep working with the therapist). Dyjak simply did not produce sufficient contrary
evidence that Irose’s and Forcum’s responses were unreasonable or not rationally
related to a legitimate objective of the facility. Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397–98.
Dyjak next insists that Harper and Scott turned a blind eye to constitutional
violations (the conditions of confinement, medical care, and nutrition) and were
personally involved because they have final authority over the facility’s operations. But
the court properly entered summary judgment for Scott and Harper on all claims. There
is no evidence that Scott or Harper personally created or knew of the conditions
affecting Dyjak, so these defendants could not be liable under § 1983. See Kemp v. Fulton
County, 27 F.4th 491, 497–98 (7th Cir. 2022). Nor could they be liable as supervisors
solely for the actions of their subordinates. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009).
Finally, Dyjak argues that the property claim was premised on substantive, not
procedural, rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. But at summary judgment, Dyjak
merely asserted a vague “claim for property deprived at CMHC.” Dyjak has waived
their claim; they cannot raise a substantive due process argument now when they failed
to develop it in the district court. See Bradley v. Village of University Park, 59 F.4th 887, 897

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(7th Cir. 2023). Regardless, to the extent that Dyjak argues that Chester’s staff acted
inconsistently with institutional policy or violated state law, Dyjak’s claim cannot
prevail. Although the Due Process Clause may, as a matter of federal law, require
procedures when state law or regulations define substantive rights, the Fourteenth
Amendment does not treat state procedural requirements or institutional policies as
property interests in and of themselves. Bell v. McAdory, 820 F.3d 880, 884 (7th Cir.
2016); see also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 487 (1995).
We have considered Dyjak’s remaining arguments, and they are either
undeveloped, see F ED. R. A PP . P. 28, or without merit.
AFFIRMED

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