United States of America v. Robert E. Williams

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted November 28, 2023
Decided November 29, 2023
Before
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 22-2841
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ROBERT E. WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 21-CR-20064-001
Colin S. Bruce,
Judge.
O R D E R
Robert Williams pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon, see 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1), and the district court sentenced him to 102 months’ imprisonment and
3 years’ supervised release. Williams appeals, but his appointed lawyer contends that
the appeal is frivolous and moves to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738,
744 (1967). Counsel’s brief explains the nature of the appeal and addresses issues that an
appeal of this kind might be expected to involve. Williams did not respond to counsel’s
motion. See CIR . R. 51(b). Because counsel’s analysis appears thorough, we focus on the
subjects that she discusses. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 22-2841 Page 2
Williams came to the attention of officers who suspected that he and another
individual sold narcotics and lived together in a townhome. The officers obtained a
search warrant, entered Williams’s home, and found in his bedroom a firearm, which
formed the basis of his § 922(g)(1) charge. In a common area of the home, they found
three other firearms—all of which were semi-automatic and capable of accepting a
large-capacity magazine—and various controlled substances and drug paraphernalia.
Williams was not charged with the drugs or other firearms.
The district court sentenced Williams to 102 months’ imprisonment. The court,
adopting the recommendations in the presentence investigation report, calculated a
total offense level of 25. Central to this calculation was the court’s determination that
the firearms and controlled substances found in the common area were part of
Williams’s relevant conduct. That determination affected his base offense level (22)
because the firearms were semi-automatic and could accept large capacity magazines,
see U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(3); required a 2-level enhancement because of the quantity of
firearms, see id. § 2K2.1(b)(1); and justified a 4-level enhancement because Williams had
the “potential of facilitating” another felony offense—drug trafficking—when he
possessed the firearm, see id. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), 2K2.1 cmt. n.14. Williams also received a
three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. When combined with a
criminal-history category of VI, see id. § 4A1.1, his guideline range was 110 to 137
months, capped by the statutory maximum of 10 years, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2).1 The
district court weighed the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and found a downward
variance justified based on Williams’s difficult childhood and nonviolent criminal
history.
After consulting with Williams, counsel first represents that Williams wishes to
withdraw his guilty plea, see United States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012), so
she explores whether there is a nonfrivolous basis to do so. A defendant may withdraw
a guilty plea only for fair and just reasons, including legal or actual innocence or if his
plea was not knowing and voluntary. F ED. R. C RIM . P. 11; United States v. Kamkarian, 79
F.4th 889, 892 (7th Cir. 2023).2 Williams did not move to withdraw his guilty plea in the
1 Congress amended § 924 in 2022, increasing the statutory maximum sentence
for violations of § 922(g)(1) to 15 years. Bipartisan Safer Communities Act, Pub. L.
No. 117-159, sec. 12004, 136 Stat. 1313, 1329 (2022). Williams’s case predates that change.
2 Another basis for withdrawal of a guilty plea is if a defendant received
ineffective assistance of counsel. See Kamkarian, 79 F.4th at 892. Counsel notes Williams’s
contention that the assistance he received in the district court was deficient, but she

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No. 22-2841 Page 3
district court, so our review would be for plain error. United States v. Schaul, 962 F.3d
917, 921 (7th Cir. 2020).
We agree with counsel that any challenge to the validity of his plea would be
frivolous. With regard to factual innocence, Williams admitted at his plea hearing to the
facts underlying the government’s basis for the § 922(g)(1) charge, and we presume his
sworn statements to be true. See United States v. Smith, 989 F.3d 575, 582 (7th Cir. 2021).
As for legal innocence, counsel rightly concludes that any challenge—even in the
aftermath of New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022)—also
would be frivolous. In Bruen, the Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment
requires the government to prove that firearm statutes like § 922(g)(1) are “consistent
with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation” Id. at 2126. Williams did not
challenge the statute’s constitutionality in the district court, so our review would be for
“plain, obvious, and prejudicial” error. United States v. Brown, 973 F.3d 667, 715 (7th Cir.
2020). But given this court’s recent acknowledgment that the historical assessment on
this question is unsettled and possibly indeterminate, see generally Atkinson v. Garland,
70 F.4th 1018 (7th Cir. 2023), any error, if there was one, would not be plain or obvious,
see United States v. Hosseini, 679 F.3d 544, 552 (7th Cir. 2012). And as for the
voluntariness of Williams’s plea, our review of the plea-colloquy transcript reflects that
the court fully complied with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Counsel next discusses whether Williams could raise any nonfrivolous argument
to the calculation of his offense level. Counsel asks, specifically, whether the court erred
by relying on relevant conduct—the firearms, controlled substances, and drug
paraphernalia found in the common area—to boost his offense level and otherwise
trigger several enhancements to his guidelines calculation.
We agree with counsel that Williams waived his right to challenge these findings
when, at sentencing, he withdrew objections that he initially had raised to them.
See United States v. Syms, 846 F.3d 230, 234 (7th Cir. 2017).
Counsel also correctly notes that it would be frivolous for Williams to challenge
the calculation of his criminal-history category. The court properly assigned criminal-
properly concludes that this claim would best be addressed on collateral review so that
a fuller factual record can be developed. See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504
(2003); United States v. McClinton, 23 F.4th 732, 737 (7th Cir. 2022).

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No. 22-2841 Page 4
history points to each of his prior convictions under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1, totaling 20 points
and a category of VI.
Finally, counsel correctly determines that Williams could not advance any
nonfrivolous argument regarding the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. We
would treat his 102-month, below-guidelines sentence as presumptively reasonable.
United States v. Gibson, 996 F.3d 451, 468–69 (7th Cir. 2021). Counsel does not identify a
reason to challenge that presumption here, and we discern none. The court adequately
considered the § 3553(a) factors, emphasizing the seriousness of the offense and the
need for deterrence (Williams’s past experiences being incarcerated did not deter him
from possessing a dangerous weapon) and Williams’s personal characteristics (having a
difficult childhood yet making meaningful efforts to avoid recidivating by obtaining
stable employment).
We therefore GRANT counsel’s motion and DISMISS the appeal.

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