Christiana Powell v. U.s. Bank National Association

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted August 14, 2024*
Decided August 14, 2024
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
No. 23-2573
CHRISTIANA POWELL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
U.S. BANK NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:22-cv-05389
Sharon Johnson Coleman,
Judge.
O R D E R
After a state court entered a foreclosure judgment and approved the sale of
Christiana Powell’s home, she sued U.S. Bank National Association, seeking to
challenge the foreclosure ruling as erroneous because the bank allegedly ignored certain
* We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the briefs
and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would
not significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 23-2573 Page 2
federal regulations. The district court dismissed Powell’s case based on the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine. That doctrine bars federal district courts from hearing cases brought
by state-court losers who complain of injuries caused by state-court judgments and seek
review and rejection of those judgments. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,
544 U.S. 280, 283–84 (2005) (citing Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Ct. of
Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983)). The district court explained that it lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction to vacate the foreclosure judgment that Powell believed the
bank had improperly obtained.
On appeal, Powell has filed a brief that does not engage the district court’s
reasoning. The brief, which appears to be a lightly edited version of her complaint, does
not even mention the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Powell belatedly addresses Rooker-
Feldman in her reply brief, but arguments raised for the first time in reply are waived.
See White v. United States, 8 F.4th 547, 552 (7th Cir. 2021). In any event, her late argument
is both incorrect and nonresponsive. She contends that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does
not apply because federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over claims, like hers,
asserting violations of federal law. But state courts have concurrent jurisdiction to
adjudicate such claims. See, e.g., Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458–59 (1990). More
problematically, like her opening brief, her reply brief does not address the district
court’s rationale that, under Rooker-Feldman, the court may not adjudicate claims about
injuries allegedly caused by erroneous state-court judgments. We are mindful of
Powell’s pro se status, Anderson v. Hardman, 241 F.3d 544, 545–46 (7th Cir. 2001), but she
is still required to comply with Rule 28(a)(8) of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure. That Rule requires Powell to include an argument in her opening brief
explaining why the district court’s rationale is incorrect. Id.; F ED. R. APP . P. 28(a)(8). She
fails to do that in both her opening and reply, and therefore we dismiss her appeal.
DISMISSED

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