Logan Dyjak v. Stacey Horstman

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted December 2, 2024*
Decided December 3, 2024
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge
No. 24-1675
LOGAN DYJAK,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
STACEY HORSTMAN, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 21-3151-JES
James E. Shadid,
Judge.
O R D E R
Logan Dyjak,1 a civil detainee at the McFarland Mental Health Center, sued
employees of the facility for due process violations in connection with limitations on
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
1 As in Dyjak’s previous appeals, we continue to use the they/them pronouns
that Dyjak uses.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 24-1675 Page 2
access to certain facility privileges. The district court granted summary judgment for the
defendants because Dyjak could not link any alleged deprivation to the defendants’
actions. We affirm.
We recount the undisputed facts, drawing reasonable inferences in Dyjak’s favor.
Rakes v. Roederer, 117 F.4th 968, 973 (7th Cir. 2024). Dyjak is civilly detained at
McFarland, having been found not guilty of murder by reason of insanity. In mid-2018,
Dyjak was diagnosed by a staff psychiatrist as having schizoaffective disorder “in
sustained remission.” On August 15, 2019, Dyjak was evaluated by another staff
psychiatrist, Stacy Horstman, who prepared a comprehensive report six days later that
modified Dyjak’s diagnosis to schizoaffective disorder “in partial remission.”2
Horstman’s report was relied upon by McFarland’s clinical director, Jo-Ann Lynn, who
updated the state court judge on Dyjak’s psychiatric needs and McFarland’s proposed
treatment plan. Dyjak believes that Horstman and Lynn “arbitrarily altered” the
diagnosis, which led the hospital to limit Dyjak’s access to computers, educational
programs, and the facility’s café.
Patients at McFarland can be assigned one of several privilege levels that
determines their freedom of movement. While a court order is required for the more
expansive privilege levels, hospital staff may independently assign others, including
“staff supervision,” which permits patients to visit non-forensic or secure areas. Dyjak
has remained at the staff supervision level since September 2018, even after the
modified diagnosis. Horstman testified that Dyjak’s diagnosis did not affect the
privilege level, but Dyjak asserts that their privileges were tightened around the time of
COVID-19’s outbreak, when staff restricted their diet, access to gym facilities, and
access to educational opportunities.
In July 2021, Dyjak sued Horstman and Lynn, along with hospital administrator
Lana Miller, for violations under the Fourteenth Amendment. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Dyjak asserted, first, that Horstman and Lynn acted with deliberate indifference when
they arbitrarily modified Dyjak’s diagnosis. Dyjak also asserted that Miller failed to
exercise professional judgment when she conditioned the restriction of privileges upon
a “blanket administrative policy.”
2 This diagnosis could be viewed as inconsistent with the defendants’ statement
in their answer “that on August 16, 2019, Defendant Horstman conducted a mental
health evaluation and reaffirmed Plaintiff’s original diagnosis of schizoaffective order in
remission.”

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No. 24-1675 Page 3
After the defendants moved for summary judgment, Dyjak sought extensions for
the time to respond. The court granted Dyjak three extensions, warning in its third
order that no further extensions would be granted. After Dyjak made their sixth request
for an extension, the court denied the request and stated that it would rule on the
defendants’ motion without Dyjak’s response.
Dyjak moved to reconsider that order, attributing the delay to (1) the court’s
earlier directive to prioritize responding in a different case, and (2) conditions of
confinement that made a timely response more difficult. Dyjak separately moved under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) for the court to postpone ruling on the summary
judgment motion until they could present additional facts in opposition. The court
denied both motions, noting the prior extensions given.
The court then granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
Regarding Dyjak’s claim about the modified diagnosis, the court found that the
evidence did not show that the defendants provided Dyjak with mental health
treatment that was objectively unreasonable—the standard for a pretrial detainee’s
claim of inadequate medical care. See McCann v. Ogle County, 909 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir.
2018). As for the claim about restricted privileges, the court concluded that the
defendants’ failure to give Dyjak access to non-secure settings did not constitute an
atypical and significant hardship that would deprive Dyjak of a state-created liberty
interest. See Thielman v. Leean, 282 F.3d 478, 484 (7th Cir. 2002).
Dyjak then moved to alter the judgment. Dyjak argued that the court violated
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f)(2) by granting summary judgment on grounds not
raised by the defendants. Dyjak maintained that the defendants’ summary judgment
motion treated his medical-care claim as grounded in procedural due process, while the
court granted summary judgment under an objective-reasonableness standard. In
Dyjak’s view, the court needed to provide notice of its intent to grant the motion on this
alternative ground, and time to respond. F ED. R. C IV. P. 56(f)(2).
The court denied this motion, too. The court explained that it based its ruling on
grounds that Dyjak had raised—the alleged disregard of Dyjak’s mental-health needs
upon the diagnosis being changed from “in remission” to “in partial remission.” The
court also pointed out that the defendants had raised the issue when they argued in
their motion that there was no evidence that the diagnosis was erroneous. Regardless,
the court added, Dyjak—having not responded to the summary judgment motion or
contested defendants’ evidence—could not show prejudice from not having an
opportunity to respond to the court’s analysis.

