Julio C. Vides-Vides v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General of the United States

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued April 4, 2024
Decided April 17, 2024
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
No. 23-3006
JULIO C. VIDES-VIDES,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General of the United States,
Respondent.
Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals.
No. A208-548-070
O R D E R
Julio Vides-Vides, a native of El Salvador, entered the United States without
inspection in November 2015. He was later apprehended and served with a Notice to
Appear. Vides conceded his removability but applied for asylum under section
208(b)(1)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A);
withholding of removal under section 241(b)(3)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A);
and protection under regulations implementing the Convention Against Torture.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

-- 1 of 4 --

No. 23-3006 Page 2
With regard to asylum and withholding of removal, Vides claimed he was a
member of five particular social groups whose mistreatment could amount to
persecution: Salvadorans who have opposed or resisted gangs; Salvadorans who have
opposed a gang known as the MS; Salvadorans who have reported criminal groups to
law enforcement; family; and Vides’ own family. He asserted that he had been
persecuted in the past and feared further persecution in the future because of his
membership in these social groups.
Vides identified two instances of past persecution. First, in 2010, Vides claimed
that individuals threatened him because they believed he was a policeman. They let
Vides leave after another person vouched that Vides was not a policeman. Second, in
2015, purported gang members held a gun to Vides’ head and told him they would kill
him if he did not help them traffic drugs. Vides testified that the gang members
targeted him because he was a “quiet, serious, [and] a good person” who would not be
suspected of selling drugs. As in the first incident, Vides was allowed to leave without
suffering physical harm. Vides later reported this second incident to police.
The immigration judge denied Vides’ application in all respects. Regarding
asylum and withholding of removal, the judge concluded that Vides failed to establish a
nexus between the risk of past or future persecution and a protected ground. The
immigration judge also denied Vides’ request for relief under the Convention Against
Torture because he failed to show that he would more likely than not be tortured if he
returned to El Salvador.
Vides appealed the immigration judge’s decision to the Board of Immigration
Appeals. The Board agreed with the judge’s reasoning and dismissed the appeal. Vides
filed a timely petition for judicial review in this court.
Vides makes three arguments in support of his petition for review. First, he
argues that his initial Notice to Appear had a date-and-time defect that requires
termination of his immigration proceedings. Second, he argues that the immigration
judge abused his discretion in denying his request to submit late-filed letters in support
of his application. Third, Vides argues that the Board of Immigration Appeals applied
the wrong standard for determining whether a nexus existed between Vides’ alleged
persecution and his protected grounds. We reject all three arguments and deny the
petition for review.

-- 2 of 4 --

No. 23-3006 Page 3
I. Notice to Appear
In Ortiz-Santiago v. Barr, 924 F.3d 956, 958 (7th Cir. 2019), we held: “The
requirement that a Notice [to Appear] include, within its four corners, the time, date,
and place of the removal proceeding is not ‘jurisdictional’ in nature. It is instead the
agency’s version of a claim-processing rule, violations of which can be forfeited if an
objection is not raised in a timely manner.” Ortiz-Santiago applies here because Vides
received sufficient notice of his actual hearing and in fact appeared to defend himself.
Vides asks us to overrule Ortiz-Santiago. We have already rejected many such requests
in the years since Ortiz-Santiago was decided. E.g., Arreola-Ochoa v. Garland, 34 F.4th 603,
607–08 (7th Cir. 2022). Vides does not provide a compelling reason to overrule these
circuit precedents.
II. Late-Filed Letters
At his individual merits hearing on October 3, 2019, Vides tried to submit as
evidence two affidavits from family members. The Department of Homeland Security
objected to the evidence as untimely. The immigration judge sustained the objection,
concluding that the offer was not timely and that Vides did not show good cause for the
tardiness.
The immigration judge did not abuse his discretion in rejecting the late affidavits.
In addition to the wide discretion that immigration judges possess in setting filing
deadlines, Section 3.1(b)(2)(B) of the Immigration Court Practice Manual states that
filings for individual hearings involving non-detained non-citizens must be filed at least
fifteen days in advance of the hearing.
Vides failed to show good cause for not submitting the two late-filed affidavits in
time. Vides’ counsel said only that he could not control the actions of family members.
That argument falls short of showing good cause that would require an immigration
judge to exercise his or her discretion to allow the late filing. It would apply to any late-
filed document provided by a third party. Excusing tardiness for this reason as a matter
of law would eviscerate the filing deadline.
III. Standard for Nexus
The Board of Immigration Appeals agreed with the immigration judge’s
determination that Vides did not establish “that any past or feared future persecution
was or would be on account of a protected ground.” In other words, Vides did not

-- 3 of 4 --

No. 23-3006 Page 4
establish the required nexus between any of his claimed social groups and the two
incidents of alleged persecution he endured, or that his purported membership in the
social groups would be a central reason for persecution in the future.
On judicial review, Vides argues only that the Board of Immigration Appeals
applied the wrong standard when determining whether he carried his burden in
establishing a nexus. He contends that the Board of Immigration Appeals inquired into
the persecutors’ motives instead of asking whether one of Vides’ protected grounds was
a but-for cause of the persecution. Vides concedes that we have long held that proof of
motive, whether by direct or circumstantial evidence, is essential to prove persecution.
That requirement was set forth in I.N.S. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483 (1992) (“the
statute makes motive critical,” and petitioner needed to provide “some evidence of it,
direct or circumstantial”). We have applied that requirement many times. E.g., Bueso-
Avila v. Holder, 663 F.3d 934, 937 (7th Cir. 2011) (proof of persecution requires direct or
circumstantial evidence that gang was motivated by protected factor).
Vides contends, however, that the Supreme Court’s decision in Bostock v. Clayton
County, 590 U.S. 644 (2020), teaches that motivations should not be considered in but-for
causation tests. Bostock interpreted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which in
relevant part prohibited covered employers from taking actions “because of” an
employee’s sex.
Elias-Zacarias requires proof of motive and remains the controlling interpretation
of the Immigration and Nationality Act, however, and contrary to Vides’ argument,
Bostock in fact left subjective motivation at the center of sex-discrimination cases under
Title VII. See id. at 656–57, 661–62. We continue to follow Elias-Zacarias and circuit
precedent in considering motivations in the nexus inquiry. See, e.g., Granados Arias v.
Garland, 69 F.4th 454, 464 (7th Cir. 2023) (considering motives in the nexus inquiry after
Bostock was decided).
The petition for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals is
DENIED.

-- 4 of 4 --