Robert K. Decker v. J. WADAS, Warden

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted November 7, 2024*
Decided November 13, 2024
Before
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 23-2179
ROBERT K. DECKER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
J. WADAS, Warden,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Indiana, Terre Haute Division.
No. 2:21-cv-00440-JRS-MG
James R. Sweeney II,
Judge.
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 23-2179 Page 2
O R D E R
After bringing a First Amendment claim against the warden of the Federal
Correctional Institution in Terre Haute, Indiana, in his official capacity,1 Robert Decker
was transferred to another prison. Because Decker’s only claim—which challenged the
placement of his wife on his no-contact list—was for injunctive relief, the district court
dismissed the suit as moot. The court also denied Decker’s motion to transfer the case to
the district where he is currently confined and to substitute the new warden. Because
the transfer mooted the claim for injunctive relief, and there were no grounds for a
transfer of venue, we affirm.
While Decker was incarcerated at FCI Terre Haute, an intelligence analyst stated
in an incident report that Decker was sending mail from the prison to aid his wife in the
commission of a crime. In response, the warden issued a memo that prohibited Decker
from communicating with his wife. Decker sued the warden, the intelligence analyst,
and the Chief of the Counter Terrorism Unit of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (Bureau).
After reviewing Decker’s complaint, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district court allowed
him to proceed only on his claim for injunctive relief against the warden in his official
capacity for violating Decker’s right under the First Amendment to communicate with
his wife. The district court invited Decker to identify any other claims it had overlooked
in its screening order, but Decker did not do so.
While Decker’s suit was pending, the Bureau transferred him to the United States
Penitentiary in Marion, Illinois (USP Marion). The warden at FCI Terre Haute moved to
dismiss this suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because Decker’s transfer
rendered his claim moot. Decker did not respond to the motion, but while it was
pending, he moved to transfer the case to the district where USP Marion is located and
to substitute its warden as the defendant. The district court denied Decker’s motion,
dismissed the suit, and advised Decker that he could file a new complaint in the
appropriate district court. This appeal followed.
Decker now argues that his transfer to another prison did not render his claim
moot. Generally, a prisoner’s claim for injunctive relief regarding a specific condition of
a prison becomes moot if he is transferred to another prison. Lehn v. Holmes, 364 F.3d
862, 871 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Higgason v. Farley, 83 F.3d 807, 811 (7th Cir. 1995)). But
1 There were multiple wardens of FCI Terre Haute during this suit, but for
purposes of the First Amendment claim, Decker sued the warden only in his official
capacity; therefore, in our decision, we do not distinguish among the individuals.

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No. 23-2179 Page 3
Decker correctly observes that a transferred prisoner’s claim is not moot if he “seeks
relief from a condition that stems from a system-wide policy” and is then transferred to
a different facility where the same policy applies. Id. at 871–72; see also United States v.
Black, 999 F.3d 1071, 1073–74 (7th Cir. 2021) (federal prisoner). Decker now contends
that the ban on his ability to communicate with his wife is a Bureau-wide policy, and
therefore the dismissal for mootness was improper. Decker did not identify this claim
when he was given the opportunity to do so after screening.
But Decker’s attempt to recast his claim as a challenge to a systemwide policy is
inconsistent with the allegations in his complaint. Decker’s claim for injunctive relief
challenged only the decision of the warden at FCI Terre Haute to block him from
communicating with his wife. Although Decker now says that a nationwide policy
continues to restrict his contact with his wife even after his transfer, he did not mention
such a policy in his complaint, nor did he amend his complaint to add these
allegations—or an appropriate defendant—when invited to do so. He cannot amend his
complaint on appeal to allege that, instead of being a victim of the decision to put his
wife on his no-contact list at FCI Terre Haute, he is also the target of a Bureau policy
forbidding that communication. See Agnew v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 683 F.3d 328,
348 (7th Cir. 2012). Therefore, his claim as he pleaded it was mooted by his transfer to
USP Marion.
Decker also argues that the district court should have transferred his case to the
district court where USP Marion is located (the Southern District of Illinois) instead of
dismissing it. We review a district court’s denial of a motion to transfer venue for abuse
of discretion. Research Automation, Inc. v. Schrader-Bridgeport Int'l, Inc., 626 F.3d 973, 977
(7th Cir. 2010). As relevant here, a district court may transfer a civil case only to a
district “where it might have been brought.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Here, Decker failed
to show that he could have brought this case—which, again, was about his no-contact
list at FCI Terre Haute—anywhere but in the Southern District of Indiana. His desire for
a change of venue arose from facts that occurred after he filed the complaint: his
transfer to Marion and his discovery that he could not contact his wife from there,
either. The court therefore had no authority to transfer the case, unless it first allowed
Decker to amend his complaint to challenge an alleged nationwide policy. (All Decker
had asked, however, was to “substitute” his new warden.) But after Decker’s move, the
case became moot, and without jurisdiction, the district court could not enter any
substantive orders in the case. See Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 90–91 (2013).
AFFIRMED

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