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On appeal, Dyjak challenges the court’s decision to enter summary judgment
without a response, and revives the arguments made while seeking
reconsideration—e.g., the difficult circumstances that pro se litigants face while
confined. But while a court should consider all relevant circumstances surrounding a
party’s failure to respond to a motion, the determination whether to excuse a missed
deadline is left to the district court’s discretion. See Miller v. Chicago Transit Auth.,
20 F.4th 1148, 1153. (7th Cir. 2021). Given that the court had granted Dyjak three
extensions and warned Dyjak that no further extension would be forthcoming, we see
no abuse of discretion to deny a fourth.
Dyjak also renews the argument that the district court failed to provide adequate
notice before granting summary judgment on grounds not raised by the defendants. But
a court need not provide additional notice under Rule 56(f) when the parties are
aware—as here—of the factual issues the court intends to rule on. See Haley v. Kolbe &
Kolbe Millwork Co., 863 F.3d 600, 613 (7th Cir. 2017); Mulvania v. Sheriff of Rock Island
County, 850 F.3d 849, 854 (7th Cir. 2017). The defendants apprised Dyjak of the relevant
facts that supported their argument for summary judgment—the psychiatric evaluation
reports and the defendants’ declarations—so Dyjak cannot claim to be surprised by the
outcome.
Dyjak next raises a procedural challenge to the court’s basis for entering
summary judgment on the medical-needs claim. Invoking the principal pleadings,
Dyjak argues that the court should have held the defendants to the admission in their
answer that “on August 16, 2019, Defendant Horstman conducted a mental health
evaluation and reaffirmed Plaintiff’s original diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder in
remission.” But while a concession in an answer is a binding judicial admission, see
Tibbs v. Admin. Off. of the Ill. Courts., 860 F.3d 502, 508 n.1 (7th Cir. 2017), Horstman
prepared a report several days later, on August 21, in which she diagnosed Dyjak’s
remission as only partial. The district court was entitled to consider this later report,
and Dyjak has not offered any evidence to refute Horstman’s modified diagnosis or
show that it was objectively unreasonable.
As for the second claim regarding the restriction on privileges, Dyjak appears to
argue that the district court applied an incorrect standard in assessing a civilly confined
person’s fundamental liberty interest. The court applied the “atypical and significant
hardship” standard used in Thielman, 282 F.3d at 484 (citing Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S.
472 (1995)), but Dyjak argues the applicable standard should be one of professional
judgment, as set forth in Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322–23 (1982). Under

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Youngberg, a civil detainee is entitled to the exercise of professional judgment when the
state subjects him to confinement. Id. Dyjak believes that Miller’s conduct did not satisfy
this standard because she (1) failed to petition the court to grant Dyjak greater
privileges and (2) adopted blanket policies limiting Dyjak’s privileges.
But even under Youngberg, Dyjak could not have prevailed. Dyjak cites no
authority to suggest that the Constitution required Miller to present such a petition, let
alone introduce any evidence that Miller adopted a blanket policy.
We have considered Dyjak’s remaining arguments, and none has merit.
AFFIRMED

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