United States of America v. Michael J. Grommet

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted February 16, 2024 *
Decided February 20, 2024
Before
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 23-2082
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
MICHAEL J. GROMMET,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 19-cr-40064-001
Sara Darrow,
Chief Judge.
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. FED. R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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No. 23-2082 Page 2
O R D E R
Michael Grommet, a federal prisoner, appeals the denial of his motion for
compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Because the district court
permissibly concluded that his release was not justified under the sentencing factors
listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), we affirm.
After a jury found Grommet guilty of conspiring to distribute methamphetamine
in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846, the district court sentenced him within the
guidelines range to 30 years’ imprisonment. At sentencing, the court acknowledged that
Grommet had experienced childhood trauma and had struggled with substance abuse.
But the court explained that these considerations did not justify a below-guidelines
sentence given Grommet’s “uninterrupted pattern of criminal conduct.” That pattern,
the court said, showed that his previous prison sentences “had zero deterrent effect” on
his behavior. Because Grommet posed “the most severe risk to recidivate” that the court
had “seen in a long time,” the court imposed a 30-year sentence to “break this cycle of
constant criminal conduct” and protect the public. Grommet appealed but later filed a
motion to dismiss his appeal voluntarily, see FED. R. A PP. P. 42(b)(2), which we granted.
Just eight months after his sentencing, Grommet asked the district court for
compassionate release based on his assertion that he was the only available caregiver
for his children. The court denied the motion, noting first that the children’s mother
appeared to be available to care for them. In addition, the court ruled, releasing
Grommet eight months into a 30-year sentence would conflict with sentencing factors
under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (stating that the court may
reduce a term of imprisonment only after considering the factors set forth in section
3553(a)). In the court’s words, releasing Grommet would “undermine the seriousness of
his offense and the need to promote deterrence” and “fail to protect the public from
further crimes.”
Six months later, Grommet unsuccessfully moved again for compassionate
release. He repeated that he was the only available caregiver for his children and added
that release was justified because his prison conditions were harsh and he had an
increased risk of severe complications from COVID-19 based on his health. In denying
the motion, the court concluded that even if Grommet had identified “extraordinary
and compelling reasons” to shorten his sentence, see 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), releasing
him still conflicted with the § 3553(a) sentencing factors. The court repeated its

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No. 23-2082 Page 3
explanation that releasing Grommet at this early juncture would undermine goals of
deterrence and would fail to protect the public.
On appeal, Grommet first argues that his reasons for release are “extraordinary
and compelling” under the recently amended Sentencing Guidelines. See U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.13(b)(1), (3), (5). We need not address that argument because the district court did
not—and did not have to—rule on it. Rather, the district court concluded that, in any
event, releasing Grommet would conflict with the sentencing factors—a determination
that provides an independent basis to deny compassionate release. United States v.
Williams, 65 F.4th 343, 349 (7th Cir. 2023).
Grommet next argues that the court abused its discretion in analyzing the
sentencing factors, but we disagree. He says that the court should have amended his
“draconian” sentence because, he contends, it is disproportionately long compared to
the sentences imposed on his co-conspirators. We put to the side the question whether,
under the amended Sentencing Guidelines and in connection with the § 3553(a) factors,
a compassionate-release motion is the proper place for this sentencing argument, which
Grommet could have raised on direct appeal. See United States v. Martin, 21 F.4th 944,
946 (7th Cir. 2021). Regardless, the court had “broad discretion” to assess the sentencing
factors, Williams, 65 F.4th at 349, and it reasonably concluded, based on Grommet’s
undeterred and long criminal past, that he remained a threat to the public and needed
the deterrence effect of a 30-year prison term. “[J]ust one good reason for denying a
compassionate-release motion suffices,” id. (citation omitted), and the court more than
satisfied that requirement here.
We have considered Grommet’s remaining arguments; none merits discussion.
AFFIRMED

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