Robert P. Young v. City of Bloomington, Illinois

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted November 21, 2023*
Decided November 21, 2023
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
No. 23-1334
ROBERT P. YOUNG,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CITY OF BLOOMINGTON, ILLINOIS,
et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 22-cv-01054-JES-JEH
James E. Shadid,
Judge.
O R D E R
Robert Young brought this civil-rights suit raising claims of official misconduct
in connection with his criminal trial and conviction. The district court dismissed the
complaint as barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). We affirm.
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the issues
have been authoritatively decided. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(B).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 23-1334 Page 2
Young was convicted of unlawful delivery of cocaine in 2006. His conviction was
affirmed on appeal. People v. Young, 890 N.E.2d 972 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 2008).1
In 2022, long after Young served his sentence, he brought this civil-rights suit for
claims arising out of his state criminal case. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Seeking both money
damages and reversal of his conviction, Young asserted that the defendants maliciously
prosecuted him, fabricated records, committed perjury, and assessed an unreasonable
fine. He initially did not try to serve the complaint upon any defendant but later filed a
certificate of service purporting to have served the defendants by certified mail.
When the defendants did not answer the complaint, Young moved for a default
judgment. The defendants then filed appearances and moved to dismiss the complaint
for failure to state a claim.
The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss on the basis that
Young’s complaint was barred by Heck. In Heck, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff
may not use § 1983 to challenge the validity of his conviction unless the conviction has
been reversed or invalidated. 512 U.S. at 585–87. The court also denied Young’s motion
for a default judgment because he had not shown that he effected valid service (i.e.,
because certified mail was not a proper method of service for any of the defendants).
On appeal, Young first asserts that Heck does not apply because his complaint
arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and not § 1983. But § 1331 itself does not allow the court to
hear his case; the complaint must also “point to an underlying source of federal law”
under which the claim arises. Okere v. United States, 983 F.3d 900, 902–03 (7th Cir. 2020).
Here, the underlying source is § 1983. And under Heck, any civil action, regardless of
the relief sought, is barred if it necessarily implies the invalidity of a criminal
conviction. 512 U.S. at 486–87; Morgan v. Schott, 914 F.3d 1115, 1120 (7th Cir. 2019). This
constraint applies even after a prisoner has been released from custody. Savory v.
Cannon, 947 F.3d 409, 419 (7th Cir. 2020) (en banc).
1 Two years after his conviction was affirmed, Young filed a habeas petition
raising arguments similar to those he presents here. The district court denied the
petition, finding that Young procedurally defaulted his claims. Young v. Robert,
No. 10-1008, 2010 WL 3025022 (C.D. Ill. July 30, 2010). In 2023, he moved to reopen the
case under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. That motion too was
denied, and he has since appealed. Young v. Governor of Ill., et al., No. 10-1008, 2023 WL
1825058 (C.D. Ill. Feb. 8, 2023), appeal docketed, No. 23-1436 (7th Cir. Mar. 8, 2023).

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No. 23-1334 Page 3
Second, Young challenges the denial of his request for a default judgment,
arguing that he properly served the defendants by certified mail in accordance with
Rule 4(i) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. But Rule 4(i) refers to service upon the
United States and its employees, which the defendants here are not. The defendants—a
municipality, a county state’s attorney, and a city detective—may be served only by the
methods described in Rule 4(j) (or by any method permitted by state law). See United
States v. Ligas, 549 F.3d 497, 500–01 (7th Cir. 2008); Homer v. Jones-Bey, 415 F.3d 748,
754–55 (7th Cir. 2005). Certified mail is not one of the enumerated means set forth in
Rule 4 by which these defendants may be served a summons. See F ED. R. C IV. P. 4(c), (j).
Nor is certified mail a valid alternative under Illinois law. See 735 ILCS § 5/2-211. Finally,
a default judgment is appropriate only when the defendants have properly been served
but have failed to plead or otherwise defend. See F ED. R. C IV. P. 4(k)(1) (serving a
summons establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant who is subject to general
jurisdiction); Ligas, 549 F.3d at 500; F ED. R. C IV. P. 55; e360 Insight v. Spamhaus Project,
500 F.3d 594, 598 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Default judgments rendered without personal
jurisdiction are void … .”).
We have considered the remaining arguments Young raises on appeal, and none
has merit.
AFFIRMED

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