United States of America v. Timothy Endre

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued November 19, 2024
Decided November 26, 2024
Before
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
No. 23-3255
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
TIMOTHY ENDRE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
No. 1:14-cr-00108
Sarah Evans Barker,
Judge.
O R D E R
Timothy Endre, who was convicted of enticing a minor through internet
communications, appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for compassionate
release. The district court denied his motion based on its analysis of the sentencing
factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Because the court adequately justified its decision, we
affirm.
In late 2013, law enforcement officers investigated sexually explicit
communications between Endre, then thirty-three years old, and a thirteen-year-old
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 23-3255 Page 2
girl. The investigation led to the discovery of sexually explicit images of the girl. After
receiving reports that the girl had run away, law enforcement soon found her in a motel
room with Endre. She told officers that she had sexual contact with Endre and that
Endre had taken photographs of her.
In 2014, Endre pleaded guilty to enticing or coercing a minor through internet
communications, 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). The court sentenced Endre to 212 months’
imprisonment and ten years of supervised release, and ordered him to pay $2,500 in
restitution.
In 2022, Endre moved for compassionate release, citing as extraordinary and
compelling factors a sexual assault he had experienced in prison, his mother’s poor
health and need for his care, and his rehabilitation. Regarding the § 3553(a) sentencing
factors, he argued that deterrence had been provided by the lengthy time he spent in
prison and that the public would be protected because of his rehabilitation in prison
and the court’s oversight throughout his supervised release. As evidence of
rehabilitation, he cited his completion of his GED and other programming.
The district court denied the motion. The court assumed that Endre could supply
at least one extraordinary and compelling reason for release but concluded that the
§ 3553(a) factors did not warrant a sentence reduction. The court explained that Endre’s
educational accomplishments and positive disciplinary record in prison were
outweighed by the seriousness of his crime; his significant criminal history, including
many felony convictions; and the substantial time remaining on his sentence. Therefore,
the court concluded that releasing Endre early would not reflect the seriousness of his
offense, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, afford adequate
deterrence, or protect the public—all § 3553(a) factors.
Endre devotes his opening brief to challenging an issue that is irrelevant for this
appeal—whether he presented extraordinary and compelling reasons for release. This is
an issue that the district court, for purposes of its analysis, had “assume[d] without
deciding.” In his reply brief, he clarifies that he means to argue that the district court—
by basing its decision on the § 3553(a) factors—did not follow the proper sequence of
analysis for a § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion, as this court set forth in United States v. Thacker,
4 F.4th 569, 576 (7th Cir. 2021). He highlights the following language in Thacker as
specifying the “best” sequence for § 3582(c)(1)(A)’s two-step analysis:
The proper analysis when evaluating a motion for a discretionary
sentencing reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A) based on “extraordinary and

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No. 23-3255 Page 3
compelling” reasons proceeds in two steps. At step one, the prisoner must
identify an “extraordinary and compelling” reason warranting a sentence
reduction … . Upon a finding that the prisoner has supplied such a reason,
the second step of the analysis requires the district court, in exercising the
discretion conferred by the compassionate release statute, to consider any
applicable sentencing factors in § 3553(a) as part of determining what
sentencing reduction to award the prisoner.
Thacker, 4 F.4th at 576. Endre then quotes our advice in United States v. Ugbah, 4 F.4th
595, 597 (7th Cir. 2021), that it is “best to proceed in that order, which reflects the
statutory structure.”
Endre reads too much into Thacker’s language. Though two steps are involved
when deciding a motion for compassionate release, nothing in the quoted passage
precludes district courts from proceeding directly to the test’s second step. Indeed, we
and our sister circuits routinely have upheld the denial of a § 3582(c) motion based only
on an analysis of the § 3553(a) factors. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 65 F.4th 343, 349
(7th Cir. 2023) (describing analysis of the § 3553(a) factors as an “independent basis” on
which to resolve a motion for compassionate release); United States v. Sarno, 37 F.4th
1249, 1255–56 (7th Cir. 2022); Ugbah, 4 F.4th at 597 (“One good reason for denying a
motion such as Ugbah’s is enough; more would be otiose.”); see also United States v.
Keitt, 21 F.4th 67, 73 (2d Cir. 2021) (“We . . . hold that when a district court denies a
defendant's motion under § 3582(c)(1)(A) in sole reliance on the applicable § 3553(a)
sentencing factors, it need not determine whether the defendant has shown
extraordinary and compelling reasons that might (in other circumstances) justify a
sentence reduction.”); United States v. Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234, 1238 (11th Cir. 2021) (siding
with circuits that have addressed the issue and “uniformly held that a district court may
assume the existence of ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’ while deciding the
compassionate-release motion before it based on the § 3553(a) factors.”).
Endre addresses the court’s analysis of the § 3553(a) factors only in his reply
brief. There, he objects first to the lack of discussion of his rehabilitation. But even if we
set aside Endre’s forfeiture of this objection (an objection he did not raise first in his
opening brief), see Motorola Solutions, Inc. v. Hytera Communications Corporation Ltd., 108
F.4th 458, 492–93 (7th Cir. 2024), the district court’s analysis here was largely
appropriate. The court justified its decision by rightly pointing out the severity of
Endre’s offense and his criminal history, which included another crime involving a
minor.

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In his reply brief, Endre also challenges the court’s § 3553(a) analysis as flawed
because it misstated his release date as 2037 rather than 2028. The court did misstate his
release date, although it correctly identified the release date earlier in its ruling. But by
not raising an argument based on this misstatement (or even noting the misstatement)
in his opening brief, Endre forfeited this argument, too. See id. Forfeiture triggers plain
error review, and “[u]nder plain-error review, reversing the district court is appropriate
only if we find: (1) an error, (2) that is clear or obvious under the law, (3) affects a
prisoner’s substantial rights, and (4) seriously impugns the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.” Sarno, 37 F.4th at 1254–55. Even if the court’s
misstatement of Endre’s release date were a clear or obvious error, there is no
reasonable probability that the misstatement affected Endre’s substantial rights. Id. at
1255. The court offered other appropriate reasons to deny Endre’s motion—and only
one reason would suffice. Id. at 1256.
AFFIRM

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