Greenwald Family Limited Partnership v. Village of Mukwonago

In the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 21-3237
GREENWALD F AMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
VILLAGE OF M UKWONAGO,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.
No. 20-CV-0048 — Lynn Adelman, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED NOVEMBER 8, 2022 — DECIDED A PRIL 29, 2024
____________________
Before S YKES , Chief Judge, and WOOD and S CUDDER , Circuit
Judges.
S YKES , Chief Judge. The Greenwald Family Limited Part-
nership owns large tracts of undeveloped land in the Village
of Mukwonago, a municipality about 30 miles southwest of
Milwaukee. From 2003 to 2013, municipal officials were
receptive to the Partnership’s development proposals,
leading to the successful completion of several mutually
beneficial projects. The relationship changed in 2014 when

-- 1 of 19 --

2 No. 21-3237
the Partnership’s plan to purchase a 4-acre plot of farmland
in an area known as “Chapman Farms” collapsed when the
proposed land division failed to satisfy the Village’s devel-
opment conditions.
Based on the failed land deal and several other conflicts
with the Village, the Partnership sued in state court, later
adding a “class of one” equal-protection claim accusing the
Village of irrationally singling it out for unfavorable treat-
ment in violation of its rights under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The Village then removed the case to federal court.
To support its claim of discriminatory treatment, the
Partnership pointed to a half-dozen adverse municipal
decisions regarding its properties. But it focused primarily
on two: the unsuccessful Chapman Farms transaction and a
new road in another part of the Village that was rerouted
from the Partnership’s property. The district judge conclud-
ed that the Village had a rational basis for its actions regard-
ing Chapman Farms, the new road, and the other adverse
decisions regarding the Partnership’s properties. The judge
accordingly entered summary judgment for the Village and
relinquished jurisdiction over the state-law claims.
We affirm. To prevail on its class-of-one equal-protection
claim, the Partnership had the burden to show that the
Village’s actions lacked any conceivable rational basis.
Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). This is
a heavy lift, and the Partnership failed to carry its burden.
The Village’s decisions regarding the Partnership’s devel-
opment proposals and properties were rationally related to
its legitimate interests in promoting its land-use objectives
and protecting the public fisc.

-- 2 of 19 --

No. 21-3237 3
I. Background
The Greenwald Family Limited Partnership—formed by
the late Darwin N. Greenwald and his son, Darwin D.
Greenwald—owns acres of commercial and undeveloped
property in the Village of Mukwonago. For many years the
Partnership successfully collaborated with the Village on
development projects involving its properties. The relation-
ship deteriorated in 2014, the year after the Village created
the position of village administrator and hired John Weidl to
fill that role. The Partnership blames Weidl for the change in
its relationship with municipal officials.
A. Chapman Farms
The story begins in September 2014 when the Partnership
offered to buy a 4-acre plot of land on the eastern edge of a
19.6-acre property known as Chapman Farms, located west
of State Highway 83 in the northwest corner of the Village.
The offer proposed to carve out the 4-acre parcel and leave
the Chapman family, the sellers, with a remnant parcel of
about 15.6 acres. So the agreement between the Partnership
and the Chapmans was contingent upon municipal approval
of the land division. That, in turn, required a certified survey
map that met the Village’s requirements.
Tamara Towns-Pozorski—the Partnership’s agent and
granddaughter of the elder Darwin Greenwald—filed an
application for a certified survey map with the Village’s Plan
Commission. Bruce Kaniewski, the village planner, respond-
ed with a letter outlining several problems with the applica-
tion. Among other concerns, he explained that a certified
survey map could not be approved without a developer’s
agreement, backed by a surety in the form of a letter of credit

