Fikreta Cenanovic v. Hamdard Center for Health and Human Services

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted November 20, 2024 *
Decided November 20, 2024
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
No. 24-1743
FIKRETA CENANOVIC,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
HAMDARD CENTER FOR HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:20-CV-07612
Edmond E. Chang,
Judge.
O R D E R
Fikreta Cenanovic injured her neck and back after falling at work. She was
unable to return to work for several months, and during that time her role was
eliminated due to restructuring. Her employer, Hamdard Center for Health and Human
Services, did not offer her an alternative position and terminated her employment.
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. FED. R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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Cenanovic filed suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12101–12213, and Illinois law, alleging that Hamdard discriminated against her
based on her disability and retaliated against her for claiming workers’ compensation
benefits. The district court granted Hamdard’s motion for summary judgment. Because
Cenanovic cannot show she is a qualified individual under the ADA or that Hamdard
retaliated against her for claiming benefits, we affirm.
We recount the facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of Cenanovic,
the non-moving party. Mahran v. Advocate Christ Med. Ctr., 12 F.4th 708, 712 (7th Cir.
2021). Cenanovic began working for Hamdard in July 2009. Hamdard provides
healthcare and support services to diverse communities in Chicago, and Cenanovic was
hired as a case manager to develop individualized case plans, coordinate support
services, and translate for Hamdard’s Bosnian clients. For nine years, Cenanovic was a
diligent and responsible employee.
On Friday, August 17, 2018, Cenanovic slipped and fell on a wet floor in
Hamdard’s basement resulting in injuries, including neck pain, back pain, headaches,
numbness and tingling in her extremities. Because of her injuries, Cenanovic did not
return to work the following Monday.
A few days later, she submitted the first of what would be a series of doctor’s
notes excusing her from work. On August 28, she filed a workers’ compensation claim
and began leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). Then, on September
4, Cenanovic submitted a second doctor’s note requesting that she be excused from
work through October 6. Her supervisors at Hamdard responded a week later through
their workers’ compensation insurers, Travelers Insurance. Travelers faxed a modified
work form to Cenanovic’s attorney, Jennifer Robinson. The form detailed work that
Hamdard considered “light duty,” but Cenanovic’s physicians never signed the form or
otherwise detailed conditions under which Cenanovic could return to work.
On October 1, a supervisor from Hamdard left a voicemail for Cenanovic asking
if she would return to work the following week as scheduled. Cenanovic responded
with a third doctor’s note asking that she be excused from work for an additional
month—through November 7. In an email to Cenanovic on October 19, Hamdard
supervisors acknowledged receipt of the third doctor’s note, noted that “light duty
work has been offered to [her],” and informed Cenanovic that her FMLA leave would
expire on November 12. That same day, the supervisors at Hamdard emailed
Cenanovic’s case manager at Travelers Insurance to say that if Cenanovic were to

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submit a fourth doctor’s note excusing her beyond the expiration of her protected leave,
her “position will be filled.”
But on November 8, Cenanovic did submit a fourth doctor’s note excusing her
from work through December 12, and she did not return to work when her FMLA leave
expired on November 12. On November 14, a supervisor from Hamdard reached out to
Travelers Insurance and asked if Cenanovic communicated any plans to return to work,
but the case manager had not heard anything. On November 27, Cenanovic submitted a
fifth doctor’s note excusing her from work for an additional four weeks and explaining
that Cenanovic’s work status would be discussed when the four weeks were up.
Three days later, on November 30, Hamdard informed Cenanovic that it was
ending her employment because it was eliminating the case-manager position under a
new organizational structure. Before receiving her termination letter, Cenanovic had
not been told that a reorganization would affect her position. While Hamdard trained
other employees who held Cenanovic’s same position for new roles under the
restructuring plan, Cenanovic had not been at work and had not been cleared by her
doctor to complete the required training for such a transition. (Hamdard admits that, if
Cenanovic had been at work, she could have completed the training and transitioned.)
Six months after Cenanovic was fired, in May 2019, her physician cleared her to return
to work.
Cenanovic filed this suit in December 2020 after receiving a right-to-sue letter
from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Cenanovic alleged that
Hamdard violated the ADA by failing to accommodate her disability and subjecting her
to disparate treatment because of it. She also brought a claim under Illinois common
law alleging that Hamdard fired her in retaliation for accessing her workers’
compensation benefits. See Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353, 357 (Ill. 1978).
The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that Cenanovic was not
a qualified individual under the ADA because her repeated requests for leave
demonstrated that she was not able to work at all. Moreover, Hamdard argued that it
did not terminate Cenanovic because she claimed workers’ compensation benefits.
Rather, she was fired because her position was eliminated during the restructuring and
Cenanovic was unable to return to work to train for a new position. Cenanovic
responded that Hamdard failed to participate in an interactive process that would have
generated a reasonable accommodation enabling her to work, violated her rights under

