Robert W. Goldsmith v. James Garrett

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted August 14, 2024 *
Decided August 15, 2024
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
No. 24-1234
ROBERT W. GOLDSMITH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JAMES GARRETT, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division.
No. 23 C 14429
LaShonda A. Hunt,
Judge.
O R D E R
Robert Goldsmith appeals the dismissal of his complaint asserting that his parole
officer and various employees of the Illinois Department of Corrections and Illinois
* The defendants-appellees were not served with process and are not
participating in this appeal. We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument
because the brief and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral
argument would not significantly aid the court. See FED. R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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No. 24-1234 Page 2
Prisoner Review Board violated his constitutional rights. But Goldsmith’s suit is barred
by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994), and so we affirm.
We credit the facts alleged in Goldsmith’s complaint for the purpose of
reviewing a dismissal on the pleadings. See Courtney v. Butler, 66 F.4th 1043, 1046
(7th Cir. 2023). Goldsmith was sentenced to four years of mandatory supervised release
to begin after his prison sentence for state convictions that are not relevant to this
appeal. After leaving prison, Goldsmith joined a local Masonic lodge, which also had
some employees of the Department among its members. One was Jason Garrett, and
Goldsmith says that Garrett immediately disliked him. At some point, Goldsmith was
removed from the Freemasons, and Goldsmith believes that Garrett’s “influence and
clout as an officer of the Freemason’s Lodge” was the sole reason for his removal.
Goldsmith also believes that Garrett used his influence within the Department to
have certain conditions of Goldsmith’s supervised release altered. Goldsmith was
required to wear an electronic monitor for what his parole officer said would be a
“short period of time.” After over a year, however, it had not been removed, and his
parole officer (not named in this lawsuit) told Goldsmith that somebody “high up” in
the Department who was connected to the Freemasons would not approve its removal.
The monitor was eventually removed after about a year.
A few months later, however, Goldsmith saw a different Department employee
he knew from the Freemasons at a car show held near the lodge. Goldsmith complained
to him about his belief that Garrett had caused his removal from the Freemasons.
Goldsmith learned later that this acquaintance interpreted his statement as a threat and
reported it to his parole officer. The next day, Goldsmith’s new parole officer, Sheldon
Magee, told Goldsmith that he was barred from communicating with Garrett, making
derogatory statements about Garrett, and visiting the Masonic lodge for the remainder
of his parole. Magee later put these instructions in writing as conditions of parole.
Goldsmith was also placed back on electronic monitoring.
In the meantime, Goldsmith had filed three petitions with the Prisoner Review
Board. First, when he had the electronic monitor the first time, he asked the Board to
remove it. Second, shortly after the incident where he spoke poorly of Garrett, he
petitioned the Board to end his supervised release early. Third, he requested that he not
be placed back on electronic monitoring after that incident. The Board granted his first
petition but never informed him of its decision, and it did not respond to the other two
petitions. Goldsmith also never received a hearing to consider early termination of his
supervised release.

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No. 24-1234 Page 3
Based on these facts, Goldsmith filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. §1983. He first
asserted that Magee, his parole officer, violated his right to free speech and freedom of
association by barring him from speaking negatively about Garrett or visiting the area
around the Freemason lodge. Second, he stated that the Board violated his right to
petition the government by not responding to his petitions and not granting him early
termination of supervised release. Finally, Goldsmith claimed that, because of a
personal vendetta, Garrett conspired with Magee, the Board, and others to violate his
constitutional rights by reinstating his electronic monitor and preventing the early
termination of his supervised release.
The district court dismissed the complaint under 28 U.S.C. §1915A, concluding
that Goldsmith’s claims were barred under Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–87, and that he could
challenge his conditions of supervised release only under 28 U.S.C. §2254. Goldsmith
then moved to alter or amend the judgment, see FED. R. C IV. P. 59(e), arguing that Heck
did not bar his claim because he intended to challenge only the procedures by which his
conditions were created, not the conditions themselves, and that habeas relief would
soon be unavailable to him because his supervised release would end imminently. The
district court denied the motion.
On appeal, Goldsmith insists that Heck does not preclude his claims. The rule of
Heck bars litigants from suing under §1983 if relief would necessarily imply the
invalidity of a criminal conviction or sentence that remains in force. 512 U.S. at 487.
Goldsmith provides three reasons why he believes his claims survive Heck: First, he
does not challenge the validity of his underlying conviction; second, he wishes to
challenge the tainted procedures that resulted in certain conditions of supervised
release, not the conditions themselves; and third, his term of supervised release has
ended, so he has no remedy under §2254. We review the dismissal of the complaint
under §1915A de novo. See Courtney, 66 F.4th at 1046.
None of Goldsmith’s arguments carries the day. First, it does not matter that
Goldsmith is not seeking to vacate his criminal conviction because Heck applies when
the requested relief would invalidate a criminal sentence as well. 512 U.S. at 487. And
we have repeatedly stated that the conditions of supervised release are part of a
person’s sentence. See Tobey v. Chibucos, 890 F.3d 634, 651 (7th Cir. 2018); Williams v.
Wisconsin, 336 F.3d 576, 579–80 (7th Cir. 2003). Goldsmith’s complaint plainly asserts
that the defendants subjected him to improper conditions. As the district court
explained, therefore, the only way for Goldsmith to challenge their actions is under
§2254 (because parole is a form of state custody). See Tobey, 890 F.3d at 651.

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No. 24-1234 Page 4
Second, Goldsmith’s challenge to allegedly unconstitutional procedures that led
to certain parole conditions does not, as he contends, meaningfully differ from a
challenge to the conditions. The theory that unconstitutional procedures led to the
additional conditions (based on the statements about Garrett), electric monitoring, or
failure to obtain early termination of supervised release cannot be reconciled with the
validity of those conditions or the length of supervised release. See Wilkinson v. Dotson,
544 U.S. 74, 81 (2005) (“[A] prisoner cannot use §1983 to obtain damages where success
would necessarily imply the unlawfulness of a (not previously invalidated) conviction or
sentence.”); Courtney, 66 F.4th at 1050.
Finally, the expiration of his custody does not allow Goldsmith to avoid Heck.
Although several Justices, and at least one court of appeals, have concluded that a claim
under §1983 accrues when custody ends—see Heck, 512 U.S. at 491–503 (Souter, J.,
concurring, joined by Blackmun, Stevens & O’Connor, JJ.); Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1,
21–22 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., concurring); Leather v. Eyck, 180 F.3d 420, 424 (2d Cir. 1999)—
this court held in Savory v. Cannon, 947 F.3d 409 (7th Cir. 2020) (en banc), that the rule
of Heck continues to apply after a person’s release from custody unless the judgment
has been set aside by a pardon or equivalent relief. Goldsmith does not contend that his
term of supervised release, or any of its conditions, has been set aside by the state’s
judiciary or by a pardon. He could have sought relief under §2254 while his supervision
lasted yet did not do so.
AFFIRMED

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