Carl Lee Ledford v. Meloday Waldo

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted March 13, 2024*
Decided March 14, 2024
Before
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 23-2463
CARL LEE LEDFORD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MELODAY WALDO, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Indiana, South Bend Division.
No. 3:21cv770 DRL-MGG
Damon R. Leichty,
Judge.
O R D E R
Carl Ledford appeals the dismissal of his civil rights suit alleging constitutional
and state tort violations related to his arrest and seizure of his property. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Ledford had moved to voluntarily dismiss his case without prejudice, but the
district court—upon finding that he had litigated in bad faith and with unreasonable
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 23-2463 Page 2
delay—dismissed the case with prejudice as a sanction. See F ED. R. C IV. P. 37(b), 41(b).
We affirm.
Ledford alleges that he was falsely accused of crimes by Meloday Waldo, setting
in motion an unlawful arrest by the Fort Wayne Police Department. Ledford asserts that
at various times during pretrial detention, the Fort Wayne Police Department, City of
Fort Wayne, and the LaPorte County Police Department violated his right to counsel,
his speedy trial rights, and his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Ledford sued these municipal entities under § 1983 for conspiring with Waldo to violate
his constitutional rights. He also advanced state-law claims of malicious prosecution
and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
When the defendants did not respond to his complaint within 21 days, Ledford
moved for default judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(a). But Rule
12(a)(1)(A)(i) requires a response only from those defendants who have been served, so
the district court—which had yet to direct service on behalf of Ledford, who was
proceeding in forma pauperis—denied the motion.
After service was made on the defendants, Waldo moved to dismiss the
complaint, and the municipal entities answered. Instead of responding to Waldo’s
motion to dismiss, Ledford again sought default judgment. The court advised him to
respond to Waldo’s motion, but he never did and instead filed an unsigned motion for
summary judgment.
The district court proceeded to issue several rulings against Ledford. The court
struck Ledford’s motion for summary judgment for failure to comply with Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 11(a), which requires pro se litigants to sign all filings. The court also
partially granted Waldo’s motion to dismiss, disposing of the § 1983 and malicious
prosecution claims, but it allowed Ledford to proceed on his claim of intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Finally, the court denied Ledford’s second motion for
default judgment because the defendants had filed timely responsive pleadings.
As the case progressed to discovery, Ledford became more recalcitrant. The court
issued a scheduling order requiring the parties to exchange initial disclosures. See F ED.
R. C IV. P. 26(a)(1). The defendants filed interrogatories and requests for documents as
well as notice to take Ledford’s deposition. Ledford ignored these requests and took no
steps to carry out his own discovery. He also failed twice to appear for his deposition.
He told the district court he missed his first deposition because he lacked the ability to
attend a remote deposition—this despite the defendants offering transportation and

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No. 23-2463 Page 3
equipment to do so. He then skipped his rescheduled deposition, telling the defendants
he had moved to voluntarily dismiss his complaint without prejudice. But Ledford in
fact did not file the motion to dismiss until two days after the rescheduled deposition.
Ledford then did not appear at a status hearing held by the court to discuss his
motion to dismiss. The court ordered Ledford (1) to respond to the defendants’
objections to his dismissal motion, and (2) to show cause why his case should not be
dismissed, with prejudice, for his failure to prosecute, including his failure to comply
with past discovery. The court warned him that his failure to respond within a month
could result in the dismissal of his case with prejudice without further notice.
The defendants then moved under Rule 41(b) to dismiss the case with prejudice
for failure to prosecute, leading the court to issue another warning. The court again
ordered Ledford to respond by the previously set deadline and cautioned him that his
failure to do so would result in the dismissal of his case with prejudice without further
notice. This time, Ledford responded, arguing that he never received notice of the status
conference, that his absence at the depositions should be excused because he did not
have transportation, and that the court was biased against him.
The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss with prejudice. The
court invoked Rule 41(b), concluding that Ledford had exhibited a clear record of delay
and contumacious conduct by failing to appear for status conferences, respond to
motions, or participate in discovery. The court added that this conduct—along with
Ledford’s defiance of its order to provide initial disclosures—exhibited willfulness, bad
faith, and fault which warranted sanctions under Rule 37(b). The court noted that
Ledford persisted in this behavior despite explicit warnings that dismissal of his suit
with prejudice would result from his actions. Finally, because Ledford himself wished
to dismiss his case (albeit without prejudice), the court concluded that dismissal with
prejudice was the only appropriate sanction.
On appeal, Ledford first targets the district court’s denial of his motions for
default judgment, arguing that the defendants’ responsive pleadings were untimely and
failed to advance any defenses to his claims. The denial of these motions, however, was
appropriate. Rule 12(a)(1)(A)(i) obligates a defendant to respond to a complaint within
21 days of service, not merely upon the filing of the complaint. See Cent. Ill. Carpenters
Health and Welfare Tr. Fund v. Con-Tech Carpentry, LLC, 806 F.3d 935, 936 (7th Cir. 2015).
And the defendants complied with Rule 12(a)(1)(A)(i) by timely responding once
served: Service took place on March 3, 2022, the Fort Wayne entities filed their answer

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No. 23-2463 Page 4
on March 15, Waldo filed her motion to dismiss on March 17, and the LaPorte County
Police Department filed its answer before its extended deadline, on April 15.
Ledford next argues that the district court erred by striking his unsigned motion
for summary judgment under Rule 11(a). But he waived this argument by failing to
engage with the district court’s reason for striking the motion—because it was
unsigned. See Cont’l W. Ins. Co. v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 3 F.4th 308, 318 (7th Cir. 2021).
Waiver aside, the district court appropriately exercised its discretion to strike the
unsigned filing because Ledford failed to correct the error in a prompt manner. Marcure
v. Lynn, 992 F.3d 625, 628 (7th Cir. 2021).
Finally, Ledford challenges the dismissal of his suit with prejudice. But this was a
proper sanction under Rule 41(b). Ample evidence supports the court's finding that
Ledford had a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct: He ignored motions from
opposing counsel, missed the status conference at which the court discussed his motion
to voluntarily dismiss, and skipped two depositions. See Cartwright v. Silver Cross Hosp.,
962 F.3d 933, 936 (7th Cir. 2020); Salata v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 757 F.3d 695, 699–700
(7th Cir. 2014). The court also carefully accounted for Ledford’s repeated failure to
participate in his lawsuit, the prejudice caused to the defendants, and the resources that
the court and defendants expended on the lawsuit. See McMahan v. Deutsche Bank AG,
892 F.3d 926, 931–32 (7th Cir. 2018). The court’s findings—including Ledford’s
disregard of his discovery obligations and defiance of the court’s order directing the
parties to exchange initial disclosures—also independently supported dismissal of the
suit with prejudice as a sanction under Rule 37(b). See Brown v. Columbia Sussex Corp.,
664 F.3d 182, 190–91 (7th Cir. 2011); Ramirez v. T&H Lemont, Inc., 845 F.3d 772, 775–76
(7th Cir. 2016).
Ledford relatedly argues that the circumstances of his detention by the defendant
police departments prevented him from obtaining the resources he needed to attend his
first deposition. But the defendants offered him transportation and alternative locations
for his depositions. To the extent he thinks he should not be faulted for skipping his
second deposition since he told the defendants that he had voluntarily dismissed his
complaint, he misstates the timeline of events. He did not file his motion until two days
after he was to be deposed, so opposing counsel was justified in insisting that the
deposition move forward at its scheduled time.
AFFIRMED

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