Ebone Porch v. University of Illinois at Chicago School of Medicine

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted May 17, 2024*
Decided May 21, 2024
Before
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 23-2529
EBONE PORCH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT
CHICAGO SCHOOL OF MEDICINE,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northen District of Illinois,
Eastern Division.
No. 21-cv-3848
Steven C. Seeger,
Judge.
O R D E R
Ebone Porch appeals the denial of leave to amend her complaint against the
University of Illinois at Chicago School of Medicine (“UIC”), in which she alleged that
the school discriminated against her by failing to accommodate her disabilities,
resulting in her dismissal from the program. But the district court correctly concluded
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. See FED. R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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No. 23-2529 Page 2
that the proposed amended complaint did not state a claim against UIC. In any event,
amendment would be futile because the suit was untimely; therefore, we affirm.
Porch lives with multiple disabilities, including Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity
Disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and learning disabilities, which require that she
have extra time when taking tests. In October 2018, Porch was re-admitted to the UIC
School of Medicine (the reasons for her initial dismissal are unclear from the record).
UIC told Porch that, to remain in the program, she would have to take and pass Step
One of the United States Medical Licensing Examination by April 6, 2019. This exam is
administered by the National Board of Medical Examiners (the “Board”).
Following UIC’s practices as set forth in the student handbook, Porch emailed
administrators requesting help obtaining accommodations from the Board for the exam.
A month later (five months before UIC’s deadline for Porch taking the exam),
administrators responded that they could not help because the request process takes six
months to complete. Porch took the exam without accommodations in March 2019 and
failed. She was dismissed from the medical school on April 26, 2019.
Porch, who was represented by counsel, filed a complaint against UIC on July 20,
2021, alleging that the school discriminated against her when it failed to reasonably
accommodate her disability in connection with the Step One exam, violating the
Americans with Disabilities Act, Rehabilitation Act, and Illinois Human Rights Act.
(She also sued the school under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for constitutional violations but later
conceded that the school was not a “person” subject to suit under that statute.) She
sought damages, reinstatement to the medical school, and future accommodations.
The district court granted the school’s motion to dismiss the complaint under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Accepting UIC’s argument, the court
concluded that Porch brought her ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims against the
wrong party because, as even the complaint acknowledged, the Board, not the school,
administered the exam and was responsible for providing accommodations such as
extra time. The court also observed that the school’s argument that Porch brought her
complaint after the statute of limitations had expired was “strong,” but it did not decide
the issue. As to the claim under the Illinois Human Rights Act, the court determined
that Porch had not exhausted administrative remedies. The court dismissed the
complaint without prejudice and gave Porch leave to file an amended complaint, but it
explained that the dismissal would convert to be with prejudice if she did not file an
amended complaint or if her amended complaint was dismissed.

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No. 23-2529 Page 3
Porch requested leave to amend her complaint and submitted a proposed
amended complaint containing only the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims. She once
again alleged that UIC harmed her by not providing her with accommodations and still
did not explain why the school was responsible even though it did not administer the
exam. Only in her reply brief supporting the motion for leave to amend did Porch
explain the connection: The accommodations process required students to first work
with the school to create an “accommodations packet” to send to the Board. In Porch’s
view, the school discriminated against her by failing to perform a necessary step in her
request to the Board, not for failing to provide accommodations at the exam. Porch also
asserted that UIC, not the Board, set the date for her to pass the Step One exam, and
that this date, though arbitrary, gave UIC a reason not to assist her with an
accommodations packet.
The district court declined to accept the amended complaint, concluding that
amendment was futile because Porch was still suing the wrong party. The court
acknowledged that Porch better explained the theory of her case in her reply brief but
concluded that she “waived” the point by omitting it from the proposed amended
complaint. The court then dismissed the case with prejudice and entered judgment.
Still represented by counsel, Porch filed a timely motion to alter or amend the
judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), which she later supplemented.
She argued that the court made a mistake of fact about the school’s responsibility for
her injuries and that she was entitled to another chance to amend her complaint. The
court denied relief, concluding that Porch’s explanation of UIC’s role in seeking
accommodations for the exam was simply “reheat[ing] arguments that received a cold
reception the first time,” not alleging new facts showing that UIC was a proper
defendant. In the meantime, the court also held a protracted inquiry into Porch’s
attorney over the combative and accusatory tone of the Rule 59(e) motion and the
attorney’s history of unprofessional conduct in the Northern District of Illinois.
Now representing herself on appeal, Porch insists that her proposed amended
complaint showed that she sued the correct party, and therefore the court should have
accepted it or, after finally understanding her theory, allowed her to amend her
complaint a second time to clarify further. She says that UIC discriminated against her
by not helping her obtain accommodations from the Board for the Step One exam,
despite requiring students to go through the school to seek such accommodations. She
also says the school’s excuse for not helping—that there was not enough time—was
illegitimate because the school intentionally gave her less than six months to pass the