-- 3 of 19 --

4 No. 21-3237
and reflecting the subdivider’s commitment to install re-
quired infrastructure improvements, including the construc-
tion of an access road from Highway 83, which abuts and
runs parallel, in a north–south direction, to the parcel. He
advised Towns-Pozorski that the placement and construc-
tion of the access road also required approval from the
Wisconsin Department of Transportation.
Kaniewski asked Towns-Pozorski to respond to his con-
cerns by December 3, ahead of the Plan Commission’s
December 9 meeting. On the December 3 deadline, Towns-
Pozorski—who had minimal experience as a developer and
had never been involved in a project requiring a certified
survey map—submitted a revised application and a one-
page document titled “Statement and Developer’s Agree-
ment” bearing her signature and the signature of Fern
Chapman on behalf of the Chapman family. Despite the title,
this document was not in fact a developer’s agreement,
which is a contract between a developer and the Village
specifying their respective commitments regarding a pro-
posed development project. The document Towns-Pozorski
submitted contained no development plans, no details about
infrastructure improvements (e.g., the access road and
utilities), no construction drawings, no construction-cost
estimates, no timeline for construction, and no surety for the
cost of construction.
Instead, the one-page document simply explained
Towns-Pozorski’s position that the development details
could wait. Regarding Kaniewski’s request for information
about the access road, she proposed “holding-off on con-
struction of the new street within the dedicated right-of-
way” until she was “able to move ahead in trying to make

-- 4 of 19 --

No. 21-3237 5
something happen on the … lot.” She acknowledged that
“the costs of the street construction” were her responsibility
as the developer, but she explained that her “first step is to
secure the purchase of the land.” She said that she planned
to seek rezoning for the parcel—from multifamily residential
to commercial—if the certified survey map was approved
and that she wished to keep her plans private “for now” but
would “certainly reveal them” when she applied for build-
ing permits.
Kaniewski reviewed the revised application and issued a
report to the Plan Commission indicating that he could
support the requested certified survey map contingent upon
the applicant’s satisfactory compliance with several neces-
sary conditions, including approval by the Village Board of a
developer’s agreement requiring the construction of the
Highway 83 access road. Kaniewski explained that although
the Partnership had no present plans to develop the proper-
ty, the proposed division of the Chapman Farms property
could not proceed without a developer’s agreement regard-
ing the construction of improvements. See M UKWONAGO,
WIS ., M UN . C ODE § 45.13 (requiring a developer’s agreement
to subdivide a property of 5 acres or more in a residential
zoning district). He discussed the impact of the project on
the adjacent Fairwinds subdivision, adding that the place-
ment of the access road to Highway 83 was “very important
to the proper traffic circulation pattern of the entire neigh-
borhood.” He also explained that the Chapmans wanted to
ensure that “the remainder of their property [would] have
access to the highway” and not be landlocked, which would
inhibit the family’s ability to sell the property for develop-
ment.

-- 5 of 19 --

6 No. 21-3237
For these reasons, Kaniewski advised the Commission to
either require immediate construction of the access road or
restrict any development of the 4-acre parcel until construc-
tion of the road was completed. He and other village staff
recommended the first option. Kaniewski identified other
necessary conditions as well, including the village engineer’s
sign-off on the project and the Department of Transporta-
tion’s approval of the road.
The Commissioners accepted Kaniewski’s recommenda-
tions and conditionally approved the application contingent
on compliance with the conditions the village staff had
described—in particular, the submission of a developer’s
agreement that included a commitment to build the access
road, preliminary construction drawings, a timeline for
construction, and a surety agreement “in an amount of the
estimated construction cost.” The Commission made it clear
that the Village Board would not approve the proposed
certified survey map until the village engineer and village
planner confirmed that the Partnership had satisfied all
conditions outlined in the tentative approval.
Towns-Pozorski was discouraged by the Commission’s
decision. On December 10, the day after the meeting, she
emailed Kaniewski to clarify the Village’s exact require-
ments and to request a draft developer’s agreement. She
explained that the Partnership needed to “consider the
bottom line and make a decision as to whether [or] not we
can continue with our plans” or “must drop them.” Towns-
Pozorski continued to email Kaniewski as December wound
down and the new year began. She wondered if a temporary
driveway might satisfy the Village (rather than immediate

-- 6 of 19 --

No. 21-3237 7
construction of the access road) and generally hoped to keep
the deal on track.
In mid-January 2015, Kaniewski followed up with
Towns-Pozorski. He told her that the Department of Trans-
portation required a traffic-impact analysis and a pending
land development before it would permit construction of the
access road. He also explained that the Chapmans had
confirmed that they “[did] not want to be left without access
to the remainder of their property.” Kaniewski emphasized
that the Village’s position on the access road remained the
same: “[W]e need a commitment to complete the street,”
which now required completion of a traffic-impact analysis
as required by the Department of Transportation. Several
days later Towns-Pozorski and the Chapmans canceled their
deal.
Around the same time, the listing agent for the Chapman
family contacted Weidl, the village administrator, to gauge
the Village’s interest in purchasing some or all of Chapman
Farms. After the deal with the Greenwald Partnership fell
through, the Village purchased approximately 8 acres in
Chapman Farms—including the 4 acres that were the subject
of the Partnership’s failed transaction—for $650,000. Over
the next two years, the Village constructed the access road
and related infrastructure. In 2017 the Village sold the
development-ready tract to Anderson Commercial Group
for $750,000. Anderson entered into a developer’s agreement
with the Village, and its certified survey map divided the lot
into four parcels. Within a year Anderson sold three of the
subdivided lots for a profit.

