Nathan John Huiras v. Kristin Cafferty

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted October 4, 2023*
Decided October 10, 2023
Before
DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge
DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
No. 23-1385
NATHAN JOHN HUIRAS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
KRISTIN CAFFERTY, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin.
No. 22-cv-1109-pp
Pamela Pepper,
Chief Judge.
O R D E R
During divorce and child-custody proceedings in the Circuit Court of Racine
County, Wisconsin, a judge held Nathan Huiras in civil contempt for not complying
with orders to refrain from harassing Nicole Huiras, his spouse. Nathan brought this
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 23-1385 Page 2
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that his wife, her lawyer, the judge, and Racine
County violated his constitutional rights. He sought relief including injunctions
dismissing the divorce proceedings outright and barring the state circuit judge from
finding him in contempt again. The district court dismissed Nathan’s suit. We affirm
the dismissal of the damages claims about the contempt order and conclude that we
lack subject matter jurisdiction over the rest of the suit.
We accept as true the well-pleaded facts in Nathan’s complaint and draw all
reasonable inferences in his favor. G & S Holdings LLC v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 697 F.3d 534,
539 (7th Cir. 2012). Nicole Huiras petitioned for divorce from Nathan and sole custody
of their children, and Nathan’s appeal of the judgment in that case is pending in the
Wisconsin Court of Appeals. Huiras v. Huiras, No. 2023AP000789 (Wis. Ct. App. appeal
docketed May 5, 2023). While the case proceeded in the state trial court, the state circuit
judge ordered Nathan, at least twice, not to harass Nicole. The judge warned Nathan
that if his misconduct continued, he would be jailed. A few months later, after finding
that Nathan had sent a threatening message to Nicole, the judge held Nathan in civil
contempt and had him jailed until he paid a fine of $1,500. Nathan was detained in
Racine County Jail for eight hours, despite his consistent willingness to pay the court-
ordered fine. With various fees, Nathan ultimately paid $1,611.75, which he believes is
evidence that the county engages in a for-profit scheme facilitated by unlawful court
orders. Nathan’s separate state appeal of that contempt order is now resolved. Huiras v.
Huiras, No. 2022AP001731, 2023 WL 3614781 (Wis. Sept. 26, 2023) (petition for review
denied).
While continuing to litigate both the divorce proceedings and his contempt
appeal, Nathan came to federal district court and sued Nicole, her attorney, the state
judge, and Racine County, alleging that they each violated his constitutional rights. He
asserted that they (1) punished him for his free speech, in violation of the First
Amendment; (2) detained him under intolerable conditions and imposed an excessive
fine, in violation of the Eighth Amendment;1 and (3) held him, or caused him to be held
in, “criminal” contempt without a jury trial, in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and
Fourteenth Amendments. He asked for damages, declaratory relief, and an injunction
against future findings of contempt. He also asked for a preliminary injunction to halt
the divorce proceedings—a request that had failed in a prior federal suit. See Huiras v.
1 We recount Nathan’s claims as he characterized them, but we note that a civil
detainee’s claims about conditions of confinement arise under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Kemp v. Fulton County, 27 F.4th 491, 495 (7th Cir. 2022).

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No. 23-1385 Page 3
Cafferty, No. 22-3081, 2023 WL 4842323 (7th Cir. July 28, 2023). The district court, relying
on abstention doctrines, dismissed the complaint, see Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971); it then denied as moot the motion for a preliminary injunction. Nathan appeals,
and our review is de novo. Village of DePue v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 537 F.3d 775, 782 (7th
Cir. 2008).
Nathan first contends that the district court wrongly denied his request for an
injunction dismissing the divorce proceedings because the defendants were violating
his constitutional rights. To address this argument, we must first ascertain whether
federal jurisdiction exists, even if no party has raised the issue, because we cannot
proceed without it. Hay v. Indiana State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 312 F.3d 876, 879 (7th Cir.
2002) (citing Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 577, 583 (1999)). We conclude
we are without jurisdiction because of the domestic-relations exception to federal
jurisdiction.
Federal courts must avoid deciding cases involving “divorce, alimony, and child
custody decrees,” Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 308 (2006), for reasons including
state courts’ superior expertise in these matters. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689,
703–04 (1992); Struck v. Cook Cnty. Pub. Guardian, 508 F.3d 858, 859–60 (7th Cir. 2007).
The exception applies “to both federal-question and diversity suits.” Kowalski v. Boliker,
893 F.3d 987, 995 (7th Cir. 2018). Although Nathan insists that he is not asking for a
divorce or child custody decree, his claim still encroaches on the state court’s
application of family law, thus implicating the exception. See Struck, 508 F.3d at 860.
Based on this jurisdictional defect, we will affirm the dismissal of the constitutional
challenge to the divorce proceedings.
Nathan’s other arguments all challenge the constitutionality of the contempt
order and his ensuing detention. He contends that the district court incorrectly
abstained from exercising jurisdiction over these claims, but we need not address this
argument. Although the district court correctly decided to abstain under Younger while
the contempt proceeding was ongoing, abstention is not an option now that it is final.
But the court also determined that the allegations about the contempt order did not
state a claim for damages against these defendants. We agree with that conclusion.
First, Nathan’s wife and her lawyer are private persons, not “state actors,” and
are therefore not subject to suit under § 1983. Despite Nathan’s conclusory assertions,
the complaint does not plausibly suggest that a state actor engaged in any joint activity
or conspiracy with these defendants. See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27–28 (1980).
Nathan’s allegation that Nicole’s harassment accusation was “meritless” or