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exam, knowing that she needed at least that much time to obtain accommodations, and
then ignored her request for help with an accommodations packet for a month. We
review denials of leave to amend for abuse of discretion while giving plenary review to
the issue of whether amendment would be futile. Runnion ex rel. Runnion v. Girl Scouts of
Greater Chi. & Nw. Ind., 786 F.3d 510, 524 (7th Cir. 2015).
The district court correctly rejected Porch’s amended complaint because, despite
the explanation in the first dismissal order, the new pleading did not include allegations
making it plausible that UIC bore responsibility for students’ accommodations at Board
exams. The proposed amended complaint reiterated that UIC discriminated against
Porch on account of her disability “by denying Plaintiff testing accommodations” and
“fail[ing] to provide Plaintiff with testing accommodations.” Nowhere did it suggest
that UIC had a role in a student’s pursuit of accommodations for an exam created and
administered by the Board, such as by asserting that UIC requires students to funnel
such requests through the school. Given Porch’s belated explanation of her theory in the
reply brief, the court could have allowed further amendment, but it did not abuse its
discretion when it had explained what was wrong with the initial complaint and had
already provided one opportunity to amend, especially because Porch was represented
by counsel. See Airborne Beepers & Video, Inc. v. AT & T Mobility LLC, 499 F.3d 663, 666
(7th Cir. 2007) (denial of leave to amend appropriate when counseled plaintiff
repeatedly failed to fix deficiencies in complaint).
And even if the district court had given Porch one more chance to amend her
complaint to clarify UIC’s role, amendment would have been futile for another reason:
Porch’s initial complaint was filed after the statute of limitations had run. See King v.
One Unknown Fed. Corr. Officer, 201 F.3d 910, 914 (7th Cir. 2000) (amendment futile if
claims are time-barred). UIC raised this affirmative defense, which the district court
deemed “strong,” and the school continues to advance it on appeal. Illinois’ two-year
statute of limitations for personal injury suits applies to suits under the ADA and
Rehabilitation Act. See Soignier v. Am. Bd. of Plastic Surgery, 92 F.3d 547, 550–51 (7th Cir.
1996) (ADA); Rutledge v. Ill. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 785 F.3d 258, 260 (7th Cir. 2015)
(Rehabilitation Act). The statute of limitations for these claims begins to run when the
injured party discovers the discriminatory act. Soignier, 92 F.3d at 551–52. For Porch, the
latest she could have discovered the school’s allegedly discriminatory conduct was
when she was dismissed on April 26, 2019. Porch filed her initial complaint on July 20,
2021—two months late. It was untimely even if UIC was the correct defendant.

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Porch argues that the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled because her
counsel was ineffective. She explains that she hired and paid her attorney 18 months
before the statute of limitations ran out, so her attorney was at fault for the delayed
filing. But equitable tolling would apply only if the defendants misled her into filing late
or if extraordinary circumstances prevented her from filing on time. See Rosado v.
Gonzalez, 832 F.3d 714, 717 (7th Cir. 2016). The actions or inactions of Porch’s attorney
do not qualify as extraordinary circumstances. See Arteaga v. United States, 711 F.3d 828,
835 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Equitable tolling cannot be premised on the incompetence of the
plaintiff’s lawyer.”); Hinterberger v. City of Indianapolis, 966 F.3d 523, 529 (7th Cir. 2020)
(“[A]ttorneys’ actions are imputed to their clients, even when those actions cause
substantial harm.”). Further, to the extent that Porch is arguing for other relief because
of ineffective assistance of counsel, she had no right to effective assistance of counsel in
a civil case, so counsel’s performance cannot be grounds for reversing. See Stanciel v.
Gramley, 267 F.3d 575, 581 (7th Cir. 2001). The proper way to pursue this issue is
through private remedies under state law, which Porch appears to have initiated. See id.
AFFIRMED

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