United States of America v. Orlando Larry

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted October 22, 2024 *
Decided October 23, 2024
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
No. 24-1794
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ORLANDO LARRY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Western District of Wisconsin.
No. 13-cr-130-jdp-1
James D. Peterson,
Chief Judge.
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. FED. R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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No. 24-1794 Page 2
O R D E R
Orlando Larry, a federal prisoner, appeals the district court’s denial of his motion
to reduce his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1) and (2). Because the district court did
not abuse its discretion in denying the motion, we affirm.
Nine years into his twenty-year sentence for distributing heroin, Larry moved for
a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). Larry argued that his medical conditions
(dysphagia and gum disease) exacerbated by prison conditions, as well as his changed
family circumstances and rehabilitation, amounted to extraordinary and compelling
reasons for his release. See id. § 3582(c)(1). He also contended that he was eligible for a
sentencing reduction under Part A of Amendment 821 and Amendment 782 to the
Sentencing Guidelines. Id. § 3582(c)(2).
The district court denied Larry’s motion. The court determined, first, that Larry’s
medical conditions were not extraordinary and compelling, given that his ailments were
not life-threatening and had been managed through prison health services. The court
also rejected Larry’s argument that his rehabilitation and his family circumstances (his
child had been placed with a relative) were extraordinary and compelling. As for the
two amendments, the court concluded that Larry’s career-offender status rendered him
ineligible for a reduction under § 3852(c)(2).
On appeal, Larry asserts that the district court inadequately considered his
medical circumstances—particularly the lengthy delays he experienced awaiting
treatment for dysphagia (difficulty swallowing) and gum disease—and the
“tremendous progress” he has made in rehabilitation. But our review of such matters is
deferential, since the discretion to evaluate a combination of circumstances rests
“principally” with the district court. See United States v. Vaughn, 62 F.4th 1071, 1073
(7th Cir. 2023). And here the court appropriately exercised its discretion in concluding
that Larry’s conditions were not extraordinary and compelling. Larry, for instance, did
not identify any evidence to rebut the court’s determination that his non-life-
threatening health conditions were adequately managed at the prison.
Larry also contests the district court’s presumption that he was sentenced as a
career offender, see U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, rather than under the drug-trafficking Guideline,
see U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. (He believes that his offense level under either Guideline was 32.)
Courts may reduce a sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) only if the sentence was
“based on” a subsequently lowered sentencing range and reduction is consistent with

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No. 24-1794 Page 3
the Sentencing Commission’s stated policy concerns. United States v. Stevenson, 749 F.3d
667, 669–70 (7th Cir. 2014).
But Larry misunderstands the basis upon which he was sentenced. The
sentencing court used the career-offender guideline to calculate his guideline range. The
court acknowledged that Larry’s base offense level under § 2D1.1 was 30 according to
the 2013 version of the Guidelines then in effect (the offense level soon thereafter
dropped two levels), but the court concluded that Larry was “not eligible for the [newly
reduced § 2D1.1 offense level] because he’s classified as a career offender.”
(Resentencing Hr’g Tr. of 1/4/2016, at 29.) The court proceeded to explain that Larry’s
total offense level under the career-offender guideline was 34, based on his three prior
Wisconsin felony convictions for child abuse, battery, and manufacturing cocaine.
See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b) (2013). When the career-offender guideline mandates an offense
level higher than the Chapter 2 guideline for the offense conduct, the career-offender
level controls the guidelines range. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b); United States v. Lomax,
712 F.3d 1087, 1089 (7th Cir. 2013).
Because Larry was sentenced as a career offender, the district court properly
concluded that neither amendment would qualify him for relief under § 3582(c). A
motion under § 3582(c) must be based on an action by the Sentencing Commission that
lowers the defendant’s sentencing range. See Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 825–26
(2010). Amendment 782 reduced the base offense level for most drug-trafficking crimes,
but it did not affect the career-offender guideline. See United States v. Robinson, 812 F.3d
1130, 1131 (7th Cir. 2016). Likewise, Amendment 821 lowered the number of status
points added to certain defendants for offenses committed while under another
sentence, U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(e) (2023), but did not stand to benefit Larry, who was
sentenced as a career offender and thus assigned a criminal history category of VI
regardless of status points. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b).
AFFIRMED

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