Michael Koumjian v. CHARLES LEE MUDD, JR. and MUDD LAW OFFICES P.C.

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted August 28, 2024 *
Decided August 29, 2024
Before
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
No. 23-3393
MICHAEL KOUMJIAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CHARLES LEE MUDD, JR. and MUDD
LAW OFFICES P.C.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 21 CV 3455
Lindsay C. Jenkins,
Judge.
O R D E R
Michael Koumjian sued his former lawyer, Charles Mudd, and Mudd’s law firm
for legal malpractice. The district court initially denied Mudd’s motion for summary
judgment, but after reconsideration it granted the motion. Because, on reconsideration,
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. FED. R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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the district court correctly recognized that Koumjian needed to present evidence from
an expert witness to support his claim, but failed to do so, we affirm.
We construe the record in the light most favorable to Koumjian, the nonmovant
at summary judgment. Adebiyi v. S. Suburban Coll., 98 F.4th 886, 891 (7th Cir. 2024). In
September 2018, Koumjian retained Mudd to represent him regarding defamation he
alleges he experienced at his former employer, ExpressJet Airlines, which had fired him
two months earlier, after a brief probationary employment. Koumjian asserts that he
wanted to pursue a wrongful-discharge claim. He talked with attorneys at Mudd’s firm,
and by March 2019, Mudd had drafted a complaint against ExpressJet. The draft
outlined three claims—defamation, false light, and tortious interference with a business
expectation—but it noted significant gaps where more information was needed in order
to sue. Koumjian asserts that, after Mudd drafted the complaint, he let the case
languish. Mudd attests that Koumjian refused to provide him with evidence that he
requested to support the draft’s allegations against ExpressJet. This dearth of evidence
led Mudd to conclude that he could not file the complaint for Koumjian.
Over a year later, on April 22, 2020, Mudd ended the representation. The
termination letter stated that Koumjian had “previously indicated [he] did not have the
funds to proceed forward with litigation” and that the law firm had “not heard from
[him] in some time.” The letter also advised Koumjian that the statute of limitations on
a tortious-interference claim would expire in a week, on April 30, and that he had to file
a complaint on his own to preserve this claim. Koumjian believes that, by this time, the
statute of limitations had expired on all his potential claims against ExpressJet.
Koumjian’s next step was this suit under diversity jurisdiction against Mudd for
legal malpractice. He principally contends that Mudd negligently failed to pursue a
wrongful-discharge claim before the limitations period expired. Mudd moved for
summary judgment. As relevant on appeal, he argued that Koumjian’s claim failed
because he lacked an expert asserting that Mudd had breached the standard of care.
Initially, the district court denied the motion. It accepted Koumjian’s stance that Mudd
had to show that the “common knowledge” exception to the rule requiring that a
malpractice plaintiff supply a standard-of-care expert did not apply, and it rejected
Mudd’s assertion that he met the standard of care as too conclusory. Mudd moved for
reconsideration. He argued that the common-knowledge exception did not apply
because Koumjian needed an expert to explain how a reasonable lawyer would evaluate
whether to file Koumjian’s suit. The court granted Mudd’s motion and entered
summary judgment in his favor. It reasoned that, although no expert needs to explain

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that a lawyer must file a worthwhile suit before the limitations period expires,
Koumjian needed an expert to state that his wrongful-discharge claim was worth filing.
On appeal, Koumjian contests the adverse summary judgment, which we review
de novo. Adebiyi, 98 F.4th at 891. Under Illinois law, which the parties agree applies, a
plaintiff in a legal-malpractice case must generally present an expert to establish the
professional standard of care; failing to do so “is usually fatal” to a malpractice claim.
Barth v. Reagan, 564 N.E.2d 1196, 1200 (Ill. 1990). The only exception is for cases in which
“the common knowledge or experience of lay persons is extensive enough to recognize
or infer negligence from the facts, or where an attorney’s negligence is so grossly
apparent that a lay person would have no difficulty in appraising it.” Id. Thus, to
survive summary judgment on the claim that Mudd negligently lost Koumjian’s
wrongful-discharge suit, Koumjian must furnish evidence from which a layperson can
infer Mudd carelessly ignored a winnable lawsuit. See Hassebrock v. Bernhoft, 815 F.3d
334, 342 (7th Cir. 2016); FED. R. C IV. P. 56.
Koumjian correctly but irrelevantly observes that Illinois courts have applied the
common-knowledge exception to some cases involving lawyers who miss filing
deadlines. See House v. Maddox, 360 N.E.2d 580, 584 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977). The exception
applies only if the defendant’s fault in letting the limitations period lapse is “apparent
and undisputed.” Ball v. Kotter, 723 F.3d 813, 822 (7th Cir. 2013). Mudd, however,
disputes whether he is at fault: He attests that he did not simply disregard a deadline to
file a worthy suit; rather, he exercised professional judgment by refraining from filing a
suit that lacked supporting evidence. See Hassebrock, 815 F.3d at 342. Koumjian did not
rebut this evidence, arguing instead that a lawyer breaches professional duties by
refraining from filing a suit that lacks evidence. But an expert must opine on matters of
professional skill or judgment, see Ball, 723 F.3d at 822–24, and Koumjian did not
present one. So rendering summary judgment against him was proper.
Koumjian also observes under Illinois law expert testimony is not needed when a
lawyer “fails to take any action whatsoever” on a case for which the lawyer has been
retained. See Fox v. Seiden, 53 N.E.3d 1005, 1013 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016). But that is not the
situation here either: Mudd drafted a complaint. He identified where it needed shoring
up. Then, after not hearing from Koumjian for over a year, he notified Koumjian that he
was ending the relationship. And even then, Mudd advised him how to proceed on his
own. This is not evidence of failing “to take any action whatsoever.”
Koumjian replies that the district court should not have required him to present
an expert for another reason—experts he contacted would not work with unrepresented

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litigants, and the court had denied his requests to recruit counsel for him. This
argument fails for two reasons. First, Koumjian did not specify or quantify to the court
the experts who refused to work with him; thus, it was impossible for the court to
evaluate the scope of this asserted obstacle. Second, to the extent Koumjian challenges
the district court’s decision refusing to recruit counsel, the court did not abuse its
discretion See Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 658 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc). The court
reasonably did not want to recruit an attorney who might face the same ethical conflict
that an attorney whom Koumjian had retained earlier in the case had faced. That
attorney withdrew because he feared that continuing to represent Koumjian would
force him to violate the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct. The court also reasonably
ruled that Koumjian was competent to manage the demands of this case because he had
a post-graduate education and did not assert any mental disability.
Finally, Koumjian argues that the district court abused its discretion in
reconsidering the denial of summary judgment because Mudd presented no new facts.
But a court’s order “may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment,” F ED. R.
C IV. P. 54(b), and a court’s discretion to reconsider an order under Rule 54(b) is
“sweeping,” Galvan v. Norberg, 678 F.3d 581, 587 n.3 (7th Cir. 2012). The district court
here had not yet entered judgment. Thus, it was free to revise its order, and as
explained above, it did so properly.
AFFIRMED

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