Jimmie Lee Culley, Jr. v. Rodney Miller

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted May 28, 2024 *
Decided May 29, 2024
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
No. 22-3197
JIMMIE LEE CULLEY, JR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
RODNEY MILLER, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Indiana, Evansville Division.
No. 3:19-cv-00023-MPB-SEB
Matthew P. Brookman,
Judge.
O R D E R
Jimmie Culley sued sheriff’s deputies, alleging that they violated his
constitutional rights by using excessive force during his arrest. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A
magistrate judge, presiding with the parties’ consent under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), entered
summary judgment for the defendants. Culley appeals, challenging the ruling that the
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. FED. R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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No. 22-3197 Page 2
deputies were entitled to qualified immunity on the excessive-force claim. Because the
deputies did not violate a clearly established right, we affirm.
In reviewing the adverse summary-judgment decision, we recite the facts most
favorably to Culley. See Wonsey v. City of Chicago, 940 F.3d 394, 399 (7th Cir. 2019). When
the arrest occurred, Culley lived with his brother, Scott, who had called the police on
March 10, 2018, to complain that Culley shoved him during a dispute and he “didn’t
want anything else to escalate.” Deputies Matthew Gardner and Logan Osborne of the
Sheriff’s Office of Vanderburgh County, Indiana, responded. They first talked to Scott,
who reported Culley’s physical aggression, and then knocked on Culley’s bedroom
door. When Culley opened the door, he had a drink in his hand and seemed intoxicated
to Gardner and Osborne, who feared that he might be unpredictable and dangerous as a
result. Gardner grabbed Culley’s right arm to arrest him. Culley told them that, because
of a previous shoulder injury, he could not be cuffed behind his back, and he “lunged”
at them. When a dog in the home then jumped on Osborne’s leg, the deputies took
Culley to the garage. One of the deputies turned Culley toward a wall and pushed him
to the ground, which produced cuts on Culley’s wrists. The deputies then picked him
up, cuffed him, and shoved him in a police car. Other officers came to the scene to
administer a breath test (revealing a blood-alcohol level of 0.13) and to review the use of
force, which they deemed proper. After his arrest, Culley spent two days in the local
jail, where staff allegedly ignored his requests for medical treatment.
Culley later pleaded guilty to domestic battery and resisting arrest. He admitted
that he “knowingly and forcibly resisted law enforcement officers” while those officers
were lawfully engaged in their duties and that he “lunged forward” when the deputies
were arresting him. He received a one-year suspended sentence.
After Culley sued the two deputies and others, the defendants moved for
summary judgment. The magistrate judge (who has since become a district judge)
entered summary judgment for Gardner and Osborn, ruling that they were entitled to
qualified immunity on the excessive-force claim. The judge dismissed the claims against
the other defendants because they were not personally involved in Culley’s arrest or
medical care at the jail.
On appeal, Culley contests only the excessive-force ruling, which we review de
novo. See Humphries v. Milwaukee County, 702 F.3d 1003, 1006 (7th Cir. 2012). Culley
contends that the deputies violated a clearly established right by shoving him to the
ground despite his shoulder injury. Public officials are immune from § 1983 suits unless

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No. 22-3197 Page 3
“(1) they violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of
their conduct was ‘clearly established at the time.’” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583
U.S. 48, 62–63 (2018) (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)). To be clearly
established, the law must be “sufficiently clear” such that “every ‘reasonable official
would understand that what he is doing’ is unlawful.” Wesby, 583. U.S. at 63 (quoting
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)). We can address the second prong first,
see Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009), and do so here because it is dispositive.
When defendants raise the defense of qualified immunity, the plaintiff must
identify a legal decision showing that the claimed right as applied to the plaintiff’s case
was clearly established, see Humphries, 702 F.3d at 1006; Culley points us to none. He
cites Clash v. Beatty, 77 F.3d 1045, 1048 (7th Cir. 1996), which states that “officers do not
have the right to shove, push, or otherwise assault innocent citizens without any
provocation whatsoever.” But Culley was not an innocent and unprovoked citizen.
When the deputies encountered him, he appeared intoxicated; they reasonably feared
that he might become dangerous, and he became so when, as Culley later admitted in
state court, he lunged at them and resisted arrest before they pushed him to the ground.
“Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a
judge’s chambers,” violates the Fourth Amendment. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396
(1989) (citation omitted). We recognize that officers may not respond to the wrongdoing
of resisting arrest by meting out punishment “on the spot” with “fists or weapons.”
Gilbert v. Cook, 512 F.3d 899, 901 (7th Cir. 2008). They may, however, “use force
reasonably necessary to subdue an aggressor.” Id. And Culley has cited no case
suggesting that the shove to the ground—after he lunged at the police and resisted
arrest despite his declared shoulder injury—was not a reasonable effort to subdue him.
Because he has not shown a violation of a clearly established Fourth Amendment right,
summary judgment was proper.
AFFIRMED

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