-- 7 of 19 --

8 No. 21-3237
B. DeBack Drive/Wolf Run Extension
The friction between the Partnership and village officials
increased when the Village relocated a proposed road away
from the Partnership’s property to accommodate a new
development southeast of the intersection of Highway 83
and I-94. The Partnership owns 47 acres of undeveloped
land at that location; the DeBack family owned an adjacent
40-acre plot. Neither had a direct access road, so the Village’s
official map called for the eventual construction of an access
road running through both properties; the projected road
was known as the “Wolf Run Extension.”
In 2017 Douglas DeBack, on behalf of the DeBack family,
requested that the Village amend its official map to facilitate
the sale of a portion of its property to ProHealth Care, a
medical center. In addition to their property next to the
Partnership’s land, the DeBacks owned another parcel
adjacent to the medical center, for a total of 100 acres.
ProHealth planned to purchase the southern half of the
DeBack family’s property, which bordered its medical
center; the DeBacks would retain the northern 50 acres. The
Village’s official map for the Wolf Run Extension called for a
road running north–south between ProHealth’s medical
center and the DeBacks’ property and eventually crossing a
large parcel of the Partnership’s property.
DeBack sought an amendment to the official map and a
certified survey map that would relocate the north–south
road to the east of the property that he planned to sell to
ProHealth so that the road could proceed along the medical
center’s new eastern border. He also proposed an east–west
public street to connect the new road with East Wolf Run to
the west of ProHealth’s property. The north–south road

-- 8 of 19 --

No. 21-3237 9
would still stretch through the Partnership’s property and
move westward to meet East Wolf Run further north, but the
proposed east–west road would provide another direct
access point.
Kaniewski reviewed DeBack’s application and deter-
mined that “[f]rom a big picture view, the proposals work.”
The Village held a public meeting on the proposed amend-
ment to the official map. No one objected. The Village Board
ultimately amended the map and approved DeBack’s certi-
fied survey map.
Around the same time, Teronomy Builders, a developer,
approached DeBack about the northern parcel. In August
2018 the Village signed a developer’s agreement for the land
with Teronomy, which planned to construct Maple Centre, a
mixed-use development that would include a hotel, restau-
rants, shops, and an apartment complex. The Village saw the
development as a significant opportunity that promised to
increase its tax base and attract new businesses. To connect
Maple Centre to East Wolf Run, the agreement required the
Village to construct the east–west access road that was
included in the 2017 map amendment.
The Village initially designed the road—named DeBack
Drive—to track the direct route outlined in the (now amend-
ed) official map. A segment of the proposed path crossed a
5-acre parcel owned by the Partnership. The Village believed
that this option was the cheapest, most direct route to con-
nect Maple Centre to East Wolf Run, so the Village Board
adopted a resolution to commence condemnation to acquire
the strip of land required for the road.

-- 9 of 19 --

10 No. 21-3237
The Partnership objected to the proposed taking. Instead
it urged the Village to construct the original north–south
road, which would stretch from Maple Centre through the
Partnership’s 47-acre lot to join East Wolf Run north of the
planned east–west intersection. The Village did not budge.
In addition to its concerns that the north–south extension
would be more costly and less direct, the Village empha-
sized that the Partnership’s northern parcel lacked infra-
structure and a development plan. Negotiations failed, and
in May 2019 the Village submitted a jurisdictional offer, a
statutory prerequisite to condemn property. The Partnership
again encouraged the Village to consider the north–south
road, but the Village responded that it would move forward
with the eminent-domain process. The following month the
Partnership sued the Village in Waukesha County Circuit
Court alleging that the taking did not serve a public purpose
and instead was intended “to harm the Greenwalds and
create an economic advantage for the Village.”
The stalemate between the Partnership and the Village
was complicated by the Partnership’s negotiations with a
potential buyer for the 5-acre parcel. At the beginning of
2019—after the Village Board passed the resolution to ac-
quire the land for DeBack Drive but before the Village made
its jurisdictional offer—the Partnership contracted to sell the
5-acre parcel to Greg Petrauski. The contract required
Petrauski to build a senior-housing community and to
oppose the Village’s effort to construct DeBack Drive. The
details are hazy, but the deal appears to have stalled over
concerns about the eminent-domain dispute and zoning
requirements.

