Patrick Bertrand Libata Samba v. Kraft Heinz Foods Company

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted November 21, 2023 *
Decided November 22, 2023
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
No. 22-2133
PATRICK BERTRAND LIBATA
SAMBA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
KRAFT HEINZ FOODS COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 20-CV-2110
Colin S. Bruce,
Judge.
O R D E R
Patrick Bertrand Libata Samba complained of discriminatory scheduling
practices at his job and was later disciplined and fired for poor job performance. He
sued his employer for retaliation under Title VII, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3, but the district
court entered summary judgment, rejecting his claims. Because no reasonable juror
could find that his discrimination complaint caused his discipline and firing, we affirm.
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. FED. R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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No. 22-2133 Page 2
In 2016, Libata Samba, who had been working for two years at a food-
manufacturing facility operated by the Kraft Heinz Food Company, submitted a
workplace complaint to Kraft’s web-based discrimination hotline. In that complaint, he
alleged that the facility’s overtime assignments discriminated against foreign-born
employees. 1 The parties dispute whether Libata Samba’s submitted complaint
contained his name and contact information. Libata Samba maintains that the online
contact information form necessarily included his name and contact information and
that he selected an option on the online form to “share [his] name and contact
information.” Kraft, however, introduced a computer printout reflecting that the
complaint was submitted anonymously.
After submitting his complaint, Libata Samba rose through the ranks (being
assigned to better compensated, senior positions) until June 2018, when he was
disciplined for unsatisfactory work performance. By this time, Libata Samba had
become a “batch man”—responsible for adding ingredients to various food products as
their recipes prescribed. In June, he was disciplined for adding too much canola oil to a
product. Then, in September 2018, he was disciplined for causing a batch of product to
overflow. And then in April 2019, he was disciplined for adding too much honey to a
product. For the last of these incidents, Libata Samba was issued a “final warning”—the
last step before termination under Kraft’s progressive disciplinary policy. Two months
later, another overflow occurred on Libata Samba’s production line; Kraft’s
investigation of the incident was inconclusive concerning whether Libata Samba caused
the overflow. Regardless, the incident resulted in Libata Samba’s disqualification from
senior positions and relegation to lower-paying, entry-level positions.
In September 2019, Libata Samba, while operating a fork truck, failed to turn and
look before backing up the truck (a violation of the facility’s policy covering fork-truck
operation) and drove into a post. A report generated by sensors on the truck registered
the impact as “severe.” Under the fork-truck policy, incidents of severe impact called
for further disciplinary action. On September 18, 2019, Libata Samba was notified that
he was being fired for poor job performance and violating the facility’s fork-truck
policy.
1 Libata Samba apparently is foreign-born, but the record does not reflect his
national origin.

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No. 22-2133 Page 3
Libata Samba filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, received a right-to-sue letter, and then sued Kraft in May 2020 for, among
other things, retaliating against him because of his hotline complaint. On Kraft’s
motion, the district court dismissed Libata Samba’s complaint for failure to state a claim
because he had not alleged that Kraft knew of his complaint or otherwise acted in
retaliation for it. The court granted him leave to amend.
Libata Samba amended his complaint to allege that Kraft knew of his hotline
complaint and retaliated against him for it by (1) assigning him to fast-moving
production lines—where mistakes were more prevalent—more often than other
employees; (2) assigning him to slow-moving lines less often than other employees;
(3) assigning him to hazardous work without proper training and equipment;
(4) wrongfully issuing him a final warning; (5) wrongfully disqualifying him from
senior positions; and (6) wrongfully firing him.
Kraft moved for summary judgment, arguing that it could not have retaliated
against Libata Samba because it was unaware of his hotline complaint. A representative
of Kraft’s human resources department attested that the company did not have a
complaint identifying Libata Samba by name. Hotline complaints were handled by a
third-party, Convercent, and always remained anonymous to Kraft unless the
complainant told management. According to Kraft’s printout of Libata Samba’s
complaint, his complaint was submitted by an “[a]nonymous employee.” On the
bottom of the printout, a “Confidentiality” policy is set forth: “Only Convercent Staff
will receive your contact information for follow up purposes. Your contact information
will not be given to your organization.” In its motion, Kraft additionally argued that
Libata Samba had no evidence establishing that any of Kraft’s conduct was motivated
by a desire to retaliate against him for filing the hotline complaint.
The district court granted Kraft’s motion for summary judgment. The court
accepted as undisputed Kraft’s proposed statement of facts because Libata Samba did
not comply with the local rules in responding to them. See C.D. Ill. R. 7.1(D)(2)(b)(6). For
similar reasons, the court barred several of Libata Samba’s proposed factual findings
but admitted others, including one stating that a senior employee had told him that
they needed to “remove a bad egg from the department.” As for the merits, the court
determined that Libata Samba had not established a prima facie case of retaliation
under Title VII: Although some of the actions Libata Samba alleged may have been
adverse (his final warning, his disqualification from senior positions, and his firing), a
reasonable juror could not conclude that those actions stemmed from his hotline

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No. 22-2133 Page 4
complaint because he had no evidence showing that the relevant decision-makers were
even aware he was the complainant.
On appeal, Libata Samba generally challenges the district court’s conclusion that
he could not make out a prima face case for retaliation under Title VII. He alludes to
one element of the prima facie case—that a plaintiff must offer evidence from which a
jury could find that he suffered an adverse employment action, see Lesiv v. Ill. Cent. R.R.
Co., 39 F.4th 903, 911 (7th Cir. 2022)—and asserts that the court overlooked other
instances of adverse actions. He contends, for example, that he was scheduled to the
“fast line” too frequently, scheduled to the “slow line” too infrequently, and assigned
hazardous work without proper training and equipment.
But Libata Samba had the burden to show that these actions were materially
adverse. Materially adverse actions are those that might dissuade a reasonable
employee from engaging in protected activity. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v.
White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006). Such actions must rise above “trivial harms,” including
“minor annoyances” that often take place at work. Id.; Lessiv, 39 F.4th at 912. And Libata
Samba did not provide evidence showing that the alleged actions rose above that level.
Our conclusion does not change even if we assume that Libata Samba could
show that he suffered adverse actions when he received a final warning, was
disqualified from senior positions, and ultimately fired. Another element of the prima
facie case for retaliation under Title VII requires him to show a causal link between his
hotline complaint and the adverse action. See Lesiv, 39 F.4th at 911.
Libata Samba maintains that the omission of any reference to Convercent in
Kraft’s hotline policy (as set forth in his employee manual) creates an inference that
Kraft alone was managing its hotline policy and thus must have known that he
submitted the complaint. But the policy does not state that Kraft receives hotline
complaints directly, and the court’s refusal to draw an inference that was contradicted
by attestations in the record was not an abuse of discretion. See MAO-MSO Recovery II,
LLC v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 994 F.3d 869, 876 (7th Cir. 2021). Libata Samba also
believes that an inference should be drawn that Kraft received his complaint in a non-
anonymized manner, given his election to share his name and contact information on
the hotline-complaint form. But that suggestion is also undermined by attestations in
the record, as well as Kraft’s printout of the complaint stating that only Convercent staff
would receive his contact information, which would not be shared with his employer.
And to the extent Libata Samaba thinks that an inference of causation should be drawn

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from the the senior employee’s comment that there was a “bad egg” in the department,
there is no evidence that this employee played a role in Libata Samba’s disciplinary and
firing decisions. See Harper v. C.R. England, Inc., 687 F.3d 297, 309 (7th Cir. 2012).
We have considered Libata Samba’s remaining arguments, but none has merit.
AFFIRMED

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