Jason Peterson v. John Drannan

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued November 15, 2023
Decided December 27, 2023
Before
DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
No. 22-2790
JASON PETERSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JOHN DRANNAN,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the
United States District Court for the
Southern District of Illinois.
No. 20-cv-727-DWD
David W. Dugan,
Judge.
O R D E R
Jason Peterson, a former Illinois prisoner, sued several corrections counselors
seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 stemming from a delay in his release to
supervision. On appeal he has narrowed his case to a single claim against John
Drannan, a counselor who was responsible for forwarding his proposed release plan to
the parole office for approval. Peterson wanted to be released to a specific halfway
house operated by Wayside Cross Ministries. But Peterson’s release conditions included
GPS monitoring, and Drannan had been told by parole officers and a Wayside
employee that the Wayside facility could not accommodate electronic monitoring. So
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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Drannan forwarded what’s known as a “homeless plan” to the parole office, signaling
that parole officers needed to work with Peterson to find a suitable release placement.
Peterson and the parole office could not agree on a host site by his scheduled
release date, so he remained in prison by operation of state law. About a year later, he
was released to the Wayside halfway house, which (as it turned out) could
accommodate GPS monitoring after all. In his § 1983 suit, Peterson sought to hold
Drannan liable for the additional time he spent in prison, which he claimed was a
violation of his Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment.
Drannan moved for summary judgment, arguing that no reasonable factfinder
could conclude that he had been deliberately indifferent to Peterson’s postrelease
housing needs and timely release from prison. The district court agreed and granted the
motion. We affirm the judgment.
I. Background
We review the summary judgment de novo, construing the evidence in the light
most favorable to Peterson as the nonmoving party. See Perry v. Sims, 990 F.3d 505, 511
(7th Cir. 2021). In 2018 Peterson was serving a sentence at the Vandalia Correctional
Center with a scheduled supervised-release date of December 24 of that year. Two
conditions of his release are important here: (1) Peterson was required to wear a GPS-
monitoring device; and (2) he needed to reside at a host site specifically established for
persons on supervised release. 730 I LL. C OMP . S TAT. 5/3-3-7(a)(5).
As Peterson’s release date approached, he submitted a proposed release plan to
Jeanie James, his correctional counselor, requesting placement at the Wayside Cross
Ministries halfway house. He was determined to reside there and believed that it
accepted parolees on GPS monitoring. James repeatedly told him that he could not go to
the Wayside halfway house because it lacked a landline and thus was not suitable for
GPS monitoring.
Peterson then tried a different tack, submitting his request directly to Vandalia’s
“field services” office, which was responsible for forwarding prisoners’ proposed
release plans to the parole office for review and approval. Drannan, a correctional
counselor assigned to Vandalia’s field-services office, processed Peterson’s request.
Drannan was aware from prior conversations with parole officers that only two
halfway houses in the state accepted parolees requiring GPS monitoring; Wayside was
not one of them. Moreover, a Wayside representative had previously told Drannan that
parolees who need GPS monitoring “can’t come here.” So Drannan declined to forward

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No. 22-2790 Page 3
Peterson’s Wayside request to the parole office. And because Peterson had not
requested any alternative locations, Drannan submitted a “homeless plan” to the parole
office in anticipation of Peterson’s forthcoming release. A “homeless plan” notifies the
parole office that a prisoner does not have a host site for his release and needs to work
with parole officers to secure a placement. Drannan knew that these notifications had
worked successfully for prisoners in the past; the parole office would arrange for a
prisoner to meet with representatives from eligible host sites who would assess the
prisoner for placement.
Peterson filed a grievance concerning his request to be placed at the Wayside
halfway house. He asserted that a Wayside representative had told him that he could
reside there with a GPS-monitoring device, and he urged Vandalia to contact that
person to secure his release to Wayside. Drannan, who also served as a Vandalia
grievance counselor, denied the grievance. He explained that Peterson needed to find a
home site, not a halfway house: “Per IDOC: GPS is not allowed to parole to anywhere
but a home site. No halfway house of any kind. Moot.”
Peterson submitted several other host-site requests to the parole office, but no
placement agreement was achieved by his release date of December 24, 2018. Because
he had no suitable housing arrangement in place, he was deemed to be in violation of
his release conditions and therefore remained in prison by operation of state law.
730 I LL. C OMP . S TAT. 5/3-3-7(a)(5), -3-9(a)(3)(B).
A few months later Peterson was transferred from Vandalia to the Taylorville
Correctional Center. He again requested approval of Wayside as his host site for
supervised release. This time his request was forwarded to the parole office and
approved (the record does not reveal why). Peterson was released to Wayside on
January 10, 2020, one year and 17 days after his original release date.
As relevant here, Peterson sued Drannan under § 1983 seeking damages for the
extra year he spent in prison. (He also sued James and two other counselors, but his
appeal is limited to his claim against Drannan.) Peterson alleged that Drannan’s
actions—primarily his refusal to forward the Wayside request to the parole office—
amounted to deliberate indifference to the risk of additional imprisonment, violating his
Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment.
Drannan moved for summary judgment, arguing that he acted reasonably to
facilitate Peterson’s release based on the facts known to him at the time: (1) he knew
that GPS monitoring was a condition of Peterson’s release; (2) he knew from prior
conversations with parole officers and a Wayside representative that Wayside would

