Mark Bochra v. Department of Education

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted February 26, 2024*
Decided February 27, 2024
By the Court:
Nos. 22-2903 & 23-1388
MARK BOCHRA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeals from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division.
No. 21 C 3887
Sara L. Ellis,
Judge.
O R D E R
Mark Bochra, a Coptic Christian of Egyptian descent, sued the Department of
Education under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after it
rejected his request to investigate his law school for discriminating against him. The
district judge dismissed the suit for three reasons. First, Bochra lacked standing in part:
He sought to challenge the Department’s definition of antisemitism, but Bochra was not
injured by it. Second, Bochra’s claim under the APA that the Department wrongly
refused to investigate his charge of discrimination failed because Bochra had the
alternative remedy of suing the school for discrimination. Third, Bochra’s contention
under § 1983 that changes to the Department’s case-processing manual violated his
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. FED. R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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Nos. 22-2903 & 23-1388 Page 2
right to due process was baseless because he had no protectible interest in the manual.
All those reasons were correct; consequently we affirm.
Bochra attended Florida Coastal School of Law where he clashed with his peers
and disputed his grade in one class. After the school’s efforts to resolve these conflicts
failed, Bochra filed an administrative complaint with the Department of Education’s
Office of Civil Rights, asserting that the law school discriminated against him based on
his religion and national origin. After unsuccessfully mediating the complaint, the
Office concluded that insufficient evidence supported Bochra’s allegations and closed
the administrative complaint. His administrative appeal was also unsuccessful. Years
later, the law school stopped enrolling new students after the Department ruled it
ineligible on unrelated grounds to receive federal funding, and it has since closed.
Bochra later sued the Department under the APA and § 1983. He appears to
worry that Jewish people are at fault for his conflicts at the school and the Department’s
failure to grant him administrative relief. This worry led to his three charges: First, the
Department uses the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance’s definition of
antisemitism, and Bochra believes it generally results in the preferential treatment of
Jewish people. (He petitioned to represent a class of persons harmed by the definition.)
Second, as the Department was processing his administrative complaint, it revised its
case-processing manual, and Bochra believes the revision prompted the Department to
stop investigating his law school, in violation of the APA. Third, Bochra contends that
by revising the manual the Department also violated his right to due process.
The judge granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. First, the judge ruled that
Bochra lacked standing to contest the Department’s definition of antisemitism (or to
represent his proposed class) because Bochra suffered no injury from it. Next, the judge
dismissed Bochra’s claim that the Department violated the APA in denying him relief
on his discrimination complaint. She explained that because Bochra had a remedy
under Title VI for any discrimination by the school, a suit against the Department under
the APA was unavailable. Finally, his due process claim failed because Bochra lacked a
protectible interest in the case-processing manual. Concluding that any amendment to
the complaint would be futile, the judge dismissed the suit with prejudice.
We begin our analysis with Bochra’s challenge to the Department’s definition of
antisemitism, and like the district judge, we conclude that he lacks standing to pursue
it. Federal courts are limited to reviewing cases or controversies, and these arise only
when a plaintiff has an actual or imminent injury fairly traceable to the defendant.

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Nos. 22-2903 & 23-1388 Page 3
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016). But Bochra does not assert that, under the
Department’s definition of antisemitism, he is accused of antisemitism, not protected
from it, or otherwise injured by it. The district court thus rightly dismissed the claim.
And, similarly, the judge did not abuse her discretion in denying Bochra’s petition to
certify a class of those allegedly harmed by the definition. Apart from his own lack of
standing, Bochra is not represented by counsel and thus cannot adequately represent
the proposed class. See Howard v. Pollard, 814 F.3d 476, 478 (7th Cir. 2015).
Next, Bochra has no claim under the APA against the Department because, as the
district court ruled, he has an alternative remedy. The APA authorizes judicial review
of a final agency action only if there is “no other adequate remedy in a court.” 5 U.S.C.
§ 704; Walsh v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 400 F.3d 535, 537–38 (7th Cir. 2005). But he
had an adequate remedy. If Bochra believes that the law school discriminated against
him and the Department did not remedy it, then he could have sued the law school, as a
recipient of federal funds, under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to achieve the
remedy he seeks. See Women’s Equity Action League v. Cavazos, 906 F.2d 742, 751
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (recognizing Title VI as adequate remedy for discrimination by federal-
funds recipients and dismissing claim under the APA). Bochra responds that the law
school no longer receives federal funds and has closed. But Bochra also tells us that he
was aggrieved by the Department’s inaction years before the school lost its funding and
closed, and he does not deny that he could have sued the school when he had the
chance. He thus had an adequate remedy against the law school for discrimination. And
in any event, courts may not review non-prosecution decisions that by statute are
committed to the agency’s discretion, as here. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837–38
(1985).
Finally, Bochra argues that he has a property or liberty interest in the previous
version of the Department’s case-processing manual, and the Department changed its
manual without according him due process. He is wrong. As Bochra describes the
manual, it addresses the Department’s procedures for processing administrative
complaints. Procedural rules alone, however, do not create a property or liberty interest.
See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250 (1983) (“Process is not an end in itself. Its
constitutional purpose is to protect a substantive interest to which the individual has a
legitimate claim of entitlement.”). Bochra’s due process claim therefore has no merit.
AFFIRMED

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