-- 10 of 19 --

No. 21-3237 11
Meanwhile, a little over a month after the Partnership
filed its takings suit in state court, the Village delivered a
written award of damages and took title to the land needed
for DeBack Drive. However, several days later the Village
recorded a quitclaim deed reversing its eminent-domain
action and returning the strip of land to the Partnership.
Weidl, the village administrator, explained in an email that
he understood that returning the land would help the Part-
nership complete its transaction with Petrauski. The Village
believed that it could move DeBack Drive 100 feet north,
away from the Partnership’s 5-acre property and across land
that the Greenwald family had donated to the municipality
years earlier.1 The Partnership continued to press the Village
to construct the Wolf Run Extension through its 47-acre
parcel. For its part, the Village explained that it was open to
constructing the north–south road in addition to DeBack
Drive but only if the Partnership agreed to develop the
surrounding property so the Village could recoup construc-
tion costs through increased tax revenue.
C. Class-of-One Equal-Protection Claim
This appeal arises from the Partnership’s first lawsuit
against the Village, which challenged the use of eminent
domain to take land for DeBack Drive from the Partnership’s
5-acre parcel. After the Village returned that strip of land,
the Partnership filed an amended complaint adding a claim
for violation of its right to equal protection under the
1 The Village’s plan to move the placement of DeBack Drive hit a snag
because the donated property was encumbered by a deed restriction that
appeared to limit its use. That matter is the subject of separate litigation
in state court.

-- 11 of 19 --

12 No. 21-3237
Fourteenth Amendment and several new claims under state
law.2 The Village removed the case to federal court.
As support for its equal-protection claim, the Partnership
relies primarily on the failed Chapman Farms deal and the
disagreement over DeBack Drive, but it also mentions
several other disputes with the Village. One is the Village’s
refusal to take over Marshview Drive, an unimproved
roadway owned by the Partnership. The public uses the
private road to access local businesses; the Partnership
wanted the Village to maintain it to ensure safety and guar-
antee public access. The Village has declined to do so in the
absence of an agreement by the Partnership concerning its
development plans for the surrounding property.
The Partnership also points to a dispute over the removal
of trees on one of its properties adjacent to Highway 83. It
explains that in 2013 the Village agreed to remove the trees,
which obstruct highway visibility. But the tree-removal issue
was not included in the final developer’s agreement between
the Partnership and the Village. In 2018 the Partnership
asked the Village to honor the spirit of the 2013 agreement
and remove the trees. The Village declined to do so because
the final developer’s agreement did not include this obliga-
tion. The Village also pointed out that the Partnership would
need to obtain a permit from the Wisconsin Department of
Natural Resources “for vegetation removal in an environ-
mental corridor.”
The Partnership next contends that the Village unfairly
denied its request for tax-incremental financing (“TIF”) for
2 The amended complaint also included a federal due-process claim. The
Partnership has abandoned that claim.

-- 12 of 19 --

No. 21-3237 13
an assisted-living development. The Village declined this
request because no funding was available in the TIF district
where the proposed development was located. Finally, the
Partnership claims that the Village improperly levied a
special assessment on its properties to recover costs spent on
infrastructure improvements near Anderson’s development
in Chapman Farms. The Village responds that it imposed the
assessment on the surrounding properties, all of which
benefitted from the municipal improvements.
As evidence that it was arbitrarily and intentionally tar-
geted for unfavorable treatment, the Partnership relies on a
dozen or so emails from Weidl to municipal staff. The emails
reflect an unfavorable view of the Partnership’s develop-
ment proposals and express frustration with the Greenwalds
generally. The details are not important. As we explain later
in this opinion, this case turns on the rational-basis standard
that governs class-of-one claims; there’s no need to consider
the Partnership’s claim that Weidl harbored personal ani-
mus.
The Village sought summary judgment on the equal-
protection claim, noting that under class-of-one doctrine, the
Partnership had the burden to prove that it was intentionally
treated differently than others similarly situated and that
there was no rational basis for the difference in treatment.
The Village addressed the first element but focused its
attention on articulating a rational basis—notably, land-use
planning objectives and financial considerations—for each of
the decisions at the heart of the Partnership’s claim.
Moving directly to rational-basis review of the chal-
lenged municipal actions, the district judge found a rational
basis for each municipal decision at issue in the case, entered