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the ADA by failing to offer her a new position after the restructuring, and provided a
pretextual reason for firing her.
The district court entered summary judgment for Hamdard, concluding that
Cenanovic’s prolonged leave from work meant that no reasonable jury could find that
she was a qualified individual under the ADA. The court then exercised its discretion to
retain jurisdiction over the state-law retaliation claim, Timm v. Mead Corp., 32 F.3d 273,
276–77 (7th Cir. 1994), and determined that Cenanovic could not show that Hamdard
had retaliated against her.
Cenanovic appeals. We review the summary judgment decision de novo. Stelter
v. Wis. Physicians Serv. Ins. Corp., 950 F.3d 488, 490 (7th Cir. 2020).
Cenanovic argues that the district court erred when it concluded that she was not
a “qualified individual” under the ADA. To establish that she is a “qualified
individual,” Cenanovic must show that she has the requisite skills and experience and
that she is able to perform the essential functions of the job with or without
accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); Nowak v. St. Rita High Sch., 142 F.3d 999, 1002–03
(7th Cir. 1998). Cenanovic argues that she had the requisite skills and training for a new
position under Hamdard’s restructuring plan. Further, she maintains that despite her
injuries, there were functions of her job, such as translation, that she “was and is” able
to perform. She faults Hamdard for failing to engage in an interactive process that
would have identified a reasonable accommodation that allowed her to maintain her
employment.
We see no error. First, Hamdard did engage in the interactive process by faxing
Cenanovic’s lawyer a modified work form, which solicited Cenanovic’s suggestions for
a reasonable accommodation. See Mays v. Principi, 301 F.3d 866, 870 (7th Cir. 2002),
abrogated on other grounds by E.E.O.C. v. United Airlines, Inc., 693 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2012).
Cenanovic argues that this was not an actual offer for modified duty because it was not
accompanied by a physician’s opinion detailing the work Cenanovic could perform. But
it was Cenanovic’s doctors who failed to sign off on the form or otherwise respond,
making her responsible for the breakdown in the interactive process. See Beck v. Univ. of
Wis. Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130, 1135 (7th Cir. 1996). Cenanovic insists that she had no
knowledge of the form, but this contention is unavailing. She does not dispute that her
attorney received the form and, at any rate, Cenanovic was notified of the form by an
email from her supervisor at Hamdard.

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Even if Hamdard had not attempted to engage Cenanovic at all, a failure to
engage in the interactive process alone is not a basis for liability. McAllister v. Innovation
Ventures, LLC, 983 F.3d 963, 972 (7th Cir. 2020). It is actionable only if it prevents the
identification of an appropriate accommodation for a qualified individual. Id. Being a
qualified individual is an element of both a failure-to-accommodate and disparate-
treatment claim under the ADA. Sieberns v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 125 F.3d 1019, 1022
(7th Cir. 1997). Before Cenanovic was fired, her doctor repeatedly excused her from all
work for a period exceeding four months. By the time her doctor mentioned that
Cenanovic could, after another month of leave, engage in conversations about a
potential (not promised) return, Cenanovic’s FMLA leave had expired. And Cenanovic
was not cleared to perform even sedentary work for several months after that note was
submitted. An individual who requires a long-term leave of absence like the one here is
not a qualified individual under the ADA. See Severson v. Heartland Woodcraft, Inc.,
872 F.3d 476, 481 (7th Cir. 2017); Byrne v. Avon Prods., Inc., 328 F.3d 379, 381 (7th Cir.
2003). Although Cenanovic had the requisite skills to be trained for a new position at
Hamdard, her inability to work for a prolonged period removed her from the class of
“qualified individuals” protected by the ADA. McAllister, 983 F.3d at 971.
Cenanovic next argues that the district court erred in entering summary
judgment on her claim under Illinois law that Hamdard retaliated against her for filing
a workers’ compensation claim. We disagree.
Under Illinois law, to prevail on a claim of retaliatory-discharge, Cenanovic
would need to present some affirmative evidence from which a reasonable jury could
conclude that that her filing of a workers’ compensation claim was the cause of her
termination from Hamdard. Hillmann v. City of Chicago, 834 F.3d 787, 794 (7th Cir. 2016);
see also Gacek v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 614 F.3d 298, 303 (7th Cir. 2010). Illinois has rejected
the use of the burden-shifting framework in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 802–03 (1973), for evaluating claims of retaliatory discharge. Gacek, 614 F.3d at 300;
see also Clemons v. Mech. Devices Co., 704 N.E.2d 403, 407–08 (Ill. 1998). Indeed, without
some evidence that her termination was motivated by the filing of her workers’
compensation claim, Cenanovic’s claim cannot survive summary judgment. See Reid v.
Neighborhood Assistance Corp. of Am., 749 F.3d 581, 587 (7th Cir. 2014). Moreover, the
causation element is not met where the employer offers a valid, nonpretextual reason
for the termination. Clemons, 704 N.E.2d at 406.
Here, Cenanovic provided no evidence from which a reasonable jury could
conclude that Hamdard fired her because she filed a workers’ compensation claim.

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Cenanovic filed her claim three months before she was terminated. In the intervening
months, Cenanovic could not perform any work. And Hamdard offered a valid,
nonpretextual reason for firing Cenanovic—it eliminated all case-manager positions at
the company, including the position Cenanovic held. Although Hamdard trained other
case managers to take on new roles within the company, Cenanovic’s absence from
work prevented her participating in any training. Hamdard’s reasons for firing
Cenanovic have not shifted. Under these circumstances, an inference of retaliatory
intent is not reasonable.
AFFIRMED

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