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“fraudulent” is a legal conclusion that we need not accept as true. McCauley v. City of
Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681 (2009)).
And the state judge holding hearings and acting on Nicole’s sworn statements does not
imply coordination with Nicole or her lawyer. Even more attenuated from this is the
state court’s collection of fees associated with the contempt order: Nathan does not
attempt to identify a county official who acted in concert with the private defendants.
Second, absolute judicial immunity applies to Nathan’s constitutional claims
against the state judge, despite Nathan’s insistence that an elected judge is not a
“judicial officer.” Wisconsin’s circuit courts are constitutionally vested with the state’s
judicial power. WIS . CONST. art. 7, §§ 2, 8. And contempt proceedings are judicial in
function as well––the exercise of a power that is “inherent in all courts” and “essential
to the administration of justice.” Young v. U.S. ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 795
(1987) (quoting Michaelson v. U.S. ex rel. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Ry. Co.,
266 U.S. 42, 65 (1924)). The state judge performed a classic judicial function by holding a
party in contempt for violating orders in a case she was presiding over, so she has
absolute immunity in a suit under § 1983. See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227 (1988).
Third, Nathan did not state a claim against Racine County arising out of his brief
detention. Although he correctly notes that a county may be subject to suit under Monell
v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978), he ignores the requirements of
this type of claim. The county cannot be liable solely because it employs staff at the
county jail where Nathan alleges he was mistreated. See id. at 694. Even if we accepted
that county officials unlawfully detained or fined Nathan or that they subjected him to
unconstitutional conditions of confinement, he made no allegations that go to the
“critical question” of what policy, practice, or custom caused his injuries. Glisson v. Ind.
Dep't of Corr., 849 F.3d 372, 379 (7th Cir. 2017). Therefore, Nathan did not state a claim
against the county. See Thomas v. Neenah Joint Sch. Dist., 74 F.4th 521, 524 (7th Cir. 2023).
Finally, Nathan challenges the district court’s decision to abstain from resolving
not only his damages claims about the contempt proceeding but also his requests for
declaratory and injunctive relief. As we have said, Younger abstention is no longer
proper because that proceeding is over. But whether the district court should have
exercised jurisdiction is immaterial because Nathan has not shown that subject matter
jurisdiction existed at all. Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009).
Specifically, Nathan lacks Article III standing to seek an injunction against being
held in contempt in the future. A plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for
each form of relief he seeks. TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S.Ct. 2190, 2210 (2021).

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Therefore, Nathan must show that the threat of harm is “real and immediate, not
conjectural or hypothetical.” See Lopez-Aguilar v. Marion Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 924 F.3d
375, 394–95 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983)).
Nathan does not plead facts plausibly suggesting that the state judge unlawfully held
him in contempt in the past—his disagreement with the underlying factual findings is
fodder for his state appeal, not a constitutional claim—let alone that the judge would do
so in the future. (Indeed, the state circuit judge’s role is now over unless the appeal
succeeds.) Another contempt citation would issue only if Nathan again violated court
orders. But we assume that Nathan does not have concrete plans to do so and will
conduct himself within the law. See Simic v. City of Chicago, 851 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir.
2017). For similar reasons, Nathan lacks standing to seek a declaratory judgment—relief
he says that the defendants and the district court overlooked. A plaintiff lacks standing
to seek a declaratory judgment if a declaration of the parties’ legal rights will provide
no relief, such as when the plaintiff, like Nathan, cannot establish that there is a reason
to anticipate future unlawful conduct. See Bontkowski v. Smith, 305 F.3d 757, 761 (7th Cir.
2002). He also has not said what purpose a declaratory judgment could serve. See id.
We have reviewed Nathan’s remaining arguments; none merits discussion. We
end by making a slight modification to the district court’s judgment, which dismissed
the case with prejudice. Dismissals on jurisdictional grounds are without prejudice to
allow a plaintiff to raise the claims in the proper tribunal. Flynn v. FCA US LLC, 39 F.4th
946, 954 (7th Cir. 2022). Based on the domestic-relations exception and a lack of Article
III standing, there is no federal jurisdiction over Nathan’s claim seeking to halt the
divorce case or his requests for declaratory and injunctive relief on his claims about the
contempt order. We therefore MODIFY the judgment to reflect a dismissal without
prejudice as to those claims. As so modified, the judgment is AFFIRMED.

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