Rufus West v. John Kind

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted May 17, 2024*
Decided May 20, 2024
Before
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 23-3075
RUFUS WEST,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JOHN KIND, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin.
No. 22-cv-178-bhl
Brett H. Ludwig,
Judge.
O R D E R
Rufus West sued two Wisconsin correctional officers, alleging that they violated
his rights under the First, Fourth, and Eighth Amendments, as well as the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), when they strip-searched him at
his prison. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 2000cc-1. The district court entered summary judgment
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

-- 1 of 5 --

No. 23-3075 Page 2
for the officers. With respect to the constitutional claims, the court determined that no
reasonable jury could conclude that the search was unrelated to a legitimate
government interest; unreasonable in scope, manner, justification, or place; or intended
to punish him. As to the statutory claim, the court concluded that the search was lawful
because it was the least restrictive means to search for contraband. West, who prefers to
go by the name “Muslim Mansa Lutalo Iyapo,” or simply “Muslim,” appeals. But
because he fails to identify a dispute of material fact regarding the justification for the
strip search, we affirm.
We recount the following facts in the light most favorable to Muslim. See Kemp v.
Liebel, 877 F.3d 346, 350 (7th Cir. 2017). In September 2021, Muslim was a state prisoner
incarcerated at the Green Bay Correctional Institute. John Kind was the prison’s security
director at the time, and Michael Cole was a correctional lieutenant. On September 10,
Kind instructed Cole to have all bathhouse workers in the prison searched for any fabric
dye in their possession illicitly. Because Muslim worked in the bathhouse, he was strip
searched by a correctional officer at Cole’s direction. The search occurred in a shower
stall without physical contact or a body-cavity search. Muslim was instructed to remove
all his clothes and manipulate his body parts, such as raising his arms, lifting his
genitals, turning around, and squatting, so the officer could visually inspect him.
Muslim practices Islam, and exposing his naked body conflicted with his religious belief
that he should not be naked in front of anyone other than his wife. Nevertheless,
Muslim complied with the search because he did not want the officer to use force, nor
did he want to face discipline for disobeying the officer. Ultimately, the officers
discovered no dye after searching the workers and their cells.
According to Kind’s declaration, he ordered the searches because he considered
linens that were dyed the wrong color to be a security threat. Before September 10, Kind
had noticed that gray-colored linens were circulating within the prison and became
concerned that someone was dyeing linens to match the color of staff clothing—
possibly to impersonate a staff member and escape the facility. (The linens should have
been white or orange only.) Kind was also aware that blue-colored dye had been
confiscated from a cell a few months earlier, putting him on “high alert” to the
possibility that dye was circulating as contraband. (In addition to posing a potential
security risk, dyeing the linens would violate Wisconsin law prohibiting the alteration
of state property.) Kind believed that a bathhouse worker may have been responsible
because linens are inventoried and stored in the bathhouse. Sometime after the
searches, Kind learned that the linens were sent off-site to be cleaned and dyed.

-- 2 of 5 --

No. 23-3075 Page 3
Muslim filed an inmate grievance about the strip search. He stated that the
search was unjustified, conducted to harass and humiliate him, and violated his
religious expression. The complaint examiner dismissed Muslim’s grievance, writing
that the workers were searched “because some dye was missing from the bathhouse,”
and strip searches are permitted under the direction of supervisors. Muslim appealed,
reiterating that the search was unjustified and arguing that dye has never been kept in
the bathhouse and therefore could not have gone missing. His appeal was dismissed
because the search was directed by a supervisor in accordance with prison policy.
Having exhausted his administrative remedies, Muslim filed this lawsuit. The
district court screened his complaint and determined that he could proceed on Fourth
and Eighth Amendment claims that the strip search was unreasonable or constituted
excessive punishment. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court also allowed Muslim to proceed
on a claim that the officers burdened his religious expression without a legitimate
justification, in violation of his rights under the First Amendment and RLUIPA. See id.;
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1.
The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. Muslim argued that at
the time of the search, Kind knew of Muslim’s religious beliefs and knew that the linens
were dyed at an outside location. Muslim pointed out that prior lawsuits alerted Kind
to his religious beliefs and that Kind had been copied on an email (sent eight days
before the strip search) that referenced off-site dyeing. Because Kind should have
known that the bathhouse workers were not dyeing the linens, Muslim inferred that
Kind ordered the strip search to humiliate him or harass him based on his religion.
Meanwhile, Kind maintained that he did not know about the off-site dyeing until after
the strip search and that, once he learned about it, he immediately took action to
remedy the incorrect dyeing. Kind and Cole further argued that the search was
conducted in a reasonable manner, there was no evidence of an intent to punish
Muslim, and there was a legitimate security reason for the search.
The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants on each of
Muslim’s claims. It determined that his Fourth Amendment claim failed because the
search was conducted reasonably: The officers limited the scope of the search to
bathhouse workers believed to have had access to dye; the search occurred in a private
shower stall; and the search was justified by legitimate security concerns. The court
explained that Kind’s mistaken belief about where the linens were dyed did not
undermine the reasonableness of the search. Furthermore, Kind’s ignorance of an email
referencing the prison’s procedure for off-site dyeing did not support an inference that

