James Johnson v. Ghaliah Obaisi

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted September 11, 2023*
Decided September 13, 2023
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
No. 22-1620
JAMES JOHNSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
GHALIAH OBAISI, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 17-cv-04675
Andrea R. Wood,
Judge.
O R D E R
James Johnson, an Illinois prisoner, appeals from the summary judgment
rejecting his claim that a prison doctor was deliberately indifferent toward his ankle
injury. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court concluded that Johnson did not provide
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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enough evidence to persuade a reasonable jury that the doctor violated the Eighth
Amendment. We affirm.
We recount the following facts in the light most favorable to Johnson, the non-
moving party at summary judgment, and draw all inferences in his favor. See Petties v.
Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 727 (7th Cir. 2016) (en banc). In late 2012, while incarcerated at
Stateville Correctional Center, Johnson injured his ankle playing basketball. He felt his
ankle pop in multiple places and believed that it was broken. A medical provider
initially examined the injury, determined that Johnson had sprained his ankle,
prescribed pain medication, authorized crutches, and ordered an X-ray that confirmed
Johnson’s ankle was not fractured. Dr. Saleh Obaisi, the prison’s medical director at the
time, reviewed and approved the sprain diagnosis, and diagnosed secondary
tendonitis. He then prescribed more pain medications for Johnson, reauthorized the use
of crutches, and ordered an ankle brace.
Two weeks after Johnson’s first appointment, Dr. Obaisi conducted a follow-up
examination and diagnosed Johnson with left foot fasciitis. He gave Johnson a steroid
injection to reduce inflammation and prescribed more pain medications. Dr. Obaisi also
discontinued Johnson’s permit for crutches. Johnson recalled the visit differently: he
testified at his deposition that Dr. Obaisi confiscated the crutches he needed for the pain
and insisted he walk without them.
Johnson’s ankle then seemed to improve. At his next follow-up appointment, he
reported only minor pain; Dr. Obaisi, observing no swelling, concluded that the
tendonitis was resolved. At another visit not long later, Dr. Obaisi noted that when
Johnson left his appointment, he walked with a normal gait and no limp. At the next
two visits, Johnson complained of ankle and foot pain; Dr. Obaisi noted the absence of
obvious abnormalities (Johnson had full range of motion and no swelling) but
continued to prescribe anti-inflammatory and pain medications.
In early 2014, Johnson sought treatment for ankle pain again. After consulting
with Dr. Obaisi, a nurse provided Johnson with an ankle brace. A few months later,
Johnson returned, and Dr. Obaisi ordered an X-ray that revealed no fracture. Additional
X-rays taken later that year and in 2016 revealed no new findings.
When Johnson continued to report pain in early 2017, Dr. Obaisi diagnosed him
with chronic left-ankle tendonitis, prescribed anti-inflammatory and pain medications,
and recommended that he consult with an off-site orthopedic surgeon. But before the
consultation could take place, Johnson was transferred to another prison. Around the

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same time, a sweep of Johnson’s cell revealed containers of expired pain medications
(naproxen and ibuprofen), indicating that Johnson might not have been following the
guidance for his prescriptions.
Johnson eventually sued Dr. Obaisi, asserting that he was deliberately indifferent
to Johnson’s severe ankle injury in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district
court, recognizing that Johnson’s case presented complex medical issues, recruited a
lawyer to represent him. Once counseled, Johnson amended his complaint, restating his
Eighth Amendment claims and adding as defendants Dr. Arthur Funk (the Regional
Medical Director) and Nikki Duffield (an Illinois Department of Corrections Healthcare
Administrator). The parties proceeded to discovery, during which Johnson settled
separately with Duffield.
Next, Dr. Funk and Dr. Obaisi (who had since died and was now represented by
his estate’s independent executor) moved for summary judgment, supported by a
statement of undisputed facts that chronicled Johnson’s medical appointments over the
years.
Johnson admitted to nearly all the undisputed facts offered by the defendants
(and where he did not admit to a fact, he did not cite to evidence to support his
disagreement). He also countered with several arguments to oppose summary
judgment. He asserted, for instance, that Dr. Obaisi expressed deliberate indifference
through profanity-laced accusations that Johnson was lying about his pain, acting like a
baby, and needed simply to “walk it off.” Johnson also contended that Dr. Obaisi
prolonged his pain by prescribing pain medications that failed to improve his ankle
sprain for more than five years. And he invoked Dr. Funk’s testimony that not only
should an ankle sprain resolve in a matter of weeks, but also inconclusive X-rays should
be followed up with an MRI.
The district court entered summary judgment for both defendants. Regarding Dr.
Funk, the court explained that there was no evidence he ever interacted with Johnson,
let alone knew of any grievances Johnson submitted, and such a supervisory official
cannot be personally liable under a theory of respondeat superior. As for Dr. Obaisi, the
court found no evidence that his treatment of Johnson’s ankle injury and pain fell below
minimal professional standards. The court highlighted Dr. Obaisi’s directives that
Johnson’s ankle repeatedly be X-rayed (seven times over five years, with no evidence of
fracture or other ailment consistent with reported pain); that Johnson receive steroid
injections, pain medications, and an ankle brace; and that Johnson be referred to an

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No. 22-1620 Page 4
orthopedic surgeon. The court added that Johnson at times appeared not to have taken
his pain medications or worn his ankle brace as ordered.
On appeal Johnson, proceeding pro se, challenges only the ruling in favor of
Dr. Obaisi. Johnson maintains that the district court ignored material facts relating to
Dr. Obaisi’s culpable state of mind (reflected through his confiscation of the crutches,
profanity-laced tirade, and discrediting complaints of pain), as well as the inefficacy of
Dr. Obaisi’s treatment regimen (called into question, Johnson says, by Dr. Funk’s
testimony and by a physician’s note stating that the pain medications were not
working).
Based on Johnson’s counseled submissions in the district court, we see no error.
As the district court rightly explained, Johnson pointed to no admissible evidence—and
instead relied on his operative complaint—to support his argument that Dr. Obaisi
provided him with constitutionally deficient care. A party opposing summary
judgment must point to specific evidence other than his pleadings. See, e.g., Celotex
Corp., 477 U.S. at 324; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). Rule
56(c)(3) assigns to the parties the duty to “cit[e] to particular parts of materials in the
record” when asserting that genuine factual disputes foreclose summary judgment.
See Flynn v. FCA US LLC, 39 F.4th 946, 953 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting FED. R. C IV.
P. 56(c)(3)). But even if we consider Johnson’s characterization in his deposition
testimony that Dr. Obaisi thought Johnson was lying about his pain, Dr. Obaisi’s
remarks do not suggest deliberate indifference. Dr. Obaisi may have been mistaken in
his views, but Johnson’s testimony does not reflect that the doctor’s opinion was
insincere. As we have explained, a doctor’s sincere belief that an inmate was
malingering does not support an inference of deliberate indifference to the prisoner’s
medical needs. See Townsend v. Cooper, 759 F.3d 678, 690 (7th Cir. 2014). Also, to the
extent Johnson thinks that Dr. Funk’s testimony created a fact question over the need
for an MRI, a difference of opinion between medical professionals does not itself
establish deliberate indifference. See Petties, 836 F.3d at 729.
Finally, Johnson submitted an affidavit concerning recent treatment of his ankle
by an orthopedic surgeon. But because he did not present this affidavit in the district
court, we may not consider it here. See Prairie Rivers Network v. Dynegy Midwest
Generation, LLC, 2 F.4th 1002, 1012–13 (7th Cir. 2021).
AFFIRMED

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