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not accept a parolee on GPS monitoring; and (3) he knew that the parole office would
work with Peterson to find suitable housing.
In response Peterson challenged Drannan’s credibility, arguing that his rationale
for not forwarding the Wayside request had shifted during litigation. When Drannan
denied his grievance, he had relied on an IDOC policy prohibiting parolees on GPS
monitoring from residing at halfway houses (an inference Peterson drew from the “per
IDOC” language in Drannan’s denial order). In contrast, in deposition and at summary
judgment, Drannan appeared to acknowledge that there is no strict department policy
prohibiting GPS monitoring at halfway houses; he instead focused on information he
had received from the parole office that prisoners with a GPS-monitoring condition and
a homeless plan could not request a specific halfway house but had to accept whatever
placement was available. This shifting explanation, Peterson argued, was evidence of
deliberate indifference. He also argued that the parole office’s ultimate approval of his
placement at Wayside showed that Drannan’s actions had unnecessarily delayed his
release.
The district court found these arguments insufficient to defeat Drannan’s motion.
Based on the undisputed evidence, the judge concluded that no reasonable juror could
find that Drannan had been deliberately indifferent to Peterson’s right to timely release.
II. Analysis
To prevail on his Eighth Amendment claim, Peterson needed to prove that
Drannan was deliberately indifferent to a known risk that he would be incarcerated
without penological justification beyond his prison term. See Whitfield v. Spiller, 76 F.4th
698, 714 (7th Cir. 2023). “Deliberate indifference” is a rigorous test akin to “a criminal
recklessness standard.” Armato v. Grounds, 766 F.3d 713, 721 (7th Cir. 2014) (quotation
marks omitted). We agree with the district judge that the evidence does not support an
inference that Drannan was deliberately indifferent to a known risk that Peterson
would be imprisoned without justification.
Under Illinois law a prisoner must have a proper host site for supervised release.
730 I LL. C OMP . S TAT. 5/3-3-7(a)(5), -3-9(a)(3)(B). Peterson was determined to reside only
at Wayside, and Drannan knew from two credible sources—the parole office and a
Wayside representative—that Wayside did not accept parolees like Peterson who
require GPS monitoring. And because Peterson had suggested no other viable plan for
his housing, Drannan notified the parole office of the problem by forwarding a
“homeless plan” for Peterson.

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Peterson responds that by never forwarding his request to live at Wayside,
Drannan knew or recklessly disregarded a risk that Peterson would likely be
reimprisoned. We disagree for two reasons. First, it is undisputed that the parole office
had previously told Drannan that Wayside was an unacceptable halfway house for
parolees on GPS monitoring. No evidence suggests that Drannan had any reason to
believe that the parole office would agree to Peterson’s preferred placement at Wayside.
Second, Drannan enlisted the parole office—the unit responsible for securing acceptable
host sites for prisoners prior to release—to coordinate with Peterson to find suitable
alternative postrelease housing. On this record no reasonable juror could conclude that
Drannan deliberately disregarded a known risk that Peterson would lack a housing
placement and thus remain in prison when his release date arrived.
Nor could a jury find that Drannan recklessly ignored the possibility that
Wayside might accept Peterson after all. A prison official does not violate the Eighth
Amendment by reasonably relying on information that later turns out to be incorrect.
See Armato, 766 F.3d at 721 (affirming summary judgment for prison officials who
reasonably believed that Illinois law prevented a prisoner from leaving custody);
Whitfield, 76 F.4th at 714–15 (affirming summary judgment for a supervisor who
understood that a prisoner’s failure to sign a release agreement prevented his release).
Drannan reasonably relied on information known to him when he processed Peterson’s
housing request—information he had previously learned from two credible sources. He
then handed the matter over to the parole office to find suitable housing for Peterson.
No evidence suggests that these steps were unreasonable, much less recklessly
indifferent to the risk of continued imprisonment.
Peterson has two other replies, but neither is persuasive. First, he argues that
Figgs v. Dawson, 829 F.3d 895 (7th Cir. 2016), supports his theory that Drannan is
responsible for his delayed release from prison. In Figgs we vacated a summary
judgment in favor of a prison supervisor because the evidence suggested that she had
violated the plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights by failing to calculate his parole-
release date, as was her job. Id. at 905. Peterson argues that Drannan is just as culpable
because he failed to call Wayside to confirm whether it would accept parolees on GPS
monitoring. But unlike the supervisor in Figgs, Drannan reasonably fulfilled his job
responsibilities. He assessed and rejected Peterson’s request for placement at Wayside
by relying on information he had previously learned from two credible sources: a
Wayside representative and the parole office. Based on this information, he referred the
matter to parole officers—the officials responsible for securing housing placements for
parolees—to assist Peterson with his housing needs.

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Second, citing employment-discrimination cases by analogy, Peterson reiterates
his argument that Drannan’s explanation for not forwarding the Wayside request has
shifted during litigation and thus lacks credibility. The analogy fails. Peterson needed
evidence to support a reasonable inference that Drannan was deliberately indifferent to
a known risk that his actions would delay Peterson’s release and thus cause him to
remain in prison without penological justification. There is no such evidence.
AFFIRMED

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