-- 3 of 5 --

No. 23-3075 Page 4
he intended to humiliate or harass Muslim. For these reasons, the court also determined
that Muslim’s Eighth Amendment claim—which requires evidence that the defendants
subjectively intended the search to be punitive—could not succeed. And Muslim’s
religious expression claims failed, the court continued, because the search was
reasonably related to a legitimate government interest, and it was the least restrictive
means for searching for the suspected contraband.
Muslim now appeals, and we review the summary judgment ruling de novo.
Henry v. Hulett, 969 F.3d 769, 776 (7th Cir. 2020) (en banc). Muslim first argues that he
sufficiently supported his Fourth and Eighth Amendment claims, insisting that the
district court wrongly allowed Kind and Cole to present evidence that the search was
justified because of a security concern. Muslim points out that during the grievance
process, he was told that the search was conducted because “some dye was missing
from the bathhouse,” which is inconsistent with the officers’ testimony that the search
was conducted because they believed workers were impermissibly dyeing linens and
possibly enabling an escape. In Muslim’s view, exhaustion requirements for prisoner
litigation prevented the officers from presenting an explanation for the search at
summary judgment that differed from the grievance response, and he argues that the
inconsistent justification raises a dispute of material fact about the officers’ motives.
But the difference between the explanation offered in the grievance response and
the officers’ court filings is immaterial. Although the Prison Litigation Reform Act
requires plaintiffs to exhaust administrative remedies and provide notice of their claims
before filing a lawsuit, it places no obligations on potential defendants. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e; Schillinger v. Kiley, 954 F.3d 990, 995 (7th Cir. 2020) (explaining exhaustion
requirements imposed on prisoners). The responses Muslim received during the
administrative review of his grievances did not estop Kind and Cole from raising
arguments or presenting evidence to defend against the claims brought in court.
For similar reasons, the divergent rationales for the search do not create a dispute
of material fact on the reason for the search: Kind and Cole did not respond to Muslim’s
grievance. The complaint examiner might have misunderstood the rationale or heard
something inaccurate, but there is no evidence that Cole or Kind was responsible for the
answer that Muslim received. Instead, the undisputed evidence shows that Kind
believed a bathhouse worker possessed dye, which posed a security risk within the
prison. Based on this belief, it was reasonable to strip-search the bathhouse workers, see
Henry, 969 F.3d at 783 (citing Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318 (2012)),
and was not a form of punishment, see Whitman v. Nesic, 368 F.3d 931, 934–35 (7th Cir.

-- 4 of 5 --

No. 23-3075 Page 5
2004). Kind’s mistake about where the dyeing occurred, even if he should have known
better, does not itself establish a constitutional violation. See generally Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994) (more than negligence is required for Eighth Amendment
claims); Balle v. Kennedy, 73 F.4th 545, 555 (7th Cir. 2023) (no constitutional liability if
defendant “should have” perceived risk). And Muslim’s speculation that Kind intended
to harass him is insufficient to create a dispute of material fact; he had no admissible
evidence that Kind was hostile to his religion. See Giles v. Godinez, 914 F.3d 1040, 1048
(7th Cir. 2019). Accordingly, the district court was right to enter summary judgment for
the defendants on Muslim’s Fourth and Eighth Amendment claims.
Muslim next argues that the district court erred by ruling on the merits of his
First Amendment claim when the officers raised only a qualified immunity defense. But
he is mistaken–the officers argued that they were entitled to summary judgment on the
merits and qualified immunity. And by neglecting to engage with the district court’s
substantive reasoning, Muslim has waived any challenge to the decision on this claim.
See F ED. R. A PP . P. 28(a)(8); Atkins v. Gilbert, 52 F.4th 359, 361 (7th Cir. 2022).
Finally, Muslim contends that the defendants were not entitled to judgment on
his RLUIPA claim because the evidence showed that he could not have been in
possession of dye, which was never stored in the bathhouse. The defendants point out,
however, that this issue is now moot. Only declaratory and injunctive relief are
available under RLUIPA, but Muslim was released from prison in January 2024,
rendering it impossible for a court to grant any prospective relief. See Grayson v. Schuler,
666 F.3d 450, 451 (7th Cir. 2012).
AFFIRMED

-- 5 of 5 --