United States of America v. Edmond J. Harris

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted November 28, 2023
Decided November 29, 2023
Before
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 23-1414
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
EDMOND J. HARRIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Illinois.
No. 3:18-CR-30090-SMY-1
Staci M. Yandle,
Judge.
O R D E R
The district court revoked Edmond Harris’s probation and sentenced him to
24 months in prison and 36 months of supervised release after Harris admitted to
violating several conditions of his probation. Harris appeals, but his appointed counsel
asserts that the appeal is frivolous and moves to withdraw. See Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). Although a defendant has no absolute right to counsel in an
appeal from revocation of probation, see Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 788–90 (1973),
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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we choose to apply the Anders framework in this context as we do with supervised-
release revocations, see, e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 814 F.3d 856, 857 (7th Cir. 2016).
Because the analysis in the brief appears thorough, and Harris has not responded to
counsel’s motion, see C IR . R. 51(b), we limit our review to the subjects that counsel
discusses. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014).
In December 2020, Harris pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute a
controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), and possession of a firearm as a
felon, 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). He was sentenced to five years of probation.
About ten months later, the district court held a noncompliance hearing to address the
probation officer’s report of Harris’s continued use and possession of controlled
substances. Harris refused an offer of residential inpatient treatment, but the court
modified the terms of Harris’s probation to include a mental health assessment and
outpatient counseling as needed. In March 2022, Harris’s probation officer filed a
petition to revoke probation, alleging that Harris had tested positive for drugs,
committed criminal trespass to a residence, and, among other administrative violations,
failed to properly report to the officer. But after Harris admitted the drug use, and the
government declined to pursue the remaining allegations, the court dismissed the
petition because of Harris’s “history of attempts to address” his addiction.
At the probation officer’s recommendation, the district court later modified
Harris’s probation to include location monitoring, a curfew, and attendance at a
residential drug-treatment program. Harris began attending the treatment program, but
he overdosed a few weeks later and then was discharged from the facility a short time
later when caught using drugs again. On January 5, 2023, the probation officer filed an
amended petition to revoke probation, re-alleging that Harris committed criminal
trespass, possessed controlled substances, and failed to report to the officer. The
petition added that Harris committed several traffic violations and failed to
meaningfully participate in addiction treatment. It classified his most serious
violations—possession of a variety of controlled substances on multiple separate
occasions—as Grade B. See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a)(2).
At his revocation hearing, Harris was placed under oath, and he admitted to all
the violations in the amended revocation petition after the government provided a
factual basis. The district court then revoked Harris’s probation. Based on Harris’s
Grade B violations and criminal history category of II, the court calculated a guidelines
range of 6 to 12 months’ imprisonment on each count, see U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a), and

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No. 23-1414 Page 3
3 years of supervised release for Count 1 (possession with intent to distribute) and 1 to 3
years of supervised release for Count 2 (possession of a firearm), see id. § 7B1.3(g)(1).
In arguing for an eight-month prison sentence and five years of supervised
release, the government highlighted Harris’s criminal history and persistent
noncompliance with probation conditions. Harris requested a sentence of time served
with six months of home confinement and location monitoring so that he could receive
addiction treatment. He argued that imprisonment for drug-abuse violations would not
deter similar conduct or serve rehabilitation goals.
The court began by noting that Harris had squandered the lenience the court had
initially exercised in sentencing him to probation instead of prison. Then the court
recounted Harris’s criminal history, highlighting the felony charges for trespass and
possession of cocaine and methamphetamine that Harris had incurred since being
placed on probation. It explained that because of his drug abuse, Harris posed a risk to
himself and others, and it observed that Harris appeared committed to treatment only
when he was before the court. Prison time was now necessary, the court concluded,
because “we have exhausted every tool we have in the box.” Citing the need for specific
deterrence, just punishment, and to protect the public, the court sentenced Harris to
consecutive 12-month sentences on the two counts of his original conviction and
36 months of supervised release.
Counsel first represents that Harris wishes to challenge the reasonableness of the
sentence. Counsel reports, however, that Harris also wants to argue the district court
erred in concluding that he committed criminal trespass. But Harris admitted to this
violation under oath and cannot withdraw his admission without also undoing the
revocation, which counsel does not understand Harris to intend. See United States v.
Wheaton, 610 F.3d 389, 390 (7th Cir. 2010) (defendant resigned to revocation decision
“cannot be allowed to challenge admissions that undergird that revocation”). Counsel
therefore refrains from discussing whether Harris’s admissions were knowing and
voluntary. See Wheeler, 814 F.3d at 857. (Counsel further observes that, even without the
Grade C violation of criminal trespass, Harris’s sentence could be no different, because
the sentence is based on the highest-grade violations; here, Grade B.)
Next, counsel correctly concludes that challenging the calculation of the
imprisonment range under the Sentencing Guidelines would be frivolous. As required,
the court considered the policy statements in Chapter Seven to calculate a range of 6 to
12 months’ imprisonment on each count of conviction. See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a); United
States v. Childs, 39 F.4th 941, 945 (7th Cir. 2022). And it correctly stated the statutorily

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No. 23-1414 Page 4
required term of 3 years’ supervised release on Count 1, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), and
the statutory maximum of 3 years’ supervised release on Count 2, see 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(b). These figures all fell comfortably within what counsel explains were the
statutory maximum sentences of 20 and 10 years for Counts 1 and 2 respectively.
Finally, counsel considers whether Harris could challenge the reasonableness of
his sentence and properly concludes that he could not. Because each sentence is within
the properly calculated range under the policy statements, we would presume that it is
not unreasonably long. See United States v. Boultinghouse, 784 F.3d 1163, 1178 (7th Cir.
2015). It would be frivolous to contest that presumption. First, as counsel explains,
despite the prolonged discussion at the hearing of Harris’s drug problems, at no time
did the district court link the length of the prison sentence to a need for drug
rehabilitation in violation of Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319 (2011). Second, the court
considered the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), emphasizing the need to deter Harris
and protect the public given Harris’s numerous violations and prior inability to
complete drug-addiction treatment. See United States v. Yankey, 56 F.4th 554, 559–60
(7th Cir. 2023). Last, the district court had discretion to run the sentences consecutively.
See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3; United States v. Moore, 784 F.3d 398, 404 (7th Cir. 2015).
Finally, counsel notes that Harris did not object to any proposed conditions of
supervised release, which the court had provided before the hearing, and that the terms
and conditions imposed are consistent with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and (b). Even if Harris
merely forfeited an appellate challenge to his supervised release, see United States v.
Flores, 929 F.3d 443, 447 (7th Cir. 2019), counsel identified no potential plain errors with
respect to the term or conditions of supervised release, and we agree with that
assessment, see United States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828, 847 (7th Cir. 2015).
We GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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