Donald Buford v. Randy Goeser

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted November 28, 2023*
Decided November 30, 2023
Before
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 23-1395
DONALD BUFORD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
RANDY GOESER, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin.
No. 21-CV-479
Stephen C. Dries,
Magistrate Judge.
O R D E R
Donald Buford, a Wisconsin prisoner, appeals a judgment on the pleadings
dismissing his claims that employees of the Wisconsin Department of Corrections
violated his constitutional rights during a strip search. The district court concluded that
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 23-1395 Page 2
Buford’s claims were barred by a settlement agreement from a previous lawsuit. We
affirm.
In 2021, Buford sued four employees of the Wisconsin Department of Corrections
for violating his rights under the First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments
during a strip search conducted six years earlier. The defendants answered that
Buford’s claims were barred by a “Mutual Release and Settlement Agreement”—signed
on April 23, 2020, in connection with another lawsuit, Buford v. Jensen, No. 19-cv-887
(E.D. Wis. June 2, 2020)—that released the State of Wisconsin, the Wisconsin
Department of Corrections, and their employees for any actions preceding the effective
date of the agreement. One provision in that agreement specified the broad scope of
claims released:
Plaintiff releases and forever discharge[s] the State, the DOC, the
Defendants, and their officers, agents, employees, successors, personal
representatives, and insurers … from any and all manner of action or
actions … that relate any action or inaction—of any Wisconsin or DOC
employee—that took place on any date before that agreement is fully
executed.
Another provision in the agreement described a “covenant not to sue”—an agreement
by Buford not to sue any of the released parties for actions that took place before the
agreement’s effective date. By its own terms, the agreement is “a full, final, and
complete compromise of a disputed claim.”
A magistrate judge, presiding with the parties’ consent, see 28 U.S.C. § 636(c),
granted the defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissed the case.
The judge determined that the language of the settlement agreement clearly prevents
Buford from bringing any claim against Department employees for actions that took
place before April 23, 2020.
On appeal, Buford argues generally that the district court did not construe his
factual allegations favorably to him, as it must on a motion for judgment on the
pleadings. See, e.g., Sinn v. Lemmon, 911 F.3d 412, 418 (7th Cir. 2018). But this argument
misses the point of the district court’s ruling. Whether Buford in fact states a claim does
not matter if the claims are barred by a valid release. See ADM All. Nutrition, Inc. v. SGA
Pharm Lab, Inc., 877 F.3d 742, 746 (7th Cir. 2017). The court here appropriately
determined that Buford released his claims when he signed the settlement agreement
forgoing suit against Department employees for actions that preceded April 2020. The
interpretation of this settlement agreement is governed by local contract law, see Carr v.

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No. 23-1395 Page 3
Runyan, 89 F.3d 327, 331 (7th Cir. 1996), in this case Wisconsin’s, and Wisconsin’s courts
give contract terms their plain or ordinary meaning. See Huml v. Vlazny, 716 N.W.2d
807, 820 (Wis. 2006). Here, there is no question that Buford’s claims relating to the 2015
strip search occurred before the settlement was executed in 2020.
Buford also argues that the settlement agreement’s broad release terms are not
binding because they conflict with an oral agreement the parties made during a
teleconference call in the prior suit. But Buford did not supply a transcript that
corroborates his understanding of such a preliminary agreement—as required by
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(b)(2), see RK Co. v. See, 622 F.3d 846, 853
(7th Cir. 2010)—let alone assert that a transcript is unavailable under Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 10(c). Regardless, Buford’s statements about the teleconference,
even if true, would not alter the scope of the agreement’s release. Under Wisconsin law,
a court may not consider evidence of prior or contemporaneous understandings where
the contract is “fully integrated” (that is, final and complete), see Town Bank v. City Real
Est. Dev., LLC, 793 N.W.2d 476, 485 (Wis. 2010), and here the settlement agreement
states that the agreement “is a full, final, and complete compromise of a disputed
claim.”
We have considered Buford’s other arguments, and none has merit.
AFFIRMED

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