-- 13 of 19 --

14 No. 21-3237
summary judgment for the Village on the equal-protection
claim, and relinquished jurisdiction over the state-law
claims.
II. Discussion
We review the judge’s summary-judgment order de no-
vo, construing the record in the light most favorable to the
Greenwald Partnership and drawing all reasonable infer-
ences in its favor. James v. Hale, 959 F.3d 307, 314 (7th Cir.
2020). The Partnership’s theory is that the Village targeted it
for arbitrary and unfavorable treatment based on personal
animus or favoritism toward other developers, violating its
Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection. Because
the case does not involve a protected class or fundamental
right, the Partnership has the “heavy burden” to prove the
elements of a class-of-one claim. FKFJ, Inc. v. Village of Worth,
11 F.4th 574, 588 (7th Cir. 2021). A class-of-one plaintiff must
establish that he was “intentionally treated differently from
others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis
for the difference in treatment.” Olech, 528 U.S. at 564.
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Olech, our cases
have struggled with the question whether proof of illegiti-
mate animus is also required; the extent to which the subjec-
tive motivations of government officials affect the analysis
remains unclear. Village of Worth, 11 F.4th at 588–89 (collect-
ing cases). We need not decide this question here because the
two elements announced in Olech are clearly established. Id.
at 588. And the Partnership’s claim fails regardless of the role
of personal animus.
To carry its burden at the first step in the Olech frame-
work, the Partnership must prove that it was “treated differ-

-- 14 of 19 --

No. 21-3237 15
ently from others similarly situated.” Olech, 528 U.S. at 564.
The Partnership and its comparators must be “prima facie
identical in all relevant respects or directly comparable … in
all material respects.” D.S. v. E. Porter Cnty. Sch. Corp.,
799 F.3d 793, 799 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v.
Moore, 543 F.3d 891, 896 (7th Cir. 2008)). At the second step in
the framework, the Partnership must prove that “there is no
rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Olech, 528 U.S.
at 564. In other words, it must “negative any reasonably
conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis”
for the difference in treatment. Miller v. City of Monona,
784 F.3d 1113, 1121 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Scherr v. City of
Chicago, 757 F.3d 593, 598 (7th Cir. 2014)). Indeed, the prof-
fered rational basis need not be the actual justification; rather,
“any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide
a rational basis will suffice.” 145 Fisk, LLC v. Nicklas, 986 F.3d
759, 771 (7th Cir. 2021) (quotation marks, emphasis, and
alteration omitted).
Our analysis begins and ends at the second step. We
agree with the district judge that the Village had a rational
basis for every one of the decisions at issue in this case. We
can generalize the rationale supporting all of them: The
Village made each land-use and public-funding decision
based on taxpayer costs, commercial benefits, land-use
planning objectives, and other community needs. In other
words, the Village acted rationally and was guided by the
factors a municipal land-use and development body would
be expected to consider. Indeed, we have rejected similar
class-of-one claims in this context. See id. (finding a rational
basis where a city manager blocked a development incentive
that had been preliminarily approved because of concerns
about the plaintiff’s financial security and ability to complete

-- 15 of 19 --

16 No. 21-3237
the project); Srail v. Village of Lisle, 588 F.3d 940, 947–48 (7th
Cir. 2009) (approving cost concerns as a rational basis for a
municipality’s refusal to extend its water system to a subdi-
vision).
We begin with the Partnership’s proposed land division
of Chapman Farms. The Village’s requirements for final
approval of Towns-Pozorski’s certified survey map were
clearly rational. The access road to Highway 83 was im-
portant to future development in the area and traffic flow in
the adjacent Fairwinds subdivision. The road was also
necessary to ensure that the remnant portion of the
Chapman Farms property would not be landlocked after the
Partnership’s proposed purchase of the 4-acre plot. More
fundamentally, the Village’s request for a developer’s agree-
ment and surety was both required by the land-use ordi-
nance and necessary to ensure that the thoroughfare would
be constructed without public funds. This factor was particu-
larly important because the Partnership would not disclose
its development plans for the parcel, so the Village could not
expect that any public funds expended on street construction
would be offset by the financial benefits accruing from new
development. In short, the Village aimed to protect the
public treasury and to promote infrastructure improvements
important to the surrounding community’s development.
The Partnership counters that the Village’s subsequent
purchase of the parcel, construction of the road, and sale of
the land to Anderson call into question the legitimacy of
these justifications. We struggle to understand how the
Village’s later ownership and management of the lot informs
the analysis. The Village’s later conduct did not involve the
Partnership at all. To the extent the Partnership suggests that

