Jamaal Charles v. Deanna Brookhart

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted September 20, 2024*
Decided September 20, 2024
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
No. 23-1911
JAMAAL CHARLES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
DEANNA BROOKHART, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Illinois.
No. 23-cv-422-MAB
Mark A. Beatty,
Magistrate Judge.
* The appellees were not served with process and are not participating in this
appeal. We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 23-1911 Page 2
O R D E R
Jamaal Charles, an Illinois prisoner, appeals the judgment dismissing his action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that challenged the constitutionality of his prison disciplinary
proceedings. The district court dismissed the complaint for failing to state a claim
because the discipline he received—demotion of status and restrictions on visitation
privileges—did not deprive him of a constitutionally protected liberty interest. For the
same reason, we affirm.
We construe Charles’s pro se complaint liberally and assume the truth of his
allegations, as supplemented by prison records he attached. See Otis v. Demarasse,
886 F.3d 639, 644 (7th Cir. 2018). This case involves two disciplinary proceedings against
Charles. The first proceeding, in May 2021, concerned a charge that he had violated
prison rules by possessing alcohol in his cell. Two officers, Shanae Gillenwater and
Darren Williams, conducted a hearing on the charge, found Charles guilty, and
recommended that he receive a 3-month demotion to C-Grade status (which involves
restrictions on phone privileges, commissary visits, work assignments, and gym
privileges) and a 6-month restriction on visitation privileges. A third officer, Deanna
Brookhart, accepted the recommendation and disciplined Charles. At a second
disciplinary proceeding in December, Charles was again found guilty of possessing
alcohol. For this violation, he was demoted to C-Grade status for a month.
Charles then brought this § 1983 suit against the officers involved in his
disciplinary proceedings, alleging that they disciplined him without any evidence or
justification, in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. He
also alleged that the defendants’ actions were part of a larger pattern or practice of
disciplining prisoners without any evidence. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 426 U.S.
658 (1978).
A magistrate judge, presiding by consent under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), screened
Charles’s complaint, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and dismissed it. The judge ruled that the
complaint failed to state a claim for relief because the allegations of restrictive privileges
and demotion of status do not affect a liberty interest requiring the protections of the
Due Process Clause. As for the Monell claim, the judge concluded that Charles could not
proceed on a theory of liability because the defendants were employees of the state of
Illinois, not a municipality.

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No. 23-1911 Page 3
On appeal, Charles renews his contention that the prison officials violated his
due-process rights by disciplining him without evidence. (He does not mention the
Monell claim against the prison officials, so we say nothing further about it.) We agree
with the magistrate judge that Charles’s allegations do not implicate a protected liberty
interest. Such an interest exists when the punishment would impose an “atypical and
significant hardship … in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v.
Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Here, the hardships that Charles would experience
because of the disciplinary actions—a demotion in offender grade and restrictions on
visitation privileges—are not atypical and significant. See Hoskins v. Lenear, 395 F.3d 372,
375 (7th Cir. 2005) (no federally protected liberty interest implicated by prisoner’s
demotion to C-grade status (which included a loss in privileges), two months in
segregation, and recommendation for transfer to another facility).
AFFIRMED

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