United States of America v. Donald C. Ridley

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted April 24, 2024*
Decided April 25, 2024
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
No. 23-2643
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
DONALD C. RIDLEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Illinois.
No. 13-cr-30084-SMY-2
Staci M. Yandle,
Judge.
O R D E R
Donald Ridley, who is incarcerated in federal prison for bank robbery, appeals
an order granting the government’s request to seize funds from his inmate trust account
in order to pay his restitution debt of about $115,000. While incarcerated, a family
member sent to his account more than $10,000, an inheritance Ridley says came from
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

-- 1 of 3 --

No. 23-2643 Page 2
Ridley’s recently deceased grandmother. Granting a motion from the government, the
district court authorized the Bureau of Prisons to apply these funds to the restitution
Ridley owes. Because the district court properly ruled that Ridley had control over the
funds and that the funds could be used for his restitution obligation, we affirm.
Ridley’s restitution debt arose from several federal crimes. He was convicted in
2014 of bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 2113(a), 2113(d), brandishing a firearm, id. §§ 2,
924(c)(1)(A)(ii), making a false statement to a federal law enforcement officer,
id. § 1001(a)(2), and obstruction of justice. Id. § 1512(b)(3). He was sentenced to 246
months’ imprisonment and five years’ supervised release. He also was ordered to pay
approximately $115,000 in restitution, which was “due immediately.”
Years later, while Ridley was still in prison, over $10,000 was deposited in his
inmate trust account at the Bureau of Prisons, and the government moved to obtain
those funds and apply them to Ridley’s restitution. Before Ridley received the
government’s motion, the Bureau froze his account. Ridley responded by writing to the
district court, asking it to halt that action. He explained that he had inherited the money
from his recently deceased grandmother, and she wanted the money spent on his
children and legal fees. Ridley also replied to the government’s motion. He argued that
$6,000 was exempt from his restitution debt because it belonged to his sons, not him. In
support, he stated in an affidavit that his cousin, who was the executor of his
grandmother’s estate, mistakenly deposited that money—bequeathed to his sons—into
Ridley’s account. He added that he was “preparing to send” the $6,000 to his sons to
fulfill a child-support order when the Bureau froze his account. Finally, he wrote that he
had been paying $50 monthly toward his restitution and that taking the new funds
would leave him indigent.
The district court granted the government’s motion and directed the Bureau to
release the funds to pay Ridley’s restitution. The court determined that no evidence
supported Ridley’s assertions that he was under an order to pay child support, and
Ridley failed to substantiate, such as through a valid will, that any of the money was
inherited by his sons. As for Ridley’s argument that he was making monthly restitution
payments, the court explained that those payments did not limit the government’s
ability to enforce the restitution that he owed.
Ridley appeals the district court’s order, but the court properly allowed the
government to apply the funds to Ridley’s restitution debt. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3664(n),
“[i]f a person obligated to provide restitution, or pay a fine, receives substantial
resources from any source, including inheritance, settlement, or other judgment, during

-- 2 of 3 --

No. 23-2643 Page 3
a period of incarceration, such person shall be required to apply the value of such
resources to any restitution or fine still owed.” The district court had ample grounds for
finding that the funds were in Ridley’s trust account over which he had control;
therefore under § 3664(n), it properly authorized the government to apply the funds to
restitution. The court was not compelled to accept Ridley’s argument that he did not
own those funds: The letter he sent stated only that his grandmother wanted Ridley to
spend the funds on his sons, not that the sons owned the funds. And the court did not
have to credit Ridley’s affidavit, in which he asserted that other documents—which he
did not provide to the court—stated that the funds belonged to his sons.
Ridley responds that, given his pro se status, the district court should have given
him another opportunity to support his assertion that $6,000 of the funds belonged to
his sons. We disagree. Although courts will construe pro se filings liberally, see Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976), pro se litigants must still follow the procedural rules
applicable to counseled litigants. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).
Under the district court’s procedure, both Ridley and the government received a chance
to address the status of the funds in his account. In fact, Ridley received two chances—
the letter he sent to the court and his response to the government’s motion. Despite
these two opportunities to substantiate his claim that the funds were legally obligated
to his sons, Ridley did not do so. Even on appeal, Ridley does not say what evidence he
would have provided to the district court if given another opportunity, nor does he
explain why he could not have offered that evidence earlier.
Finally, Ridley argues that Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
required the district court to give him another opportunity to prove his assertions about
the funds, but he is incorrect. Although “restitution in a criminal case is fundamentally
a civil remedy,” United States v. Sawyer, 521 F.3d 792, 796–97 (7th Cir. 2008), Ridley’s
reliance on Rule 56 is inapplicable because, among other reasons, neither he nor the
government moved for summary judgment.
AFFIRMED

-- 3 of 3 --