-- 16 of 19 --

No. 21-3237 17
the Village’s later ownership and sale of the Chapman
property implies that the conditions on Towns-Pozorski’s
land-division application were arbitrary, it misunderstands
the deference of our inquiry. The conditions imposed on the
Partnership’s proposed purchase were easily justified by
ordinary development considerations. That suffices.
We turn next to the dispute over DeBack Drive. The Part-
nership’s allegations focus on the Village’s refusal to con-
struct its preferred north–south connection from Maple
Centre to East Wolf Run, but the Village had a rational basis
to favor DeBack Drive. The Partnership’s preferred route
lacked infrastructure like utility access and a sewage system.
It also provided a less direct connection between the pro-
posed Maple Centre development and East Wolf Run. By the
Village’s estimate, the construction expenses for that road
were several million dollars higher than DeBack Drive. The
Village offered to construct the northern extension in addi-
tion to DeBack Drive if the Partnership committed to a
developer’s agreement for the larger 47-acre parcel. Again,
the Village prioritized local taxpayers over the Partnership’s
preferences. It chose the most cost-effective option to connect
a proposed development to a nearby road and refused to
finance new infrastructure without the promise of an eco-
nomic return.
We turn next to the basket of additional adverse actions
affecting the Partnership or its properties. The Village re-
fused to take over the maintenance of Marshview Drive—
the private, unimproved roadway on the Partnership’s
property—without a developer’s agreement in place. It was
completely sensible to refuse to spend public funds without
the assurance of a return for taxpayers. The Village also

-- 17 of 19 --

18 No. 21-3237
declined to remove trees from one of the Partnership’s
properties when the governing developer’s agreement,
which laid out the parties’ respective obligations, did not
require it to do so. That too was reasonable.
The Village denied the Partnership’s request for tax-
incremental financing because no funding remained in the
relevant TIF district. We cannot conceive of a reason to
question the rationality of that justification. The Partnership
relies on an email from Weidl regarding possible tax-
incremental financing for a development in a different TIF
district but does not explain its relevance to the Village’s
decision regarding the district at issue here.
Finally, the Village imposed a special assessment on all
properties—including the Partnership’s—that benefitted
from the municipal improvements in Chapman Farms. It’s
common and completely reasonable for municipalities to
recoup some construction costs from property owners who
benefit from publicly funded improvements. The Partner-
ship counters that some of the assessed property straddles
the Town of Mukwonago and thus the Village lacked the
authority to levy a special assessment. But the final resolu-
tion authorizing the assessment states: “The special assess-
ments provided for hereunder shall be deferred until such
time as … [t]he property or portion thereof is within the
jurisdictional limits of the Village of Mukwonago.” (Emphasis
added.)
The Partnership colors its account of the Village’s actions
with repeated references to Weidl’s emails. But his commu-
nications ultimately do not matter. Every one of the Village’s
actions had ample justification, firmly grounded in the
legitimate governmental interests in promoting sound land-

-- 18 of 19 --

No. 21-3237 19
use objectives and protecting taxpayer funds. The Partner-
ship’s claim fails regardless of evidence of personal animus.
In sum, the Partnership failed to satisfy its burden to
negative any conceivable rational basis for the Village’s
actions. The Village safeguarded public funds by ensuring
that it would enjoy a financial return before committing to
constructing new infrastructure. And it advanced future
development in line with long-term planning goals. These
objectives may, at times, lead to outcomes that conflict with
those preferred by local landowners. This tension is under-
standable—likely inevitable—when the goals of an individ-
ual property owner conflict with what local government
believes is best for growth and development. The Partner-
ship is a disappointed landowner; it is not the victim of
unconstitutional discrimination.
A FFIRMED

-- 19 of 19 --