Neal Price v. Village of Homewood

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted October 15, 2024 *
Decided October 16, 2024
Before
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge
No. 24-1896
NEAL PRICE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
VILLAGE OF HOMEWOOD, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 24 CV 595
Lindsay C. Jenkins,
Judge.
O R D E R
Neal Price sued the Village of Homewood after it issued him a traffic ticket with
a fine that exceeds what he believes is the maximum that Illinois law permits; he
asserted that the Village imposed an excessive fine in violation of his rights under the
Eighth Amendment and federal anti-extortion laws. The district court dismissed the
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. FED. R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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No. 24-1896 Page 2
case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that Price had no Article III
standing. We affirm because Price never paid the traffic ticket, and the Village
eventually dismissed it, so he lacks the necessary injury-in-fact to have standing.
In November 2023, Price drove through Homewood while not wearing his
seatbelt. A Homewood police officer issued him a ticket for violating its local ordinance.
Price disputed the ticket, arguing that the fine was unlawful because 625 ILCS
5/12-603.1 sets a maximum fine of $25, and the ticket was for $50. In the administrative
proceedings, the Village explained to Price that as a home-rule municipality, see 65 ILCS
5/1-2-1, it has independent authority to regulate motor vehicles and set a customized
schedule of fines not to exceed $250, see 625 ILCS 5/11-208.3(a), (b)(10).
Instead of paying the ticket, Price sued the Village and the officers who ticketed
him. He brought a claim in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the $50
fine violated the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause and that having to
interact with police and defend the citation caused him emotional distress. The district
court also understood Price to seek relief for attempted extortion under the Hobbs Act,
18 U.S.C. § 1951, and Illinois tort law.
While the case was pending, the Village dismissed the ticket, relieving Price of
any obligation to pay the fine. The Village then moved to dismiss the complaint,
arguing that, without an obligation to pay the ticket, Price lacked standing to sue, like
the plaintiff who made a similar claim in Simic v. City of Chicago, 851 F.3d 734 (7th Cir.
2017). The district court agreed and dismissed the case for lack of federal jurisdiction.
Price appeals, and we review the decision on standing de novo. Spuhler v. State
Collection Serv., Inc., 983 F.3d 282, 285 (7th Cir. 2020).
On appeal, Price first argues that Simic is no longer good law, so the district court
erred in relying on it. Price seizes on a statement in the opinion that questioned whether
the Excessive Fines Clause applies to local governments; he points out that in Timbs v.
Indiana, 586 U.S. 146, 154 (2019), the Supreme Court said that it does. Thus, Price infers,
Simic cannot control the outcome of his case. But in Simic we said that the plaintiff
lacked standing even if the Excessive Fines Clause applied to a fine for a municipal
ordinance violation. Simic, 851 F.3d at 739. Timbs therefore does nothing to undermine
the rationale for concluding that the Simic plaintiff lacked standing.
And like that plaintiff, Price, too, lacks standing. Federal courts may only
consider “Cases” and “Controversies,” U.S. C ONST., Art. III, § 2, meaning the plaintiff
must have a concrete injury-in-fact, not just a belief that the government is acting

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No. 24-1896 Page 3
illegally. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 340–41 (2016). For the purposes of the
Excessive Fines Clause, this means that a plaintiff suffers an injury only when the
government extracts a payment, not when it merely seeks one. Simic, 851 F.3d at 739
(citing United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 328 (1998)). Price never paid the ticket
and is not obligated to do so. Therefore, as the Village argues, this case is materially
indistinguishable from Simic, in which the plaintiff lacked standing to bring her
excessive-fine claim once she no longer had to pay her ticket for driving while using a
handheld device, in violation of a city ordinance. The fact that Price spent time or
money challenging the ticket and pursuing this claim cannot create standing.
See Dinerstein v. Google, LLC, 73 F.4th 502, 522–23 (7th Cir. 2023); Simic, 851 F.3d at 739.
Price also argues that he has standing to pursue other claims based on the
allegations in his complaint: violations of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, and the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1694(c), based
on the Village’s “attempted extortion.” But the Hobbs Act is a criminal statute that does
not provide any citizen with a private right of act of action, so his standing is beside the
point. Stanard v. Nygren, 658 F.3d 792, 794 (7th Cir. 2011). Further, Price never
mentioned RICO in opposing the motion to dismiss and so has waived this argument.
See Douglas v. Reeves, 964 F.3d 643, 649 (7th Cir. 2020). Waiver (and plausibility) aside, a
civil RICO claim is unavailable here: Price suffered no pecuniary injury and asserts only
that he suffered emotional distress, which is not compensable under the private RICO
provision. Ryder v. Hyles, 27 F.4th 1253, 1257 (7th Cir. 2022). Finally, to the extent that
the district court considered whether Price’s “extortion” allegations pointed to a claim
under Illinois common law, Price does not mention any such claim in his appellate
briefs, so we need not address state law nor the parties’ related arguments about federal
jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship.
AFFIRMED

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